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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the context-dependence of the quantity words few and
many and the interaction between their linguistic meaning and rich statistical world
knowledge. Concretely, one theory by Fernando and Kamp (1996) is explored which
makes precise predictions about how contextual information might be integrated in
the semantics. This theory assumes that the “surprise reading” of few and many
expresses that a number or a proportion is lower or higher than expected. Context-
dependent prior expectations about a relevant quantity are formalized as probability
distributions PE over cardinalities and the cardinalities which count as few or many
are determined by applying fixed, context-independent thresholds θfew and θmany
to the cumulative density mass of these distributions. In other words, few and
many comprise a stable core meaning, which explains why speakers and listeners
manage to successfully communicate with these context-dependent expressions and
how children can acquire proficiency in their use.
Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) theory is tested by couching it in a probabilistic
model of language use in which the threshold parameters are treated as latent pa-
rameters. Their values cannot be directly observed, but are estimated based on
experimental data by applying Bayesian inference. In several series of experiments
prior expectations are elicited and the production and interpretation of sentences
with few and many are measured. In particular, the cardinal and the proportional
reading of the quantity words is examined as well as the effect of overtly marking
surprise with adverbs like surprisingly or compared to constructions.
Keywords: context-dependence, few, many, prior expectations, computational mod-
eling, Bayesian inference
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation untersucht die Kontextabha¨ngigkeit der Wo¨rter few (‘wenige’)
und many (‘viele’) und die Interaktion zwischen deren linguistischer Bedeutung
und statistischem Weltwissen. Konkret wird eine Theorie von Fernando und Kamp
(1996) vorgestellt, die pra¨zise Vorhersagen daru¨ber macht, wie die Informationen
aus dem Kontexts in the Semantik integriert werden. Diese Theorie nimmt an, dass
die sogenannte “U¨berraschungs-Lesart” von few und many ausdru¨ckt, dass eine
Zahl oder Proportion kleiner oder gro¨ßer ist als erwartet. A priori Erwartungen im
jeweiligen Kontext werden als Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilungen PE u¨ber natu¨rliche
Zahlen oder Proportionen formalisiert. Welche Zahlenwerte als few oder many gel-
ten, wird bestimmt indem feste, kontextunabha¨ngige Grenzwerte θfew and θmany auf
die kumulierten Wahrscheinlichkeiten dieser Verteilungen angewendet werden. Mit
anderen Worten, few und many enthalten eine feste Kernbedeutung, die erkla¨ren
kann, warum Sprecher und Ho¨rer so erfolgreich mit diesen kontextabha¨ngigen Be-
griffen kommunizieren und wie Kinder ihre Verwendung erlernen ko¨nnen.
Fernando und Kamps (1996) Theorie wird getestet indem sie in ein probabilistis-
ches Modell u¨bersetzt wird, welches die Grenzwerte als latente Parameter betrachtet.
Deren Werte ko¨nnen nicht gemessen werden, sondern sie werden mit Bayesianischer
Inferenz basierend auf experimentellen Daten gescha¨tzt. In mehreren Versuchsrei-
hen werden a priori Wahrscheinlichkeiten im jeweiligen Kontext und die Produktion
und Interpretation von Sa¨tzen mit few und many gemessen. Insbesondere wird die
kardinale und die proportionale Lesart betrachtet, sowie die Modifikation von few
und many mit surprisingly (‘u¨berraschend’) und compared to (‘im Vergleich zu’)
Konstruktionen, die die “U¨berraschungs-Lesart” explizit markieren.
Schlagwo¨rter: Kontext-Abha¨ngigkeit, few, many, a priori Erwartungen, probabilis-
tische Modelle, Bayesianische Inferenz
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Context-Dependence of few and many
Context-dependence is a key feature of the quantity words few and many. How
many counts as “many” and how few counts as “few” can vary extremely across
contexts. This is why “describing context-dependence can (needless to say) be a
tricky matter” (Fernando and Kamp, 1996, 64). This is exemplified in the following
sentences:
(1) a. Ben has many siblings.
b. Chris’ team scored many points in the last basketball match.
(2) a. Melanie owns few pairs of shoes.
b. Few people watched the Olympics this time.
The number of Ben’s siblings needed to make (1a) true is much lower than the
number of points that are needed to make (1b) true. Similarly, the number of shoes
Melanie needs to own for (2a) to be true is much lower than the number of viewers in
(2b). Indeed, precise truth conditions seem to be impossible to determine. For this
reason, it is a challenge for linguistic theory to explain how speakers and listeners
successfully communicate with expressions so context-dependent and vague and how
children can acquire proficiency in their use.
In this respect few and many share the properties of gradable adjectives like
short and tall or cheap and expensive, which can be equally context-dependent in
their positive form (Kennedy and McNally, 2005; von Stechow, 2009). What sets the
quantity words apart from gradable adjectives, however, is their syntactic flexibility
and broad distribution. They can occur in positions that are usually occupied by
quantifiers (few/many people like punting), adjectives (the few/many bars were
crowded), or numerals (many/few more punts participated), as pointed out by Solt
(2009, 2015). Their occurrence in positions that could be called quantificational,
predicative, attributive, and differential is exemplified below.
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(3) a. quantificational: Many/few people in Tu¨bingen like to go punting on
the Neckar.
b. predicative: Josh’s friends are many/few.
c. attributive: The many/few bars in Tu¨bingen were crowded on Satur-
day night.
d. differential: Many more/few more/many fewer than 60 punts partici-
pated in the last punting race on the Neckar.
Another contrast between quantity words and gradable adjectives is that few and
many exhibit several readings. The two most prominent readings are the cardinal
and the proportional reading.
(4) Cardinal reading
a. Joe ate many burgers.
b. Sue has many friends on Facebook.
c. Andy drank few cups of coffee last week.
d. There are few Trump supporters in California.
(5) Proportional reading
a. Many women out of the 1000 participants who tested the new contra-
ceptive method became pregnant.
b. Many of Mr. Smith’s students passed the exam.
c. Few people voted for Trump in D.C. last year.
d. Few of Mr. Smith’s students passed the exam.
The cardinal reading of few and many in (1), (2) and (4) describes a number as
small or large whereas their proportional reading in (5) expresses that a proportion
is small or large (Partee, 1989).
Both readings are equally context-dependent. The examples in (4) and (5) show
that very different numbers or proportions can count as few or many depending on
the context. (4a) is probably true if Joe ate more than four burgers, whereas Sue
in (4b) needs to have more than, say, 700 friends on Facebook to make the sentence
true. For cardinal few, (4d) can be truthfully uttered even though there are several
million Trump supporters in California, but (4c) is only true if Andy drank less
than, say, five cups of coffee last week. Similarly, the proportional reading of many
in (5a) can describe a proportion as little as five per cent as being large, but in (5b)
probably more than half of the students need to have passed the exam to count as
many. Sentence (5c), on the other hand, is true for a proportion of, say, less than
twenty per cent, but in a sentence like (5d) proportions up to sixty or seventy per
cent could count as few.
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Examples (5b) and (5d) show few and many ’s context-dependence particularly
clearly since - in adequate contexts - the same proportion can truthfully be described
as both few and many.
(6) a. Context: Mr. Smith’s class had to take a very difficult exam, which
usually only a very small percentage of participants passes. Contrary to
his expectations, 60% of his students passed the exam.
b. Statement: Many of Mr.Smith’s students passed the exam.
 More students of Mr. Smith’s than expected passed the exam.
(7) a. Context: Mr. Smith’s students had to take an exam, for which they
were very well prepared. Mr. Smith had expected all of his students to
pass, but only 60% of the students passed the exam.
b. Statement: Few of Mr.Smith’s students passed the exam.
 Fewer students of Mr. Smith’s than expected passed the exam.
In both contexts in (6a) and (7a), the proportion of students who passed the exam
is 60%. But the statement in (6b) describes this proportion as many whereas in
(7b) it is described as few.
As pointed out above, an unsolved puzzle of the field of linguistics and cogni-
tive science is how exactly context-dependent expressions receive their meaning in
context. Numerous attempts have been made at assigning few and many a fixed
semantic contribution, but, given their extreme vagueness and context-dependence,
this undertaking turns out to be very difficult. At this point, semantic accounts
tend to shift the load of determining the quantity words’ concrete denotation to
pragmatic theories and have some notion of context fix of what counts as “few” or
“many” (more on this in the discussion of the semantics of positive form adjectives
and quantity words in Section 2.2). In this dissertation we investigate an analysis of
few and many that goes beyond simply assuming that a context simply outputs few
and many ’s meaning and makes more concrete predictions about the integration of
the context.
The examples in (6) and (7) bring to light a concept that we assume to be a
key factor determining the use of the quantity words few and many : quantitative
expectations about events or cardinalities in the context. Following Clark (1991)
and Fernando and Kamp (1996), we take it that the so-called “surprise reading”
of few and many expresses that a cardinality or proportion is lower or higher than
expected in the respective context. The idea of employing these prior expectations
in the semantics of few and many seems particularly promising because it describes
their relationship with the context using the mathematical concept of probabilities.
Probabilities apply well to describe subtle differences in judgments and noisy em-
pirical data, and have turned out to be fruitful in other domains of cognitive science
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as well. Probabilistic models can formalize the underlying processes of coming to
understand the world, for example in learning concepts, acquiring language, and
grasping causal relations (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007; Frank et al., 2009; Tenenbaum
et al., 2011). Moreover, neural nets are used in deep learning algorithms, a branch
of machine learning and artificial intelligence research, to simulate the human brain
(Schulz, 2017). But also in semantics and pragmatics the role of probabilities is at-
tracting increasing attention (see Goodman and Lassiter (2015), Franke and Ja¨ger
(2016) and references therein), as will become evident in the course of this disserta-
tion.
One theory that makes concrete predictions about how the denotation of few and
many ’s surprise reading is determined in the context was first suggested by Clark
(1991) and formally worked out by Fernando and Kamp (1996). These authors try
to identify a stable core meaning of these expressions: a complex yet systematic
function from contexts to precise denotations. According to this approach, a sen-
tence of the form “Many As are B” is true if the actual number of n = |A ∩B | is
surprisingly high. More precisely, “Many As are B” is true if the actual cardinality
n = |A ∩B | exceeds a fixed threshold θmany on a measure of surprise, which is de-
rived from a contextually supplied measure of a priori expectations PE about likely
values of n. Even with a fixed and contextually-stable threshold for what counts as
sufficiently surprising, whether a certain n counts as surprisingly high can still vary
dramatically for numbers of siblings and points scored during a basketball match,
because we may have dramatically different prior expectations PE. This provides
an explanation for the fact that context-dependence and vagueness can be possible
despite a systematic, calculable and learnable stable core meaning.
While such a surprise-based semantics may seem like an appealing idea, it also
raises methodological concerns. It becomes exceedingly hard to test the predictions
of such an account because the precise nature of what counts as surprising is hard
to assess based on solitary introspection. In this thesis, we set out to test Clark’s
(1991) and Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) theory with modern methodology. Since
neither prior expectations nor threshold values can be estimated based on intro-
spection alone, data about the population’s statistical world knowledge are elicited
experimentally and the production and interpretation behavior of a large group of
subjects will be measured. Based on these data, we seek to demonstrate how data-
driven computational modeling can be a helpful addition to the linguist’s toolbox,
exactly where solitary introspection fails and the theory under scrutiny concerns
latent parameters that are not directly observable, like a threshold θmany on a mea-
sure of surprise. By Bayesian inference, we will estimate plausible values of latent
parameters in probabilistic models. We will show how the semantic theories we want
to test can be couched in a computational model and explore whether they make the
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correct predictions to explain the context-dependence of few and many in its various
uses. In particular, we make use of the models to investigate the cardinal and the
proportional reading. Furthermore, we examine whether speaker behavior changes
when prior expectations are overtly marked, either by the adverb surprisingly or by
a compared to construction.
As well as learning about the production and interpretation of sentences with
few and many, their semantics and in particular their compositional analysis will
be discussed in detail. Based on Romero (2015, 2017), we discuss how a sentence’s
comparison class can be derived from the available semantic and pragmatic compo-
nents.
1.2 The Structure of this Dissertation
The focus of this dissertation is on three series of experiments that were conducted
to investigate the context-dependence of few and many and to test Fernando and
Kamp’s (1996) semantic theory. Before we delve into the details, however, an
overview of previous linguistic and psychological work as well as an introduction
into the applied methodology is provided. The structure of this dissertation is as
follows.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the many readings of few and many and dis-
cusses factors governing their availability. It presents three semantic analyses which
reflect the variety of positions the quantity words can occupy, as exemplified in (3):
few and many are treated on par with quantifiers (Romero, 2015), with adjectives
(Romero, 2017) or as degree modifiers (Solt, 2009). After a brief discussion of the
differences between few and many, the surprise-based semantics by Fernando and
Kamp (1996) is introduced, which is to be tested experimentally in the following
chapters. Before doing so, we present an attempt to derive the quantity words’ “sur-
prise reading” and comparison classes compositionally and propose an intensional
version of the positive degree operator POS. To do so, we are building on Romero’s
(2015) semantic analysis and Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) probabilistic approach
to few and many ’s “surprise reading”.
Chapter 3 follows up on the linguistic background by presenting relevant psycho-
logical studies and experiments on the context-dependence of many and few. Clark
(1991) proposes the use of probabilities to describe language. He suggests represent-
ing prior expectations as a probability distribution on which few and many impose a
threshold. An extensive series of experimental studies was produced by Moxey and
Sanford (2000) and Sanford et al. (1994), which also identifies prior expectations of
the contexts as a factor which influences the use and interpretation of few and many.
Finally, Newstead and Coventry (2000) and Coventry et al. (2005, 2010) investigate
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the influence of visual cues on the use of few and many. One of their experiments
will be replicated in Chapter 5 to investigate the role of prior expectations in a
visually displayed context.
In Chapter 4, relevant terminology and concepts of computational modeling and
Bayesian inference will be explained. In the subsequent chapters, we demonstrate
how Bayesian inference in connection with data-driven computational modeling can
be a helpful tool for learning about theories which are hard to grasp by solitary
introspection and which concern latent parameters that are not directly observable.
Chapter 5 focuses on the cardinal reading of few and many. It sets off with a
replication of Newstead and Coventry’s (2000) experiment to investigate the influ-
ence of various visual factors on the use of the quantity words. We test whether
these effects of visual presentation can be reduced to an explanation in terms of ex-
pectations. Next, we show how Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) theory can be couched
in a probabilistic, computational model. This demonstration builds on the proceed-
ings paper by Scho¨ller and Franke (2015) and was elaborated by Scho¨ller and Franke
(2017a). In three experiments we gather data on participants’ prior expectations and
their production and interpretation behavior of few and many in 14 contexts. This
series of experiments was also presented in Scho¨ller and Franke (2016) and Scho¨ller
and Franke (2017a). We demonstrate how the computational model and Bayesian
inference can be applied to test the theory, which assumes as the semantic meaning
of few and many a fixed pair of threshold values on a distribution representing prior
expectations of the context.
Chapter 6 follows up on Chapter 5 by investigating constructions which mark
the “cardinal surprise reading” of few and many overtly. We explore the role of
the adverb surprisingly in combination with the quantity words and test whether
it functions as an intensifier or just marks that surprise is expressed. Surprisingly
is compared with the intensifying adverb incredibly and a compared to construction
which openly addresses expectations. A judgment task is conducted and a variant of
the computational model from the previous chapter is used to analyze the data. This
chapter builds on a proceedings paper by Scho¨ller and Franke (2017b). Additionally,
we present an interpretation task as a follow-up experiment and complement the
analysis of the data with further Bayesian methods.
The proportional reading of few and many is the subject of Chapter 7. An inter-
pretation experiment tests whether proportional few and many can be accounted for
by a fixed, context-independent threshold on proportions and finds that this is not
the case. The proportional reading is influenced by expectations of the context, too.
These findings go back to a proceedings paper by Scho¨ller and Franke (2016). To
further investigate this reading, a series of experiments in both real-world and very
abstract contexts is conducted to collect information on prior expectations about
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cardinalities and production data. We find that the proportional reading can both
express that a proportion is numerically small or large or surprisingly small or large.
We propose a computational model which is an extension of the model incorporating
Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) theory from Chapter 5. This model assumes that the
contextual contribution required for the proportional reading is two-fold. The first
is an uninformed, uniform belief about proportions and the second are informed
prior expectations about likely proportions based on world knowledge. We propose
a linear combination model which incorporates the assumption that the amount of
world knowledge employed depends on its salience in the context. We test again
whether a fixed pair of threshold values on prior expectations can explain the use
of few and many.
In the final chapter, Chapter 8, the dissertation’s main findings are summarized
and we will discuss what they contribute to a theory of context-dependence. We
conclude with open questions and interesting issues for future work.
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Chapter 2
Linguistic Background of Quantity
Words
The goal of this thesis is to explain the interaction between context-dependent ex-
pressions like few and many and the context. Before we start delving into the
details of this undertaking, it is wise to get an overview of the general properties
of the object of interest. A vast body of semantic literature on few and many has
evolved which describes and explores the available readings of sentences with few
and many, their semantic properties as well as their context-dependence. Building
on the findings of previous research is inevitable because we can only learn about
the pragmatics of few and many, how they are produced and interpreted across
contexts, when we understand their semantic and syntactic properties.
Section 2.1 provides an overview of the many readings which a sentence with
few and many can express and discusses the factors which allow or prevent their
availability. The lexical semantics of few and many is discussed in Section 2.2.
We will see that there is controversy in the literature about how to classify them.
They have been claimed to share the semantic properties of quantifiers (Westerst˚ahl,
1985; Partee, 1989), parametrized determiners (Hackl, 2000; Romero, 2015) and
adjectives (Hackl, 2009; Dobrovie-Sorin, 2013) and also to be semantically empty
gradable quantifiers over degrees (Rett, 2008; Solt, 2009). To avoid terminology
which commits to one of the theories, few and many will be labeled “quantity
words” from now on (cf. Rett, 2008). Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 introduce
the approaches we consider to be most insightful, show how truth-conditions can
be derived compositionally in the respective semantics and discuss strengths and
weaknesses of each theory. Section 2.2.4 describes characteristics of few.
One issue that is left out in the cold by all of the competing semantic analyses
from Section 2.2 is how exactly few and many interact with the context. Fernando
and Kamp (1996) address this open issue and spell out a semantic theory which
makes the truth conditions of few and many dependent on prior expectations. Their
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approach is presented in Section 2.3 and will be tested experimentally and extended
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. A related open issue of the semantics of context-dependent
expressions is how to derive their context-dependence, more concretely their com-
parison classes and the related prior expectations, compositionally. The difficulties
of this undertaking and first steps towards a solution of the problem are presented
in Section 2.4.
2.1 The Many Readings of few and many
Sentences with few and many can be ambiguous between different readings. In
this section we introduce three readings which received a lot of attention in the
linguistic literature. Section 2.1.1 discuses the cardinal and proportional reading
of few and many, Section 2.1.2 the reverse proportional reading and Section 2.1.3
presents factors which influence which of the readings is dominant.
2.1.1 The Cardinal and the Proportional Reading
The most prominent readings were famously distinguished by Partee (1989) (and
a long tradition thereafter) and labeled the cardinal and the proportional reading.
They are exemplified in (8) and (10).
(8) a. There are few nightclubs in Tu¨bingen.
b. Joe ate many burgers at the barbecue.
The sentences in (8) exhibit cardinal readings. (8a) expresses that only a small
number of nightclubs exists in Tu¨bingen. (8b), on the other hand, asserts that the
number of burgers eaten by Joe is considered large.
Partee (1989) suggests that many ’s cardinal reading has a meaning “like that of
the cardinal numbers, at least [xmin], with the vagueness located in the unspecified
choice of [xmin], it being part of the meaning of many that the value of [xmin] must
be one that counts as large in the given context. The cardinal reading of few is
similar except that it means at most [xmax], and [xmax] is generally understood to
be small” (Partee, 1989, 383)1. Simple truth conditions for a sentence of the form
“Few/Many A are B” under a cardinal reading are given in (9) (Partee, 1989, 383).
(9) Cardinal reading
a. Few : |A ∩B | ≤ xmax
b. Many : |A ∩B | ≥ xmin
1Partee (1989) labels both threshold values as n. For consistency with the theory proposed in
Section 2.3 we use xmax and xmin instead.
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Under a semantics as in (9a), sentence (8a) is true if the number of nightclubs in
Tu¨bingen is smaller than xmax. (8b) is true if the number of burgers eaten by Joe
is larger than xmin.
An example of the proportional reading of few and many is given in (10).
(10) a. Few children like spinach.
b. Many of my students passed the exam.
Sentence (10a) states that the proportion of children who like spinach is low whereas
(10b) expresses that the proportion of the speaker’s students who passed the exam
is large.
Partee (1989) describes the threshold of the proportional reading “as a frac-
tion between 0 and 1 or as a percentage” (Partee, 1989, 384). Truth conditions of
“Few/Many A are B” under a proportional reading could look as in (11).
(11) Proportional reading
a. Few : |A ∩B | : |A | ≤ kmax
b. Many : |A ∩B | : |A | ≥ kmin
For few, sentence (10a) is true if the proportion of children who like spinach is not
greater than kmax. The sentence in (10b) is true if the proportion of the speaker’s
students who passed the exam is at least kmin.
Partee (1989) suggested that the cardinal and proportional reading correspond
to two lexically distinct meanings of few and many. The lexical ambiguity theory is
supported by a scenario as in (12a) and sentences (12b) and (12c), where we find a
truth-conditional difference between the readings (cf. Partee, 1989; Romero, 2015).
(12) a. Scenario: All the faculty children attended the 1980 picnic, but there
were few faculty children back then. Almost all faculty children had a
good time.
b. Few faculty children attended the 1980 faculty picnic.
c. Many (of the) faculty children had a good time.
In this scenario, (12b) expresses that the number of faculty children who were present
at the picnic is small, regardless of the fact that all children attended. The sentence
is true under a cardinal but not under a proportional reading because proportional
few “certainly never means ‘all’... The cardinal reading, on the other hand, is quite
compatible with few being all, since it asserts the number of [children] that satisfy
the predicate is small without saying anything about what proportion of the set
of [children] that is” (Partee, 1989, 391). Partee’s (1989) line of reasoning can be
made clearer when spelling out the truth conditions of the sentences in terms of
the semantics of few in (9) and (11). The cardinal reading of few predicts the
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sentence to be true if the number of kids attending is smaller than a contextually
provided threshold xmax: | faculty kids at picnic | ≤ xmax. According to the context
in (12a), these truth conditions are fulfilled, rendering the sentence true under a
cardinal reading. For the proportional reading of few, however, the proportion of
kids attending must be smaller than a certain threshold kmax. But the proportion of
attending faculty kids of all faculty kids does certainly not fulfill this condition, since
all faculty kids attended; | faculty kids at picnic | : | faculty kids | = 1. Consequently,
sentence (12b) is not true under a proportional reading of few, but true under
a cardinal reading. Partee (1989) concludes that these different truth conditions
require two distinct lexical entries. In contrast, (12c) is true under a proportional but
not under a cardinal reading because even though a large proportion of the children
had fun, their overall number was small. The truth-conditional difference between
the cardinal and the proportional reading in this scenario supports Partee’s (1989)
ambiguity hypothesis of few and many, which is advocated also by Westerst˚ahl
(1985); Cohen (2001) and Krasikova (2011). Further factors which differentiate
between a cardinal and proportional interpretation of few and many are presented
in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.2 The Reverse Proportional Reading
Besides the cardinal and proportional readings, Westerst˚ahl (1985) claims that there
is an additional reading of few and many, the reverse proportional reading.
(13) a. Scenario: 14 out of a total of 81 winners of the Nobel Prize in literature
come from Scandinavia.
b. Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize in literature.
c. Paraphrase: Many winners of the Nobel Prize in literature are Scandi-
navians.
Westerst˚ahl (1985) suggests that sentence (13b) has a reading paraphrasable as
(13c). This reading is not accounted for by the proportional semantics of many in
(11b) because 14 Scandinavians are not enough to constitute a large proportion of
the roughly 15 million Scandinavians. Many ’s arguments need to be reversed to
arrive at the desired truth conditions.
The same argument has been made for few by Herburger (1997) and Cohen
(2001). Herburger (1997) makes the strong claim that for a scenario as in (14a),
both a proportional reading and a cardinal reading are ruled out, because neither
the total number of applicants nor the total number of cooks nor the total number
of cooks who applied is known.
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(14) a. Scenario: “The fellowship committee is sorting through the applications
for travel funding to Paris. Without knowing how many applicants there
are, at an early point during the review process they observe that on
average only every twentieth application was sent in by a cook, which is
a much lower percentage than they had anticipated.” (Herburger, 1997,
61f)
b. Few cooks applied.
c. Paraphrase: Few applicants were cooks.
Truth conditions which account for the reverse proportional are given below:
(15) Reverse proportional reading
a. Few : |A ∩B | : |B | ≤ kmax
b. Many : |A ∩B | : |B | ≥ kmin
This third reading is problematic for semantic theory no matter whether few
and many are classified as a quantifier or as an adjective (Romero, 2017). These
problems and a solution proposed by Romero (2015, 2017) are discussed in more
detail in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, which present the respective semantic theories.
2.1.3 Factors Influencing the Availability of the Readings
Before we move on to review the competing semantic analyses, we want to inspect
the factors which influence the availability of the readings of few and many. From
a pragmatic point of view, the context has to provide enough information about
the cardinalities which few and many are meant to describe. What marks the
proportional reading off from the cardinal reading is a difference in scale structure.
The key characteristic of the proportional reading is the existence of an upper bound
on |A | or |B |.
In terms of the semantic environment, Partee (1989) and Herburger (1997) fol-
low Milsark (1977) in relating cardinal and proportional few and many to general
properties of the distribution of determiners. “Milsark argues that some restrictions
normally posed in terms of definiteness could be better explained on the basis of
a classification of determiners as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ ” (Partee, 1989, 387). Weak
determiners include the indefinite determiner a, unstressed some, cardinal numbers,
a few, and no and fulfill the symmetry property (see below). Strong determiners in-
clude the definite determiner the, all, most, and neither (Barwise and Cooper, 1981;
Partee, 1989). In contrast to other determiners, few and many can be attributed
to both determiner classes, depending on their reading. Cardinal few and many are
classified as weak determiners whereas proportional few and many count as strong.
Only weak determiners can occur in there-existentials.
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(16) a. weak: There are few/many/some2/no children in the garden.
b. strong: *There is/are few (of the)/many (of the)/every/each/all chil-
dren/child in the garden3.
Furthermore, when few and many are used in explicitly adjectival positions, in
which they are preceded by the definite determiner, for example, only the cardinal
reading is available (Partee, 1989). Cardinal many, for example, can be taken to
mean “large in number” and rather patterns with an adjective (compare (17b) and
(17c)). It characterizes the NP, but it does not contribute quantificational force
(Herburger, 1997).
(17) a. The few women at the party had lots of fun.
b. The many children in the park enjoyed the sunshine.
c. The numerous children in the park enjoyed the sunshine.
d. *The few/many of the guests are from Bavaria.
Strong DPs pattern with definites in that they denote a small percentage of the
NP (Herburger, 1997, 55). The denotation of strong DPs is quantificational and
not adjectival because they do not express an intersective property. Instead, they
contribute how two sets are combined with each other. This can be exemplified with
the symmetry property, as spelled out by Solt (2009, 7) (first formally, then more
intuitively).
(18) a. A determiner Det is symmetric iff for all A,B : B ∈ Det(A) iff A ∈
Det(B).
b. DetAs are B iff DetBs are A.
This property holds for weak, cardinal few and many and also for number words as
in (19a) and (19b) but not for strong, proportional few and many or for all as in
(19c) and (19d).
(19) a. Manycard women were at the party. ⇔ Manycard guests at the party were
women.
b. Five women were at the party. ⇔ Five guests at the party were women.
c. Fewprop women are great-grandmothers. < Fewprop great-grandmothers
are women.
d. All great-grandmothers are women. <All women are great-grandmothers.
Strong determiners are not symmetrical since their semantics specifies exactly how
the two sets they quantify over are related with each other. Proportional few and
many are thus classified as strong.
2the weak, unstressed version of some.
3Ungrammatical or marked sentences are marked with * or ??.
2.1. THE MANY READINGS OF FEW AND MANY 15
individual level predicate stage level predicate
example Few Chinese have blue eyes. Few students were hungry for lunch.
permanent temporary
reading proportional proportional and cardinal
Table 2.1: Readings of few and many with ILPs and SLPs
In terms of the types of predicates few and many combine with, only the pro-
portional reading is available when few and many occur in the subject position of
individual level predicates (ILP), as in (20).
(20) a. Many of my friends are smokers.
b. Few Chinese have blue eyes.
(20a) exemplifies another property of proportional few and many : they can be
accompanied by the partitive construction of the which makes the subset-superset
relation overt. The subject position of a stage-level predicate (SLP) allows both
readings.
(21) Few kids were hungry for lunch because of the big breakfast they had.
Table 2.1 presents a brief overview. For a more formal characterization of weak
and strong determiners, I refer the reader to Barwise and Cooper (1981) or Partee
(1989).
Which reading is available is also influenced by information structure. Focus
influences the comparison class in relation to which few and many receive their
meaning. A comparison class is a set of objects that are similar in some way to
whatever is being discussed. “In many cases, the comparison class is just the set of
things that the participants in a conversation happen to be talking about at a given
time. In formal terms, a comparison class is a subset of the universe of discourse
which is picked out relative to a context of use” (Klein, 1980, 13). In (22a), focus on
Joe has the effect that the number of burgers consumed by Joe is compared to the
number of burgers eaten by other relevant people, like other guests at the barbecue.
In contrast, (22b) expresses that the number of burgers consumed by Joe is large
as compared to other food that he might have eaten, like hot dogs, sandwiches or
muffins.
(22) a. JOE ate many burgers at the barbecue.
b. Joe ate many BURGERS at the barbecue.
For our purposes, focus is used to mark a constituent off from relevant alternatives
(Schwarzschild, 1997). The next section introduces how focus marking is analyzed
semantically. In the compositional analyses we will treat focus marking on par
with contrastive topic marking. Partee (2010) illustrates these two concepts with
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an example and points out that not everything with “intonational prominence” is
focus.
(23) a. Where do your sons live?
b. Well, [my oldest son]CT lives in [Massachusetts]F, [my middle son]CT lives
in [Alaska]F, and [my youngest son]CT lives in [Salt Lake City, Utah]F.
The answer’s topic is ‘my sons’, and the subject of each clause is a contrastive
topic, because different answers are necessary for different sons. If they all lived in
Massachusetts, the answer could begin with ‘My sons live...’, using a simple topic
phrase with no intonational prominence (Partee, 2010, 4).
Moreover, Herburger (1997) claims that the reverse proportional reading is only
available if the quantity word’s first argument is focused. She calls these readings
”focus-affected” because she claims that in cases like (24) it is focus rather than syn-
tax that determines the order in which the quantity word applied to its arguments.
(24) a. Many SCANDINAVIANS have won the Nobel Prize in literature.
b. Few COOKS applied.
Finally, another linguistic construction that influences the readings of few and
many and especially their comparison class are frame setters like for - and compared
to-phrases. These phrases are called frame setters because they “set the frame”
for the matrix clause and contribute its comparison class. They denote comparison
classes which ”affect the standard involved in the semantics of positive forms of
gradable adjectives” (Bylinina, 2014, 143) and they presuppose that the subject of
the gradable predicate (a gradable adjective or a quantity word) is included in the
comparison class set (Kennedy, 2007; Schwarz, 2010). 4
(25) a. There are few cars in the car park for a Monday evening.
b. Compared to the other kids, Jimmy ate many muffins.
c. *For a small dog, our cat Billy catches many mice.
The for -phrase in (25a) evokes a comparison between the number of cars on today’s
Monday evening and the number of cars typically present on Monday evenings. Fur-
thermore, it has the effect that the sentence can be uttered meaningfully only on
a Monday evening, otherwise we run into a presupposition failure. Similarly, (25b)
triggers a comparison with a group of relevant kids. (25c) exemplifies a presupposi-
tion failure because the cat Billy is not a member of the comparison class consisting
of small dogs. In the experiments presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, frame setters
will be used to make sure that participants produce and interpret the experimental
4A gradable adjective is an adjective that occurs in comparison constructions (for example tall,
taller, tallest). It is semantically treated as making reference to degrees on a scale of a particular
dimension like height, weight, beauty or cardinality (cf. Beck, 2011).
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test sentences with respect to the same comparison class. In particular Chapter 6
will compare for - and compared to-phrases.
2.2 The Semantics of few and many
As already pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, there is controversy about
how to classify few and many semantically. There are by now three prominent
semantic treatments. Few and many have been attributed to share the semantic
properties of a
• quantifier (Barwise and Cooper, 1981; Westerst˚ahl, 1985; Partee, 1989; Her-
burger, 1997; Heim and Kratzer, 1998; Hackl, 2000; Romero, 2015)
• adjective (Partee, 1989; Hackl, 2009; Krasikova, 2011; Dobrovie-Sorin, 2013;
Romero, 2017)
• semantically empty degree quantifier (Rett, 2008, 2016; Solt, 2009, 2015)
These accounts and their characteristic features will be summarized in the following
sections. We will show that each of them generates the desired truth conditions, but
comes with different problems, as pointed out above. Furthermore, we will see that
none of them commits to how the standard of comparison or threshold is determined
in relation to the context. To anticipate the remainder of this chapter, Romero’s
(2015) quantifier semantic account in Section 2.2.1 (which is formally very similar
in spirit to Romero’s (2017) adjectival semantics in Section 2.2.2) will be picked up
again in Section 2.4 in which we risk a first attempt to systematically derive prior
expectations and to formalize their interaction with the sentence’s comparison class.
Solt’s (2009) is introduced to present an account which can uniformly account for the
quantity words’ many occurrences and positions, as pointed out in the introduction
of this thesis and repeated in Section 2.2.3.
What all of the competing analyses share, however, is the essential meaning
contribution: few expresses a small cardinality, many a large cardinality. A degree-
semantic framework has been developed to formalize the intuition that cardinalities
come about by counting, can be compared with each other and therefore be ordered
on a scale. In what Beck (2011) calls the “standard theory” of comparison construc-
tions, gradable adjectives like tall are taken to relate individuals to degrees on a
scale (more on scales below).
(26) JtallK: x is tall to degree d
The simplified semantics of tall in (26) then expresses that an individual has the
property of reaching a certain degree on a height scale. This degree can be compared
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to other degrees on the scale, for example with the comparative operator -er (Beck,
2011, 5).
(27) a. Andy is taller than Anthea.
b. J-erK: the degree matrix clause > the degree than-clause
 Andy’s height > Anthea’s height
The degree semantics literature assumes that not only comparatives are com-
posed of a gradable predicate and a comparison operator -er, but that also other
comparison constructions are made up of a gradable predicate and a comparison
operator (von Stechow, 1984; Heim, 1999; Beck, 2011). For example, superlatives
decompose into a gradable predicate and the superlative operator -est and equatives
come with the equative operator as...as. Interestingly, these comparison operators
do not always have to be overt. The frequently used positive form of the adjective
does not immediately suggest that a comparison is made at all.
(28) a. Andy is tall.
b. Michael’s friends are many.
Nevertheless, even in cases as in (28), the height described by tall or the cardinality
described by many are related to other relevant degrees in the context and compared
to what counts as normal in this case. For example, (28a) is interpreted to express
that Andy’s height is taller than the average height and (28b) expresses that Michael
has more friends than other people. This comparison to a “standard value” on
the scale is assumed to be contributed by a null morpheme POS which binds the
gradable predicate’s degree argument and makes reference to a neutral interval on
the respective scale (von Stechow, 1984). A scale S, in turn, is a triplet 〈D,<,DIM〉
consisting of a set of degrees D, an ordering relation on that set < and a dimension
of measurement DIM . Dimensions include cardinality, length, height, duration,
volume, and weight, for example (Solt, 2015, 231f).
(29) JPOS K = λC〈dt, t〉.λD〈dt, t〉.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(C) ⊆ D
The POS operator is a quantifier over degrees. The variant used here (cf. Romero,
2015) takes as its first argument a set of sets of degrees C which corresponds to
the comparison class. The comparison class contains the sets of degrees of fo-
cus/contrastive topic alternatives which are evaluated by the ∼ operator (more
below). These alternatives are also called the focus/contrastive topic associates of
POS. For our purposes it does not make a difference which kind of marking the
constituent carries (see Romero, 2015). C is input to the function L which returns
the so-called neutral interval Ns = L(JCK) of the comparison class. For a sentence
as in (28a) and focus on Andy, the comparison class contains the heights of other
relevant people, say men in Germany. The neutral interval returned by L would
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then contain those degrees on the height scale which count as neither tall nor short.
Andy’s height formalized as a set of degrees as well (not as a single degree); it is the
set of all degrees below his actual, maximal height. The idea is illustrated in the
example below.
(30) . 1.93m (Andy’s height)
◦−−−−−−−−−−−−−|−−−−−−−|︸ ︷︷ ︸−−−−−•
. Ns
◦−−−−−−−−−−−−−
︷ ︸︸ ︷
|−−−−−−−|−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ HEIGHT
. 1.70m 1.85m
The relevant scale is the height scale and the corresponding degrees are indicated
in meters and centimeters. The height scale is illustrated by the bottom line in the
graphic. Let’s assume for the sake of the example that the neutral interval of the
heights of adult men in Germany is [1.70, 1.85]. Sentence (28a) is mapped to true if
Andy’s height is greater than those heights which count as neutral (or which are the
endpoints of the interval), that means when the neutral interval is fully contained
in the interval of Andy’s heights (the top line). In other words, Andy can be called
“tall” in this context if he is at least 1.86m tall. Since Andy’s height is 1.93m, the
sentence can be truthfully uttered in this context. See Beck (2011), von Stechow
(2009), Kennedy (2007) and references therein for a more thorough introduction
into degree semantics and the at times elusive semantics of the positive operator.
The decomposition of the positive form of gradable adjectives into their stem
and the degree operator POS is transferred to few and many (Solt, 2009; Hackl,
2009; Romero, 2015, 2017):
(31) a. few = few + POS
b. many = many + POS
POS is responsible for the quantity words’ interaction with the context and will be
central to the compositional analysis in all three semantic theories of few and many.
We mentioned above that few and many are evaluated relative to a comparison
class. The comparison class contains the sets of degrees of focus/contrastive topic
alternatives which are evaluated by the ∼ operator. This idea goes back to the
theory of focus by Rooth (1992) and neatly summarized by Beck (2006). In the
two examples below, focus is used to mark contrast. Contrastive focus can occur in
a discourse in which one speaker objects the other. Semantically, focus introduces
alternatives. We will assume the same for constituent marked as a contrastive topic.
(32) a. Hayley invited Ross.
b. RYANF invited Ross.
(33) a. Ryan invited Harriet.
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b. Ryan invited ROSSF .
Sentences (32b) and (33b) are associated with the structures in (34a) and (34b).
According to Rooth (1992), an operator ∼ (the squiggle operator) and a variable Ci
adjoin to the structure labeled α. Ci is called the focus anaphor and will eventually
contain the relevant focus alternatives. In the following sections, this variable will
be the semantic representation of the sentence’s comparison class.
(34) a. [[α [F RYAN] invited ROSS] ∼C1]
b. [[α Ryan invited [FROSS]] ∼C2]
Rooth (1992) associates two different semantic objects with α, its ordinary semantic
value JαK0 and its focus semantic values JαKf . Note that the sentences (32b) and
(33b) have the same ordinary semantic value, but differ in their focus semantic value,
due to the different focus marking (Beck, 2006).
(35) a. [[α [F RYAN] invited Ross] ∼C1].
b.
JαK0 = λw. Ryan invited Ross in w.
= that Ryan invited Ross.JαKf = λw. x invited Ross in w | x ∈ D
= {that Ryan invited Ross, that Hayley invited Ross, ...}
(36) a. [[α Ryan invited [FROSS]] ∼C2].
b.
JαK0 = λw. Ryan invited Ross in w.
= that Ryan invited Ross.JαKf = λw. Ryan invited y in w | y ∈ D
= {that Ryan invited Ross, that Ryan invited Harriet, ...}
The ∼ operator introduces a presupposition requiring that the context provides
at least one proper focus alternative to the proposition that is asserted, ie. an
element differing from the ordinary semantic value of the focused phrase with respect
to the accented item (Umbach, 2001). The ∼ operator “does not determine the
interpretation of the variable Ci uniquely, but it does constrain it. It basically says
that whenever you have a sentence with something focused in it, its presupposed
that there is some relevant set of alternatives in the context” (Partee, 2010).
(37) J [α ∼ Ci]Kg0 is only defined if JCiK ⊆ JαKgf & JCiK 6= JαKg0.
If defined, J [α ∼ Ci]Kg0 = JαKg0
For the examples in (34a) and (34b), C1 and C2 differ in whether the relevant
alternatives are inviters or invitees.
In the following three sections, three standard semantic treatments of few and
many are introduced under the decomposition assumption in (31). The lexical
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entries as well as positive and negative features of each account are summarized
in Table 2.2. We assume the compositional rules of Functional Application (FA),
Predicate Modification (PM) and Predicate Abstraction (PA) by Heim and Kratzer
(1998). Where additional rules are necessary, we point them out explicitly. Sec-
tion 2.2.4 will briefly review previous work on the negativity of few. Section 2.3
introduces the surprise-based semantics of Fernando and Kamp (1996), which makes
a concrete proposal of how to calculate the neutral interval across contexts. The
challenge of a formal integration of prior expectations and comparison classes into
the compositional analysis is subject to Section 2.4.
2.2.1 Quantifier Semantics
The quantifier account is probably the most common analysis of few and many.
The quantificational analysis in its most standard form goes back to the Generalized
Quantifier Theory by Barwise and Cooper (1981). Few and many are treated as
“quantifying determiners” that express relationships between two sets of individuals
(type 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉), similar to some, lots of and all. They specify “that the cardinality
of their intersection exceeds (many) or falls short of (few) some standard determined
by the context” (Solt, 2015, 225). Following Partee (1989) as in the previous section,
the semantics of few and many look as in (38) and (39).
(38) Cardinal reading
a. JfewK〈et, 〈et, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≤ xmax
b. JmanyK〈et, 〈et, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≥ xmin
(39) Proportional reading
a. JfewK〈et, 〈et, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | : |P | ≤ kmax
b. JmanyK〈et, 〈et, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | : |P | ≥ kmin
In the previous section, we already pointed out that there is a third attested
reading of few and many. The “reverse proportional reading” reverses the order of
the arguments of the quantity words.
(40) Reverse proportional reading
a. JfewK〈et, 〈et, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | : |Q | ≤ kmax
b. JmanyK〈et, 〈et, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | : |Q | ≥ kmin
The reverse proportional reading poses a problem for semantic theory because
it violates a universal property that the Generalized Quantifier Theory ascribes to
all quantifiers: reverse proportional few and many with a semantics as in (40) are
not conservative. Conservativity is defined in (2.2.1) (Barwise and Cooper, 1981;
Keenan and Stavi, 1986).
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(41) A function f ∈ D〈et, 〈et, t〉〉 is conservative iff for any P and Q ∈ D〈e, t〉:
f(P )(Q) = 1 iff f(P )(P ∩Q) = 1
For example, some is a conservative quantifier because “some books are new” iff
“some books are new books”. This does not hold for reverse proportional few and
many as exemplified in (14) and (13). It is not the case that “Few cooks applied” in
(14) (in the sense that few applicants are cooks) iff “Few cooks are applying cooks”.
Equally, it is not true that ”Many Scandinavians won a Nobel Prize in Literature”
in (13) (with the reverse proportional reading that many winners of a Nobel Prize
in literature are Scandinavian) iff ”Many Scandinavians are Nobel Prize winning
Scandinavians”.
A solution for the problem is brought forward by Romero (2015), who builds
on Hackl (2000), Heim (1999) and Schwarz (2010). She analyzes few and many as
parametrized determiners (type 〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉), which have a degree argument and
decompose into the stem and POS (as illustrated in example (44) below). This
semantics allows her to derive the truth conditions of all three readings in a compo-
sitional way while preserving conservativity. There is only one proportional lexical
entry and the difference between the regular proportional and the reverse propor-
tional reading is due to a scopally-mobile POS which can associate with material ex-
ternal or internal to the original host NP (cf. Heim, 1999; Schwarz, 2010). Romero’s
(2015) lexical entries for few and many are defined as follows:
(42) Romero’s (2015) cardinal reading
a. JfewcardK〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉 = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≤ d
b. JmanycardK〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉 = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≥ d
(43) Romero’s (2015) proportional reading
a. JfewpropK〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉 = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | : |P | ≤ d
b. JmanypropK〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉 = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | : |P | ≥ d
The relationship between many and the context is established by having the
positive operator POS bind many ’s degree argument. We assume here that the
associate of POS bears focal stress or functions as a contrastive topic. POS can
associate with a constituent internal or external to the host NP, thereby deriving the
different readings (cf. Romero, 2015). An external associate results in the regular
reading, an internal associate in the reverse reading.
To demonstrate these semantics at work, a compositional analysis of each reading
is carried out with the semantics of many from above. An LF for each sentence as
well as the most important steps in the calculation are provided. First, the analysis
of the cardinal reading of many is demonstrated. Too keep the analysis concise,
only the most important composition steps are spelled out. The respective nodes
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are marked with a circled number in the tree and their denotations are provided in
the list underneath the tree.
Focus/topic-marking on Joe results in a comparison between Joe and other rel-
evant people (other guests at the barbecue, for example). Plural individuals are
marked with by the * operator (see Hackl, 2001). The variable’s domain is only given
explicitly where considered necessary (for example, λx. ... instead of λx ∈ De. ...)
(44) JoeF/CT ate many burgers.
〈t〉 5
POS
〈〈dt, t〉, 〈dt, t〉〉
C
〈dt, t〉
〈d, t〉 4
∼C 〈d, t〉 3
λd1 〈t〉
〈et, t〉 2
many
〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉
d1
〈d〉
burgers
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
λt2
JoeF/CT
〈e〉 ate
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉
t2
〈e〉
(45) a. 1 = λx. Joe ate x
b. JmanycardK = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≥ d
c. 2 = λQ〈e, t〉. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩Q | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λd. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Joe ate x} | ≥ d
e. 4 is defined iff JCK ⊆ {λd′. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Joe ate x} | ≥ d′,
. λd′. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Max ate x} | ≥ d′,
. λd′. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Sue ate x} | ≥ d′, ...}
f. JPOS K = λC<dt,t>.λD<d,t>.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(C) ⊆ D
g. 5 = 1 iff L(JCK) ⊆ λd. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Joe ate x} | ≥ d
Sentence (44) is true if Joe ate many burgers, where many is evaluated relative to
the number of burgers that other people ate.
Second, the truth conditions of the regular proportional reading are derived.
Romero (2015) analyzes this reading as a result of POS associating with an element
external to the host NP. In sentence (46), “pizza”, many ’s second argument, is
focus-marked and triggers the alternatives contained in C.
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(46) Many (of the) kids like pizzaF/CT .
〈t〉 5
POS
〈〈dt, t〉, 〈dt, t〉〉
C
〈dt, t〉
〈d, t〉 4
∼C 〈d, t〉 3
λd1 〈t〉
〈et, t〉 2
many
〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉
d1
〈d〉
kids
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
like
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉
pizzaF/CT
〈e〉
(47) a. 1 = λx. x like pizza
b. JmanypropK = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | : |P | ≥ d
c. 2 = λQ〈e, t〉. | {x : *kids(x)} ∩Q | : | {x : *kids(x)} | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λd. | {x : *kids(x)} ∩ {x : x like pizza} | : | {x : *kids(x)} | ≥ d
e. 4 is defined iffJCK ⊆ {λd′. | {x : *kids(x)} ∩ {x : x like pizza} | : | {x : *kids(x)} | ≥ d′,
. λd′. | {x : *kids(x)} ∩ {x : x like spinach} | : | {x : *kids(x)} | ≥ d′,
. λd′. | {x : *kids(x)} ∩ {x : x like cherries} | : | {x : *kids(x)} | ≥ d′, ...}
f. JPOS K = λC<dt,t>.λD<d,t>.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(C) ⊆ D
g. 5 = 1 iff
L(JCK) ⊆ λd. | {x : *kids(x)} ∩ {x : x like pizza} | : | {x : *kids(x)} | ≥ d
Sentence (46) is true if many kids like pizza, where many is evaluated relative to the
proportion of kids who like other kinds of food.
Third, we address the reverse proportional reading. Romero’s (2015) achieve-
ment is that she can derive the truth conditions of this reading with only one pro-
portional determiner manyprop and fewprop, which are both conservative. The reverse
proportional reading is obtained when POS is associated with an element internal
to the host NP. In example (48), repeated from above, Scandinavians, many ’s first
argument, is focused which triggers the reversed reading that many winners of a No-
bel Prize in literature are Scandinavians (cf. Herburger, 1997). See Romero (2015)
for a more thorough discussion of the truth conditions of the reverse proportional
reading and its comparison class. Note that in the calculation “the Nobel Prize in
literature” will be abbreviated to “NP” of type 〈e〉.
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(48) Many ScandinaviansF/CT have won the Nobel Prize in literature.
〈t〉 5
POS
〈〈dt, t〉, 〈dt, t〉〉
C
〈dt, t〉
〈d, t〉 4
∼C 〈d, t〉 3
λd1 〈t〉
〈et, t〉 2
many
〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉
d1
〈d〉
ScandinaviansF/CT
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
have won
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉
NP
〈e〉
(49) a. 1 = λx.x have won NP
b. JmanypropK = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | : |P | ≥ d
c. 2 = λQ〈e, t〉. | {x : *Scand(x)} ∩Q | : | {x : *Scand(x)} | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λd. | {x : *Scand(x)} ∩ {x : NP-winner(x)} | : | {x : *Scand(x)} |
≥ d
e. 4 is defined iff JCK ⊆
{λd′. | {x : *Scand(x)} ∩ {x : NP-winner(x)} | : | {x : *Scand(x)} | ≥ d′,
. λd′. | {x : Mediterr*(x)} ∩ {x : NP-winner(x)} | : | {x : Med*(x)} | ≥ d′,
λd′. | {x : M.East*(x)} ∩ {x : NP-winner(x)} | : | {x : M.East*(x)} | ≥ d′,
...}
f. JPOS K = λC<dt,t>.λD<d,t>.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(CC) ⊆ D
g. 5 = 1 iff L(JCK) ⊆
λd. | {x : *Scand(x)} ∩ {x : NP-winner(x)} | : | {x : *Scand(x)} | ≥ d
Sentence (48) is true under a reverse proportional reading if “the proportion of
Scandinavians that have won the Nobel Prize in literature is large compared to a
threshold based on the proportions of inhabitants of other world regions that have
won the Nobel Prize in literature” (Romero, 2015, 23).
After having seen the cardinal reading, the regular proportional and the reverse
proportional reading, the question might arise whether there is also such a thing as
a “reverse cardinal” reading. This is actually possible when cardinal many ’s first
argument is focused as in
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(50) Joe ate many burgersF/CT .
Focus on “burgers” triggers the comparison class of other things Joe might have
eaten and the sentence is true if Joe ate more burgers than, say, sandwiches, hot
dogs and muffins. Since the cardinal reading is symmetrical anyway, this reading is
not considered particularly interesting or problematic. We leave it to the reader to
derive this reading compositionally.
In a nutshell, we see the strength of the quantificational approach in its sim-
plicity. It does not need further covert semantic machinery and its application is
straightforward. Moreover, it fits the proportional reading well by intersecting two
sets of individuals. We have shown that even the reverse proportional reading can
be captured by a single proportional lexical entry while preserving the conserva-
tivity feature (Cohen, 2001; Romero, 2015). On the downside, the quantificational
account does not capture adjectival uses in which few and many are preceded by
the definite determiner. Quantifiers and the definite determiner are supposed to be
in complimentary distribution and thus the quantificational analysis would rule out
this well-attested use. Such a case is better accounted for by an adjectival semantics.
2.2.2 Adjectival Semantics
Few and many ’s similarity to gradable adjectives has led to the development of an
adjectival semantics similar to cardinality predicates like numerous, which expresses
the property “small/large in number relative to the average number in the given con-
text” (cf. Partee, 1989; Hackl, 2009; Krasikova, 2011; Dobrovie-Sorin, 2013; Romero,
2017). Arguments for treating few and many on par with adjectives come from their
parallel behavior in comparative constructions. Both quantity words and gradable
adjectives are available in the positive, comparative and superlative form:
(51) a. many, more, most
b. few, fewer, fewest
c. tall, taller, tallest
The standard semantic analysis of these three comparison constructions is to decom-
pose them into a stem and functional operators (cf. von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy
and McNally, 2005; Beck, 2011). This analysis has also been applied to quantity
words.
(52) a. tall = tall + POS
taller = tall + -er
tallest = tall + -est
28 CHAPTER 2. LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND OF QUANTITY WORDS
b. many = many + POS (Romero, 2015, 2017)
more = many + -er (Hackl, 2000)
most = many + -est (Hackl, 2009)
Furthermore, only adjectives, but not quantifiers, can occur in explicitly adjectival
positions and be preceded by the definite determiner, similar to example (17) above.
(53) a. The many construction sites brought the traffic to a standstill.
b. The few shops that were still open didn’t sell the shoes I wanted.
c. The *some/*no/*all students were late.
An adjectival semantics of few and many can be straightforwardly transferred
from gradable adjectives. The cardinal semantics in (54) provides two lexical entries,
depending on whether the quantity word appears as an intersective adjective or com-
bines directly with a plural individual whose atoms are counted. The intersective
version of type 〈e, t〉 would combine with its plural noun sister via Predicate Modi-
fication and thereby pattern with other adjectives, whereas the entry in the second
line takes its sister as an argument via applying Functional Application (Heim and
Kratzer, 1998).
(54) Cardinal reading
a. JfewK〈e, t〉 = λx〈e〉. |x | ≤ xmaxJfewK〈et, 〈e, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | ≤ xmax
b. JmanyK〈e, t〉 = λx〈e〉. |x | ≥ xminJmanyK〈et, 〈e, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | ≥ xmin
(55) Proportional reading
a. JfewK〈et, 〈e, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | : |P | ≤ kmax
b. JmanyK〈et, 〈e, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | : |P | ≥ kmin
The cardinal and the proportional reading again seem unproblematic, but once
we turn to the reverse proportional reading, we run into a compositionality problem.
(56) Reverse proportional reading
a. JfewK〈et, 〈e, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | : |Q | ≤ kmax
b. JmanyK〈et, 〈e, t〉〉 = λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | : |Q | ≥ kmin
It is a property of adjectives that they only “see” their sister in the tree, be it an
individual or a noun. They cannot, however, raise out of the NP they are contained
in and take higher scope. This is why a semantics for the reverse proportional
reading as in (56) is not compositional. The quantity word needs to calculate a
proportion over |Q |, but does not have a λQ-argument (Romero, 2017).
Romero (2017) sets out to solve the compositionality problem. Regular and
reverse proportional few and many are again fused into one lexical entry, which
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however, does not only look at its 〈e, t〉 complement as a whole but also at its
atomic subparts. Both the cardinal and the proportional variant receive a degree
argument which is bound by the null morpheme POS. POS once more associates
with a focus- or contrastive topic-marked constituent. Associates external to the
host DP trigger the regular reading, internal associates a reverse reading.
(57) Romero’s (2017) cardinal reading
a. JfewcardK〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 = λd〈d〉.λx〈e〉. |x | ≤ dJfewcardK〈d, 〈et, 〈e, t〉〉〉 = λd〈d〉.λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | ≤ d
b. JmanycardK〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 = λd〈d〉.λx〈e〉. |x | ≥ dJmanycardK〈d, 〈et, 〈e, t〉〉〉 = λd〈d〉.λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | ≥ d
(58) Romero’s (2017) proportional reading
a. JfewpropK〈d, 〈et, 〈e, t〉〉〉 = λd〈d〉.λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | : |PAtomic | ≤ d
b. JmanypropK〈d, 〈et, 〈e, t〉〉〉 = λd〈d〉.λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | : |PAtomic | ≥ d
The adjectival semantics is now to be applied to the sentences from the previous
section. A necessary assumption for the composition to work, however, is that
many ’s type 〈e〉 argument is existentially bound by the covert operator existential
closure ∃ if no overt determiner is present. Furthermore, many ’s host NP and the
VP will be combined via Predicate Modification, not by Functional Application as
above. We will see that the result of the compositional analysis will be the same
as for a quantifier analysis of few and many. The cardinal reading of many of the
example sentence repeated from above is presented first.
(44) JoeF/CT ate many burgers.
〈t〉 6
POS
〈〈dt, t〉, 〈dt, t〉〉
C
〈dt, t〉
〈d, t〉 5
∼C 〈d, t〉 4
λd1 〈t〉
∃e 〈e, t〉 3
〈e, t〉 2
many
〈d, 〈et, 〈e, t〉〉〉
d1
〈d〉
burgers
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
λt2
JoeF/CT
〈e〉 ate
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉
t2
〈e〉
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(59) a. 1 = λx. Joe ate x
b. JmanycardK = λd〈d〉.λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | ≥ d
c. 2 = λx〈e〉. *burgers(x) ∧ |x | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λx〈e〉.*burgers(x) ∧ |x | ≥ d1 ∧ ate(x)(Joe)
e. 4 = λd.∃x[*burgers(x) ∧ |x | ≥ d ∧ ate(x)(Joe)]
f. 5 is defined iff JCK ⊆ {λd′.∃x[*burgers(x) ∧ |x | ≥ d′ ∧ ate(x)(Joe)],
. λd′.∃x[*burgers(x) ∧ |x | ≥ d′ ∧ ate(x)(Max)],
. λd′.∃x[*burgers(x)∧|x | ≥ d′∧ate(x)(Sue)], ...}
g. JPOS K = λC<dt,t>.λD<d,t>.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(C) ⊆ D
h. 6 = 1 iff L(JCK) ⊆ λd.∃x[*burgers(x) ∧ |x | ≥ d ∧ ate(x)(Joe)]
Sentence (44) is true if Joe ate many burgers, where many is evaluated relative to
the number of burgers that other people ate.
Next, the regular proportional reading is analyzed. Again, this reading arises if
the focused constituent is external to the host NP, see the repeated example.
(46) Many (of the) kids like pizzaF/CT .
〈t〉 5
POS
〈〈dt, t〉, 〈dt, t〉〉
C
〈dt, t〉
〈d, t〉 4
∼C 〈d, t〉 3
λd1 〈t〉
∃e 〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 2
many
〈d, 〈et, 〈e, t〉〉〉
d1
〈d〉
kids
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
like
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉
pizzaF/CT
〈e〉
(60) a. 1 = λx.x like pizza
b. JmanypropK = λd〈d〉.λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | : |PAtomic | ≥ d
c. 2 = λx〈e〉. *kids(x) ∧ |x | : | {z : *kids(z)} | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λd.∃x[*kids(x) ∧ |x | : | {z : *kids(z)} | ≥ d ∧ like(pizza)(x)]
e. 4 is defined iffJCK ⊆ {λd′.∃x[*kids(x) ∧ |x | : | {z : *kids(z)} | ≥ d′ ∧ like(pizza)(x)],
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. λd′.∃x[*kids(x)∧ |x | : | {z : *kids(z)} | ≥ d′ ∧ like(spinach)(x)],
. λd′.∃x[*kids(x)∧|x | : | {z : *kids(z)} | ≥ d′∧like(cherries)(x)], ...}
f. JPOS K = λC<dt,t>.λD<d,t>.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(C) ⊆ D
g. 5 = 1 iff
L(JCK) ⊆ λd.∃x[*kids(x) ∧ |x | : | {z : *kids(z)} | ≥ d ∧ like(pizza)(x)]
Sentence (46) is true if many kids like pizza, where many is evaluated relative to the
proportion of kids who like other kinds of food.
The last compositional analysis to be presented is of the reverse proportional
reading. Again, the definite description “the Nobel Prize in literature” is abbreviated
by “NP”.
(48) Many ScandinaviansF/CT have won the Nobel Prize in literature.
〈t〉 5
POS
〈〈dt, t〉, 〈dt, t〉〉
C
〈dt, t〉
〈d, t〉 4
∼C 〈d, t〉 3
λd1 〈t〉
∃e 〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 2
many
〈d, 〈et, 〈e, t〉〉〉
d1
〈d〉
ScandinaviansF/CT
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
have won
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉
NP
〈e〉
(61) a. 1 = λx.x have won NP
b. JmanypropK = λd〈d〉.λP〈e, t〉.λx〈e〉.P (x) ∧ |x | : |PAtomic | ≥ d
c. 2 = λx〈e〉.*Scand(x) ∧ |x | : | {z : *Scand(z)} | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λd.∃x[*Scand(x) ∧ |x | : | {z : *Scand(z)} | ≥ d ∧ NP-winner(x)]
e. 4 is defined iffJCK ⊆ {λd′.∃x[*Scand(x)∧|x | : | {z : *Scand(z)} | ≥ d′∧NP-winner(x)],
. λd′.∃x[*Mediterr(x)∧|x | : | {z : *Mediterr(z)} | ≥ d′∧NP-winner(x)],
. λd′.∃x[*M.Eastern(x)∧|x | : | {z : *M.Eastern(z)} | ≥ d′∧NP-winner(x)],
. ...}
f. JPOS K = λC<dt,t>.λD<d,t>.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(C) ⊆ D
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g. 5 = 1 iff
L(JCK) ⊆ λd.∃x[*Scand(x)∧|x | : | {z : *Scand(z)} | ≥ d∧NP-winner(x)]
Sentence (48) is true under a reverse proportional reading if “the proportion of
Scandinavians that have won the Nobel Prize in literature is large compared to a
threshold based on the proportions of inhabitants of other world regions that have
won the Nobel Prize in literature” (Romero, 2015, 23).
In sum, we find that the adjectival account can derive the same truth conditions
under the assumption that the degree variable is bound by POS whose associates are
prosodically marked. In contrast to a quantifier semantics, the adjective semantics
needs an additional silent operator ∃ to bind the pronoun of type 〈e〉. The adjectival
account is particularly elegant to derive cardinal readings and quantity words in
combination with the definite determiner.
2.2.3 Degree Quantifier
A third account was proposed by Solt (2009, 2015) and Rett (2008, 2016). They
analyze few and many as a semantically empty, gradable quantifier over degrees.
Further semantic machinery, like a measure function, is contributed by covert se-
mantic operators. This summary focuses on Solt’s work, who treats few and many in
parallel with little and much and aims to account not only for their quantificational
and adjectival uses, but also for differential uses in a unified semantics.
(62) Solt (2015, 222)
a. quantificational: Many/few students attended the lecture.
b. predicative: John’s friends are many/few.
c. attributive: The many/few students who attended enjoyed the lecture.
d. differential: Many more/few more/many fewer than 100 students at-
tended the lecture.
Instead of treating few and many as quantifiers like every or adjectives like tall
Solt (2009, 2015) suggests that they are gradable predicates of intervals (sets of
degrees) on some dimension of measurement. She claims that only such a semantics
can capture all of the various uses exemplified in (62). In her decompositional
account she strips few, many, little and much of most of their semantics content
which is instead contributed by a series of null functional elements (see Solt, 2009,
Chapter 3). In a compositional analysis of a sentence with quantificational few or
many, the truth conditions are the same as under a quantificational semantics in
which all of these operators are already contained in the semantics of many. This is
why her proposal looks unnecessarily complicated, at least for quantificational few
and many. Solt, however, claims that her reduced semantics is necessary to account
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for the various uses of quantity words in a unified way. The syntactic form she
assumes and the lexical entries she proposes are given below.
(63) a. JmanyK = λdd.λI# ∈ D〈d, t〉.d ∈ I
b. JfewK = λdd.λI# ∈ D〈d, t〉.d /∈ I
c. JMeasK = λxe.λdd.µDIM(x) ≥ d
d. ∃ (Existential Closure)
e. JPOSK = λI〈d, t〉.∀d ∈ Ns[d ∈ I]
DP
MeasP
QP
DegP
-er
POS
Q
many
few
little
much
MeasP’
Meas NP
burgers
According to Solt’s theory, the only semantic contribution of many and few is to
check whether a degree is contained in an interval. The remainder of their meaning
is contributed by Meas and POS. In terms of the LF, Solt (2009, 2015) proposes that
the quantity words are located in the specifier position of a DP-internal functional
head Meas, which introduces a degree argument. Then, they undergo Quantifier
Raising (Heim and Kratzer, 1998) and take sentential scope. They take as their
argument a set of degrees (see the LF structure below). Consequently, the quantity
words are not assumed to combine with their NP restrictor directly. They are taken
to be embedded in a measure phrase MeasP. Note that ”Meas does not encode
a specific dimension. Rather, the dimension in question is ‘filled in’ on the basis
of the NP denotation, the nature of the degree expression that it combines with,
and the context of interpretation” (Solt, 2009, p. 105). The scale’s dimension is
underspecified in the semantics of Meas because Solt (2009, 2015) aims to apply
the operator to few and many as well as to much and little. In contrast to much
and little, which are more free in the choice of their scale and can operate on scales
of volume, weight etc., many and few require that the interval is of dimension
cardinality. The degrees on the cardinality scale must be countable (indicated by
the # subscript). A last remarkable feature of Solt’s (2009) proposal is that instead
of attributing quantificational force over individuals to Q-adjectives themselves, she
opts for existential closure in order to be able to also account for their predicative
uses.
In the positive form, the degree argument of many is bound by the null morpheme
POS. POS establishes a comparison with a neutral interval provided by the context.
In the following, the three example sentences from above are analyzed. We start out
again with the cardinal reading of many in its quantificational use. An LF structure
and a compositional analysis are presented. Note that it seems inconvenient to apply
Quantifier Raising three times and Existential Closure only in order to avoid type
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mismatches. Furthermore, the measure function cannot be included via Function
Application but needs an own composition rule. The rule Variable Identification is
based on Kratzer’s (1996) Event Identification rule and combines the Meas Node
with its nominal complement. Note that in contrast to Romero (2015, 2017), the
POS operator used here, does not take the comparison class as its argument and
thus does not build on focus/contrastive topic alternatives.
(44) Joe ate many burgers.
6
POS<dt,t>
〈d, t〉 5
λd3 〈t〉
4
d3 many2
〈d, 〈dt, t〉〉
〈d, t〉 3
λd2 〈t〉
∃
d2 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 2
Meas
〈e, dt〉
burgers
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
λt1
Joe
ate t1
(64) a. 1 = λx. Joe ate x
b. JMeasK = λx.λd.µDIM(x) ≥ d
c. 2 = λd.λx.*burgers(x) ∧ µDIM(x) ≥ d
d. 3 = λd.∃x[*burgers(x) ∧ µDIM(x) ≥ d ∧ ate(x)(Joe)]
e. JmanyK = λdd.λI# ∈ D<d,t>.d ∈ I
f. 4 = λI# ∈ D<d,t>.d3 ∈ I
g. 5 = λd.∃x[*burgers(x) ∧ µ#(x) ≥ d ∧ ate(x)(Joe)]
h. JPOSK = λI<d,t>.∀d ∈ Ns[d ∈ I]
i. 6 = 1 iff ∀d ∈ Ns ∃x[*burgers(x) ∧ µ#(x) ≥ d ∧ ate(x)(Joe)]
Sentence (44) is true if Joe ate many burgers, where many is evaluated relative to
the neutral interval on the cardinality scale.
For the proportional reading, Solt (2009) takes a different path than the ap-
proaches in the previous sections. Instead of a lexical ambiguity, she claims that the
ambiguity is caused by a difference in scale structure. “The proportional reading
arises when an upper bound to the scale is assumed, whereas the cardinal reading
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arises when there is no salient upper bound” (Solt, 2009, p.209). Two environments
force a proportional reading: the subject position of an individual-level predicate and
the partitive construction of the. Solt (2009) suggests that they share the “totaliz-
ing” property. The concepts of totalizing and individualizing can be explained with
the determiners every and each. Every is totalizing whereas each is individualizing.
(65) a. Every cake is tasty.
b. Each cake is tasty.
“The totalizing effect comes not from the [quantity word] itself but from the con-
struction in which it occurs... Totalizing has a consequence for measurement, in
that the measurement scale introduced by the functional head Meas is restricted to
measuring the extent of that totality” (Solt, 2009, p.218). A plural NP in the sub-
ject position of an individual-level predicate ”is interpreted by first pulling aside the
totality of individuals in its extension, and then subjecting them to the predicate”
(Solt, 2009, p.222). Based on these observations, Solt (2009) adjusts the semantics
of the NP itself by adding a supremum operator. Find my interpretation of her
analysis applied to example (46) below.
(46) Many (of the) kids like pizzaF/CT .
6
POS<dt,t>
〈d, t〉 5
λd2 〈t〉
4
d2 many1
〈d, 〈dt, t〉〉
〈d, t〉 3
λd1 〈t〉
∃
d1 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 2
Meas
〈e, dt〉
kids
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
like pizza
(66) a. 1 = λx. x like pizza
b. JkidsK〈e〉 = sup(λx. *kids(x))
⇒ shift from group to set type, PSP as domain restriction on MeasJkidsK〈e, t〉 = λy : y ⊆sup(λx. *kids(x)). *kids(y)
c. JMeasK = λx.λd.µDIM(x) ≥ d
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d. 2 = λd : d ≤ µDIM(sup(λx. *kids(x))).λy : y ⊆ sup(λx. *kids(x)).
*kids(y) ∧ µDIM(y) ≥ d
⇒ scale is bounded on the upper end
e. 3 = λd : d ≤ µDIM(sup(λx. *kids(x))).∃y [ *kids(y) ∧
µDIM(y) ≥ d ∧ like(pizza)(y)]
3 is defined iff y ⊆ sup(λx. *kids(x)) and d1 ≤ µDIM(sup(λx. *kids(x)))
f. JmanyK = λdd.λI# ∈ D<d,t>.d ∈ I
g. 4 = λI# ∈ D<d,t>.d3 ∈ I
h. 5 = λd : d ≤ µ#(sup(λx. *kids(x))).∃y [ *kids(y) ∧ µ#(y) ≥ d ∧
like(pizza)(y)]
i. JPOSK = λI<d,t>.∀d ∈ Ns[d ∈ I]
j. 6 = 1 iff ∀d ∈ Ns ∃y [ *kids(y) ∧ µ#(y) ≥ d ∧ like(pizza)(y)]
where the domain of degrees d is restricted to d ≤ µ#(sup(λx. *kids(x)))
Sentence (46) is predicted to be true if many kids like pizza where the number
denoted by “many” is bounded by the totality of kids.
We see that it is possible to derive the truth conditions of the proportional
reading with Solt’s (2009) decompositional account. The question that arises and
remains unanswered, however, is what in the semantics triggers the totalizing ef-
fect and restricts the scale. Following Solt (2009), this should be triggered by the
semantics of an individual-level predicate or the partitive construction, but Solt
(2009) does not show how this should work in the composition. An even more
obvious question is how Solt (2009) would account for the proportional reading of
stage-level predicates. Sentences containing few and many and a stage-level pred-
icate can be interpreted both proportionally or cardinally. The only explanation
offered by Solt (2009) is that discourse cues either impose a boundary (resulting in
a proportional) reading or they do not (resulting in a cardinal reading). The lexical
ambiguity theory assumed in the quantificational and adjectival account is by far
more straightforward in this respect. Moreover, it is not clear how Solt’s (2009)
account of the proportional reading should be extended to the reverse proportional
reading. For a sentence like (48), the scale would have to be restricted by the VP,
with which Meas does not combine directly. Whether restricting the scale and the
totalizing effect can take place randomly, detached from syntactic and semantic
properties, is questionable.
All in all, Solt’s (2009) theory is a well-motivated attempt to give a unified
semantics of the various uses of few and many. This attempt works out well com-
positionally for the cardinal reading in a quantificational position. Nevertheless, the
semantics is blown up by a number of covert operators and, at least for the quantifi-
cational use, the same result can be achieved with a simpler (be it quantificational
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or adjectival) semantics. The derivation of the proportional reading is equally com-
plicated and leaves the reader with several open questions. For the remainder of
this thesis we will therefore adhere to the former two accounts.
2.2.4 The Semantics of few
After having intensively discussed the semantics of many, we notice that most theo-
ries put few in second place. This might be due to the complex issue of the semantics
of antonyms. In this section we only provide a brief overview over the semantics
of few. Further, non-semantic properties of few, like referents it prefers bring into
focus, are also discussed in the next chapter, where psychological work is introduced.
The difference between few and many is picked up again in Chapter 6 and especially
in Section 6.7, where unexpected results of the interaction between surprisingly and
few are discussed.
The literature agrees in that the negative member of an adjective pair like short
- long, young - old, slow - fast, few - many involves negation. There is a debate,
however, whether the negation is lexicalized as in (67a) or whether the antonym is
split in the syntax into a negation operator little and the positive adjective as in (67b)
(Kennedy and McNally, 2005; Heim, 2006, 2008; Beck, 2011). See an illustration of
the two theories below:
(67) a. JfewK = λ A. λ B. |A ∪ B | ≤ xmax
b. JfewK = JlittleK (JmanyK)
A lexicalized negation is what we have assumed in the previous sections for the
sake of simplicity. It is just intuitive that few, which expresses that a cardinality is
small, denotes the smaller than relation ≤ between a cardinality and a degree. The
example sentences (44), (46) and (48) originally containing many can be analyzed
with few in a straightforward way. We exemplify the cardinal reading under a
quantifier semantics.
(68) JoeF/CT ate few burgers.
38 CHAPTER 2. LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND OF QUANTITY WORDS
〈t〉 5
POS
〈〈dt, t〉, 〈dt, t〉〉
C
〈dt, t〉
〈d, t〉 4
∼C 〈d, t〉 3
λd1 〈t〉
〈et, t〉 2
few
〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉
d1
〈d〉
burgers
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
λt2
JoeF/CT
〈e〉 ate
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉
t2
〈e〉
(69) a. 1 = λx. Joe ate x
b. JfewcardK = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≤ d
c. 2 = λQ〈e, t〉. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩Q | ≤ d1
d. 3 = λd. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Joe ate x} | ≤ d
e. 4 is defined iff JCK ⊆ {λd′. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Joe ate x} | ≤ d′,
. λd′. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Max ate x} | ≤ d′,
. λd′. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Sue ate x} | ≤ d′, ...}
f. JPOS K = λC<dt,t>.λD<d,t>.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(C) ⊆ D
g. 5 = 1 iff L(JCK) ⊆ λd. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Joe ate x} | ≤ d
(70) . 3 (# of burgers NOT eaten by Joe)
. •−−−|−−−−−−−|︸ ︷︷ ︸−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
. Ns
◦−−−−−−−−−
︷ ︸︸ ︷
|−−−−−−−|−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ BURGERS EATEN
. 4 6
The truth conditions are illustrated in the graphic in (70). Node 3 in (2.2.4)
denotes the set of degrees such that the number of burgers eaten by Joe is smaller.
This is equivalent to the interval of the numbers of burger that Joe did not eat. If
Joe ate, say, only 2 burgers, 3 would denote the interval [3 ,∞]. Further assuming
that the neutral interval Ns = L(JCK) = [4 , 6], 3 is fully contained in the number
of burgers not eaten by Joe. This results in the number of burgers eaten by Joe,
namely 2, counting as few in this context. The truth conditions in 5 are met.
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We see that a lexicalized analysis of the negation contained in few is easily
derived compositionally. However, since there is only one lexical item, this analysis
cannot account for the ambiguity that sentences with few exhibit, but not sentences
with many (Heim, 2006, 2008; Solt, 2009). That sentences with few carry one more
scope-taking element than sentences with many can be observed in the following
example from Solt (2009, 45f.). The difference is explained with the claim that
sentences with few can be ambiguous because the negation contributed by few can
take variable scope, either above or below the modal can (♦). The differences in
truth conditions are exemplified by the mutually exclusive continuations. Sentences
with many are not ambiguous.
(71) The students can take few advanced classes...
a. ‘... because not many courses are offered.’
 little > ♦ > many
It is not possible for students to take a large number of classes.
b. ‘... and still get their degree.’
 ♦ > little > many
It is possible for students to not take a large number of classes.
(72) The students can take many advanced classes.
It is possible for students to take a large number of classes.
To account for the ambiguity, Heim (2006, 2008) and Bu¨ring (2007a,b) suggest a
decomposition of the negative antonym into little and the positive antonym. Little
contributes (adjectival) negation and is scopally mobile. Bu¨ring (2007b) suggests
the following semantics:
(73) for any gradable adjective A, Jlittle AK = λd〈d〉.λx〈e〉.¬[JAK(d)(x)]
This adjectival negation is immediately compatible with the adjectival version of
many in (57).
However, the decomposition analysis is not an uncontroversial approach to the
semantics of antonyms. Heim (2008) points out that there is evidence for and against
it, and “the dilemma that results defies a simple solution”. I refer the reader to Heim
(2006, 2008), Bu¨ring (2007a,b) and Beck (2012) for a more thorough introduction
into the elusive semantics of antonyms and little in particular as well as a discussion
of the restrictions on the scope positions of the negation. The decomposition account
of few as well as the apparent difference between few and many will be brought up
again in Sections 6.7 and 7.7.
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2.3 A Surprise-Based Semantics for few and many
In the last section, we have seen three semantic theories of few and many. Even
though they differ in the semantic properties they ascribe to the quantity words, the
predicted truth conditions of sentences with few and many are essentially the same:
for a sentence with few, the described cardinality needs to be smaller than a certain
threshold value (i.e. the respective boundary of the neutral interval), for many it
needs to be greater. And these conditions lead directly to the open issue that all
three theories leave unanswered. None commits to how these threshold values are
derived for the respective comparison class. Romero (2015, 2017) derives at least
the superset of the comparison class in a compositional way, but she does not specify
how the function L determines the boundaries of the neutral intervals Ns. A more
fine-grained variant to set the standard of comparison is suggested in Solt (2011a),
where the neutral interval, or standard range RStd, is constructed around the median
of the comparison class. “The standard range RStd can be defined as a central range
whose width is dependent on the degree of dispersion in the comparison class” (Solt,
2011a, 194).
(74) JFred is short for a jockeyK = 1 iff HEIGHT(Fred) < RStd,
where RStd = medianx:jockey(x)(HEIGHT(x)) ± n; for some value n.
The proposal is, however, only spelled out for sentences in which the comparison
class is made overt by a for -phrase and a compositional analysis is not presented.
This is why it is not clear how and in which form the contextual information is
integrated on the basis of which the standard of comparison (i.e. the threshold
value) is derived. And even though the derivation of the standard is here described
in more detail than in other approaches, Solt (2011a) does not further specify how
the deviation n from the median is to be determined for each comparison class.
And exactly this is an aspect of Solt’s (2011a) proposal that could turn out to
be problematic: it commits to an equal distance n below and above the median.
Especially in contexts in which the value’s distribution is very left- or right-skewed,
the equal distance from the median makes wrong predictions. For example, in
a comparison class of jockeys, the left-skewed distribution of heights shows a very
small dispersion at the left end of the scale, but a larger degree of dispersion towards
the upper end. See Figure 2.1 for an illustration. Let’s assume that the distribution’s
median is 153cm. In such a comparison class, a jockey does not need to be much
shorter than the median to count as short, say 149cm and below counts as short.
This would result in a value of n = 3cm. An upper bound of RStd of 153cm + 3cm
= 156cm would be too low, however, since a significant group of jockeys is tall up
to at least 160cm. Given this example, we suggest to drop the standard range’s
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Figure 2.1: Sample distribution for jockey’s heights
symmetry assumption. For a definite verdict, the proposal would have to be tested
experimentally though.
A further complication in the undertaking of deriving few and many ’s threshold
values is that in many cases extensional alternatives as in the compositional analyses
(45), (47) or (49) are not sufficient. With a well-known example Keenan and Stavi
(1986) demonstrate the variance in many ’s denotation and how to derive it. The
use of many cannot even be predicted in a reliable manner when it refers to the
same group of individuals. Nouwen (2010) sums up their example:
(75) a. Imagine a conference of lawyers and policemen where normally 60 lawyers
and 40 policemen attend. Also, on average, only 10 attendants are
women. This year, there are only 20 lawyers, but a staggering 80 po-
licemen. Strikingly, all the lawyers happen to be women and all the
policemen are men. (Nouwen, 2010, 238)
b. Many lawyers attend the meeting this year.
c. Many women attended the meeting this year.
Given the context in (75a), (75b) is probably judged false whereas (75c) tends to be
accepted even though the set of lawyers and the set of women is exactly the same!
“This shows that if the context and the number of relevant individuals are both
fixed, many still gives rise to different meanings” (Nouwen, 2010, 238). Building on
the example above Keenan and Stavi (1986) and Lappin (2000) conclude that few
and many cannot be treated extensionally, because the context, alternatives, and
expectations and desires about them play a crucial role. Bastiaanse (2014) arrives
at the same conclusion and suggests an intensional treatment, too, but bases his
argumentation on Barwise and Cooper’s (1981) Generalized Quantifier Theory.
42 CHAPTER 2. LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND OF QUANTITY WORDS
One theory that sets out to resolve the open issue of the derivation of threshold
values while allowing for intensionality is the surprise-based semantics proposed
by Fernando and Kamp (1996). The intensionality that Keenan and Stavi (1986),
Lappin (2000), and Bastiaanse (2014) demand can be accounted for by a systematic
incorporation of a measure of expectations into the semantics. In the case of few
and many, prior expectations capture which cardinalities a speaker considers likely
or unlikely in a certain context. For example, given the scenario in (75a), a speaker
might expect that between 8 and 12 women attend the conference, whereas numbers
of women of 7 and lower or of 13 and higher are considered increasingly unlikely.
On the other hand, the speaker might consider it likely that roughly between 50
and 70 lawyers attend the conference, but higher or lower numbers are ascribed
an increasingly lower possibility. For this reason the same number can count as
many when compared to expectations about women but not when compared to
expectations about lawyers.
Examples like (75) bring up the idea that sentences with few and many exhibit
what we will call “surprise readings”. The cardinality described by the quantity
word is compared with cardinalities that are considered likely in the situation. Let
us for now have a look at a simpler example. The sentence in (76) would then
express that the number of cups of coffee drunk by Andy is lower or higher than
expected.
(76) Andy drank few / many cups of coffee last week.
 Andy drank less / more cups of coffee than expected.
In the context of coffee consumption, the contextual contribution based on which
few and many receive their meaning would be expectations about the number of cups
of coffee that Andy or people with Andy’s coffee drinking habits might have drunk
last week. Some cardinalities might obviously be considered more likely than others
in this context. For example, numbers higher than 40 are probably negligible. The
possibilities a speaker ascribes to each cardinality can be formalized in a probability
distribution PE and then be the contextual input for the semantics.
The idea that probability distributions play a role in the semantics of vague and
context-dependent expressions has already been brought forward by Clark (1991),
who builds on early work by Ho¨rmann (1983). Clark’s (1991) account of Ho¨rmann’s
(1983) observation that context-depence is closely related with expectations is dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 3.1 and only briefly summarized here. Clark suggests
that few could rather be taken to denote “the 25th percentile (range: 10th to 40th
percentile) on the distribution of items inferred possible in [the current] situation”
(Clark, 1991, 271). This approach explains the “cardinal surprise reading” of few
and many in sentences like (76) as intensional, comparing the actual number of
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cups of coffee that Andy drank last week to a probabilistic belief PE which captures
our expectations about the number of cups of coffee that Andy drank. This pro-
posal was formally worked out by Fernando and Kamp (1996). We will call it the
Clark-Fernando-Kamp (CFK) semantics.
The core idea of the CFK semantics is that few and many ’s lexical meaning
is a stable, context-independent function which contains a fixed threshold value θ.
This complex yet systematic function maps contextual input to precise denotations
by taking as input the cumulative density mass of PE and cutting it off at a fixed
percentage θ. Cardinalities higher than the cut-off would then count as many,
for example. Here, we focus on the extent to which this approach can explain in
particular unstressed cardinal readings as in example (76) (see Section 5.6 for further
discussion).
Coming back to the example in (76), the prior expectation PE is highly context-
dependent. It assigns a measure of relative probability to each number n, or more
precisely, to each proposition ‘Andy drank n cups of coffee last week’. If Andy is a
close friend, expectations could be very specific about Andy and his coffee drinking
habits. If Andy is a complete stranger, expectations are more likely very general
and derive from what one would normally expect from a person like Andy (with
fuzziness in what counts as relevantly being like Andy). In both cases, we may
think of PE as reflecting the relevant properties of a comparison class in a, perhaps,
loose sense of the term. Explicit lexical material or intonational and contextual cues
may guide the inference of the relevant PE. Usually, some uncertainty about the
exact properties that form the relevant comparison class will remain.
In contrast to the elusive parameter PE, there is also a context-independent
lexical meaning of few and many, namely a pair of fixed thresholds θfew and θmany
on the cumulative distribution of PE. Truth conditions of the CFK semantics for
sentences as in (76) are given in (77)5.
(77) CFK Semantics
a. JFew As are BK = 1 iff |A ∩ B | ≤ xmax
where xmax = max {n ∈ N | PE(|A ∩ B | ≤ n) < θfew}
b. JMany As are BK = 1 iff |A ∩ B | ≥ xmin
where xmin = min {n ∈ N | PE(|A ∩ B | ≤ n) > θmany}
From (77b), the sentence “Many As are B” is true if the number n = |A ∩ B | is
no smaller than xmin. In turn, xmin is specified as the lowest number for which the
5Fernando and Kamp (1996) spell out their semantics in terms of possible worlds. To illustrate
the basic idea we opt for a simpler extensional version here, also because we do not find a contra-
diction to the expectation-based comparison classes we assume. An intensional semantics will be
discussed in more detail in the next section.
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of the CFK-semantics
cumulative density mass of our prior expectation PE about the number of As with
property B is higher than the semantically fixed threshold θmany. As a result, “Many
As are B” is true if the actual number of As with property B is sufficiently surprising,
where surprise is relative to contextually-variable PE and what is sufficient surprise
is encoded in contextually-stable θmany.
To illustrate, consider the example in Figure 2.2 for the many-sentence in (76).
Prior expectations PE could look like in Figure 2.2a: they would assign a probability
to any natural number n, indicating how likely we think it is that Andy drank n cups
of coffee last week. Figure 2.2b shows the cumulative distribution of the distribution
in Figure 2.2a. If θmany was fixed to, say, 0.8, then the CFK-semantics would identify
xmin to be 8. Accordingly, for this PE, the many-sentence in (76) would be false for
any n < 8 and true for any n ≥ 8.
While such a surprise-based semantics may seem like an appealing idea, it also
raises methodological concerns. Since the precise nature of what counts as surprising
is hard to assess based on solitary introspection, it becomes exceedingly hard to
test the predictions of such an account. The main contribution of Chapter 5 is
therefore methodological. We seek to demonstrate how data-driven computational
modeling can be a helpful addition to the linguists’ toolbox, exactly where solitary
introspection fails and the theory under scrutiny concerns latent parameters that are
not directly observable, like a threshold on a measure of surprise. In other words,
we argue here, by means of a case study on the meaning of many and few, for the
usefulness of a particular approach to theoretically inspired statistical modeling of
empirical data.
2.4 Comparison Classes and Prior Expectations
Throughout this chapter we have seen various semantic accounts of few and many.
All of them formulate their truth conditions in terms of threshold values, which
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determine the applicability of the quantity words. These threshold values in turn
are dependent on a comparison class which “in some way serves to provide a frame
of reference or standard of comparison” (Solt, 2011a, 190). The comparison class
is closely linked to prior expectations, because it determines which information is
taken into account when speaker or listener reason about the prior distribution
PE they have in mind. To our knowledge, how a sentence’s semantic meaning
and comparison classes constrain reasonable prior expectations has not yet been
formalized. For example, Fara (2000), Kennedy (2007), Solt (2011a), or Bylinina
(2014) make reference to comparison classes, but do not further formalize or formally
integrate expectations. We set out to discuss the interesting relationship between the
speaker’s and listener’s epistemic state, their prior expectations and the sentence’s
semantics.
In the following, we will propose a “moderately radical pragmatic” account of
prior expectations, which in concert with a formal semantic analysis of the sentence’s
contribution explains how speaker and listener arrive at few or many ’s denotation
in context. This approach is “radical” because it allows for a lot of freedom in how
to obtain PE. But it is “moderate” in the sense that it requires PE to be natural and
inferable. It is also “moderate” in that it allows the linguistic material to inform
the inference of PE. The pragmatic proposal will be complemented by a formal
semantic analysis of sentences containing few or many and a formalization of prior
expectations. Instead of simply assuming that PE is magically fixed at some point
to be able to proceed with the semantic analysis, we will formally derive it from
the semantic and pragmatic contributions of the utterance. We propose a modified
version of the positive operator POS, an intensional degree operator POSsurp, to
compositionally derive the truth conditions of the surprise reading of few and many.
2.4.1 A “Moderately Radical Account” of Prior Expecta-
tions
PE is treated as a contextually free variable in the sense that the speaker has a
concrete PE in mind when uttering a sentence with a context-dependent expression,
but the listener may have to infer it in order to interpret the utterance. Let us
expand on this by assuming that a speaker wants to express with (44) from above
that Joe ate more burgers than she had expected him to eat.
(44) JoeF/CT ate many burgers.
What the speaker does is compare the actual number n of burgers eaten by Joe with
her probabilistic belief PE about the number of consumed burgers. To be clear, the
distribution PE provides the prior probability of Joe eating a certain number of
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Figure 2.3: This figure depicts the reasoning process of speaker and listener when an
utterance U expressing a surprise reading is made. On the basis of her underlying
epistemic state ti, the speaker forms prior expectations PE about the number of burg-
ers Joe might eat. The speaker then reasons whether to produce U as a description
of n, the actual number of burgers eaten by Joe, or to remain silent: P (U | n, ti).
Upon hearing U, the listener needs to jointly infer n and ti: P (n, ti | U). From U, a
comparison class can be derived, which constrains the inference of PE via a measure
function µ and thus ultimately also the inference of ti.
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burgers at this event, and this probability was determined before learning about the
actual number n of burgers consumed by Joe.
The shape of the prior expectations PE, and ultimately the decision to make
an utterance U , are influenced by the speaker’s epistemic state ti, as illustrated by
Figure 2.3 and the conditional production probability P (U | n, ti). This formula
expresses the speaker’s probability of producing utterance U given a cardinality n
and an epistemic state ti, see also in Section 5.3. The same shape of the distribution
PE can be triggered by different epistemic states ti. But different epistemic states
can also lead to different PEs. Furthermore, epistemic states may include more or
less concrete world knowledge. For example, the speaker can be aware that Joe
is a man from the US, that Joe is a man from the US who attended a barbecue,
that Joe is a US male who attended a barbecue on Saturday together with certain
other guests, and maybe other things. An open question is which bits and pieces
of information could or should inform the estimate expressed in a single PE for the
speaker. The information that goes into an estimate could be almost trivial (Joe
is a human being, so he cannot eat more than, say, 50 burgers at the most), but it
could also be quite elaborate (Joe is a meatlover, likes burgers especially, was not
particularly hungry that day... ).
Whereas a speaker’s PE is only dependent on her individual epistemic state,
the listener’s task in a talk exchange is more elaborate. PE as inferred by the
listener is influenced by the utterance (see more below), and by the listener’s world
knowledge. However, successful communication is only possible if the listener’s prior
expectations are sufficiently similar to the speaker’s. The challenge for the listener
is that the comparison class often goes unsaid. Consequently, we see the listener’s
role as inferring not only a cardinality upon hearing an utterance U , but also the
speaker’s epistemic state based on which she formed her PE when uttering U (cf.
Tessler et al., 2017). The formula P (n, ti | U) expresses the listener’s probability
of inferring a cardinality n and the epistemic state ti given utterance U . Find this
illustrated in Figure 2.3, which depicts a listener reasoning both about an utterance
and about the speaker and her epistemic state.
The speaker can provide guidance about his epistemic state by explicitly men-
tioning the sentence’s comparison class. Comparison classes can be made overt in
the sentence by a for -phrase (Kennedy, 2007; Schwarzschild, 2013; Bylinina, 2014)
or a compared to construction, for example.
(78) a. For a skinny man Joe ate many burgers at the barbecue.
b. Compared to his brother, Joe ate many burgers at the barbecue.
In most cases though, the comparison class is underspecified by the sentence
meaning. This leaves the listener with a gap between the information provided by
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the lexical material and information necessary to infer the exact epistemic state
based on which expectations are formed. Have a look at the example uttered by the
speaker in Figure 2.3.
(79) Joe ate many burgers at the barbecue.
The lexical meaning of this sentence only expresses that the number of burgers con-
sumed by Joe at the barbecue is large. It does, however, not restrict the comparison
class any further and only gives few hints on the speaker’s epistemic state. We do
not know from the lexical material whether the number is large for Joe, the vege-
tarian, or Joe, the meat-lover, for example. Moreover, the sentence itself does not
state whether Joe is compared to other guests at the party ( he ate more than
most other guests) or whether the recent barbecue is compared to previous events
( he ate more than at most earlier times). What sentence (79) expresses, however,
is that the speaker knows that Joe participated in a barbecue, excluding at least
those epistemic states from Figure 2.3 in which Joe went to a burger restaurant, for
example.
Furthermore, the listener’s inference of the speaker’s epistemic state can be in-
fluenced by the information structure of the sentence, as exemplified by the contrast
between (44) and (50) (repeated from above, see Sections 2.1.3, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2),
suggesting that the associate of POS can be focus/contrastive topic-marked.
(44) JoeF/CT ate few burgers.
(50) Joe ate many burgersF/CT .
In these examples, the speaker gives a hint of what exactly she compares the number
of burgers eaten by Joe with, by focus/contrastive topic marking a constituent. Did
she compare Joe to other guests, or burgers to other types of food? Note, however,
that prosodic information is only a weak cue because it is easy to misperceive (if
spoken). The same intonational contour can mark different focus/contrastive topic
structures and focus/contrastive topic marking can have reasons other than signaling
PE. For example,
(80) a. Few of the faculty children had a good time.
b. No! Few of the faculty children had a badF time.
Another option, which we want to pursue for now, is that the speaker com-
pares the number of burgers actually eaten by Joe to the number of burgers Joe
is or could have been expected to eat. Such an intensional comparison class sug-
gests itself to explain surprise readings, which compare the degrees described by a
gradable predicate with expectations about the degree. A comparison between the
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number of burgers eaten by Joe in (79) and prior expectations about his burger con-
sumption can be formalized as comparing the probability of sets of possible worlds.
Further evidence for an intensional comparison class comes from examples like the
lawyers-women scenario in (75) (repeated from above), for which a comparison class
containing individuals does not provide the correct truth conditions.
(75) a. Imagine a conference of lawyers and policemen where normally 60 lawyers
and 40 policemen attend. Also, on average, only 10 attendants are
women. This year, there are only 20 lawyers, but a staggering 80 po-
licemen. Strikingly, all the lawyers happen to be women and all the
policemen are men. (Nouwen, 2010, 238)
b. Many lawyers attend the meeting this year.
c. Many women attended the meeting this year.
All of these cues in the linguistic material can influence how the listener infers
the speaker’s epistemic state. In the following, we want to dive further into the
semantics. Even though we have seen that the information present in the sentence
is not sufficient to identify a single candidate for the contextually free variable PE,
it certainly restricts the set of candidates. This is why we consider a compositional
derivation of intensional comparison classes an important next step in bridging the
gap between a compositional semantic analysis of the sentence and prior expec-
tations, which are essential input for Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) derivation of
threshold values.
2.4.2 Compositional Derivation of Comparison Classes and
Formalization of PE
Even though PE might not be fully specified by the sentence, the set of candidates is
considerably restricted by the linguistic material. For example, the topic of sentence
(79) is the consumption of burgers and it is far off to compare the number of burgers
eaten by Joe with the number of books in the library. For this reason, the composi-
tional analysis of a sentence with a context-dependent expression is a good starting
point when its comparison class is to be determined. The biggest challenge will be
to formally derive prior expectations while taking the sentence’s comparison classes
into account. To be clear about the terminology, we will use comparison class to
refer to the set of focus/contrastive topic alternatives as proposed by Romero (2015,
2017). This set as we understand it here does not immediately fix threshold values,
in contrast to e.g. Solt’s (2011a) use of the term.
As demonstrated in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, focus-marking on Joe can be inter-
preted to derive an extensional comparison class over alternative individuals.
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(44) JoeF/CT ate many burgers.
(81) JCK ⊆ {λd. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Joe ate x} | ≥ d,
. λd. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Max ate x} | ≥ d,
. λd. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩ {x : Sue ate x} | ≥ d, ...}
This comparison class triggers intuitive truth conditions requiring that Joe ate more
burgers than most other relevant individuals. Note, however, that input into the
CFK-semantics is a probability distribution over cardinalities. A distribution which
can be calculated directly from an extensional comparison class is a frequency distri-
bution, resulting from summing up those individuals whose set of degrees in JCK has
the same maximal degree. This distribution is then normalized to sum up to 1 to
become a probability distribution. In the burger example, the probability assigned
to a degree (i.e. cardinality) is just the normalized count (i.e. the proportion) of
guests who have eaten this cardinality of burgers. Thus obtaining a probability
distribution from a comparison class in (81) is mathematically possible and could
provide the correct truth conditions for a case in which the speaker knows the num-
ber of burgers eaten by every guest at the party. This comparison class, cannot,
however, account for subjective beliefs and expectations. Moreover, if extensional
focus alternatives were all that matters for the inference of PE, we would run into
problems especially in the case where there are very few alternatives. If there were
only two alternatives to Joe (i.e. two other people at the barbecue), we only ever get
three cardinalities. The construction of PE as a frequency distribution would give
us equal probability for these three cardinalities and zero probability for all others.
For three guests at the barbecue and θmany > 0.67 the sentence “JoeF ate many
burgers” would be true if Joe ate most of all, independent of what this number may
be. This does not always have to be the case.
If (79) (for now without overt focus) is interpreted as comparing Joe’s burger
consumption to beliefs about his individual burger eating habits or to beliefs about
burger consumption in the overall population, the comparison class in (81) is not
sufficient; an intensional one is necessary, as already pointed out by Romero (2017).
We assume (and will show experimentally in the following chapters) that the most
salient reading of few and many in sentences like (79) is the surprise reading, which
interacts closely with subjective prior beliefs about the context. For this reason, we
suggest to employ alternative possible worlds in the formalization of every surprise
reading of few and many, independently of overt focus marking as in (44).
To achieve our goal of formalizing beliefs with an intensional semantic account
of the sentence and to formalize the inference of PE, some more effort has to be
put into modifying the positive operator POS, which will be given more semantic
and pragmatic power. Traditionally, POS serves to infer a value assignment for the
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ti
utterance
pragmatic input
semantic input
Doxti
D
W PE
µ
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θfew, θmany
Figure 2.4: Visualization of the semantic (rectangles) and pragmatic (circles) com-
ponents of the intensional degree operator POSsurp in (87)
free degree variable introduced by a gradable adjective or, in our case, a quantity
word (Schwarz, 2010; Hohaus, 2015). We build on this role assigned to POS and
expand its influence. So far, the version in (29) does not specify how exactly PE
or the neutral interval interact with the sentence meaning. POS takes as its first
argument a comparison class C, which is input to the function L. L returns the so-
called neutral interval Ns = L(JCK) of the comparison class. But in which way C is
influenced by prior expectations and how exactly the neutral interval is determined
is not spelled out in (29).
(29) JPOSK = λC〈dt, t〉.λD〈dt, t〉.L〈〈dt, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉(C) ⊆ D
In the following, we propose an intensional degree operator POSsurp with a dox-
astic modal base. In this respect, POSsurp has interesting parallels with Meier’s
(2003) semantic proposal for too and enough. In order to connect our proposal for
a “surprise-reading version” of POS with the discussion in the previous section and
with Figure 2.3, let us start at the pragmatic level. The epistemic state ti held
by the speaker and inferred by the listener is a rich representation of beliefs about
the world which incorporates all sorts of causal and epistemic dependencies. In a
conversation, however, we are only concerned with those aspects of the world which
are relevant for the evaluation of the recent utterance. These relevant aspects are
focused by the question under discussion (QUD) (Roberts, 1996). We take it that
the QUD is represented by an intensional comparison class W brought forward by
the compositional analysis of the sentence. POSsurp introduces alternative possible
worlds to the world variable w0 in the intensionalized set of degrees which it takes
as its argument, parallel to the Romero-style extensional comparison classes. This
intensional comparison class W, is a set of properties of degrees which are linked to
worlds compatible with Doxti(w0), the beliefs held in the epistemic state ti. W is the
minimal semantic contribution necessary to derive PE. In order to now systemati-
cally derive PE from ti while taking W into account, we introduce a free pragmatic
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variable into POSsurp, the measure function µ. µ measures our beliefs given ti,
by assigning the worlds in Doxti(w0) a probability, resulting in PE. While being a
representation of ti, µ is more coarse-grained since it only takes into account those
aspects of ti which are specified by W. The listener will infer µ and possibly ti from
the utterance, but once she has done this, PE is fully determined by µ and W. From
PE, POS
surp calculates xmax and xmin via θfew and θmany. Find the components of
POSsurp visualized in Figure 2.4.
In the following, our proposal will be explained in detail by deriving the surprise
reading of the sentence
(82) Joe ate many burgers.
The logical form for this sentence looks as follows6:
〈s, t〉 4
λw0 〈t〉
POSsurp
〈s, 〈〈s, 〈d, t〉〉, t〉〉
w0
〈s〉
〈s, 〈d, t〉〉 3
λw2 〈d, t〉
λd1 〈t〉
〈et, t〉 2
many
〈d, 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉〉
d1
〈d〉
burgers
〈e, t〉
〈e, t〉 1
λt3
Joe
〈e〉
ate
〈s, 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉〉
w2
〈s〉
t3
〈e〉
The first steps of the compositional analysis are given below:
(83) a. 1 = λx. Joe ate x in w2
b. JmanycardK = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≥ d
c. 2 = λQ〈e, t〉. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩Q | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λw.λd. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w} | ≥ d (=: D)
On the semantic side, the role of POS will be extended to derive the sentence’s
intensional comparison class W. W can be thought of as a QUD and determines
6We continue with POSsurp of a different type from (29) (〈s, 〈〈s, 〈d, t〉〉, t〉〉), see (87).
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what goes into PE. To derive W, POS
surp takes as its argument an intensionalized
set of degrees D and a world variable w0. In the present example, D contains the
intensionalized set of degrees corresponding to cardinalities of burgers eaten by Joe
in some world, as given in 3 in the LF and spelled out in (83d). The version of
POS we assume for the surprise reading then creates a set of sets of degrees by
applying D to the doxastic alternatives of the evaluation world w0. The result is
the sentence’s intensional comparison class W.
(84) W := {D(w) : w ∈ Doxti(w0)}
. = {λd′. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w} | ≥ d′ : w ∈ Doxti(w0)}
The introduction of intensions via POSsurp proceeds in a similar way to the introduc-
tion of extensional alternatives proposed by Romero (2015, 2017), and triggers a set
of alternative worlds. This set of alternative worlds is restricted by a conversational
background Doxti(w0), which is compatible with the speaker’s or listener’s beliefs in
the actual world w0 given their epistemic state ti. For several reasons, we assign the
introduction of alternative worlds to POSsurp and do not assume focus-marking on
the world variable, which would be even more parallel to the extensional case. First,
we believe that every surprise reading requires an intensional component to enable
the inference of prior beliefs. Second, a surprise reading can also be available when
overt focus marking as in (44) is present. Overt focus marking will be analyzed
“traditionally” in the composition. Below, we will elaborate on how the extensional
and the intensional alternatives interact to influence the derivation of PE. Third,
the association with prior expectations is not only driven by semantic, but rather by
pragmatic mechanisms. These are contributed by POSsurp as will be demonstrated
presently.
Once POSsurp has determined the intensional comparison class W, the next step
towards a probability distribution over cardinalities assumed to be performed by
POSsurp is to employ a probabilistic measure function µ to the worlds in Doxti(w0)
which are also linked to the properties made relevant by the QUD, as specified by W.
The proposal in (85) is a formalization of the reasoning process from an epistemic
state ti and an utterance triggering W to a probability distribution PE.
Note that it is crucially the intensional properties of degrees in W, see (84)
for an example, which determines what goes into PE. Among other things, W
greatly influences the probability distribution’s domain. As pointed out before, if
W contains sets of degrees related to burger eating, PE cannot express expectations
about the number of girlfriends Joe had before he got married7.
7For this reason, it is essential that W contains properties of degrees and not abstract degrees
(i.e. numbers).
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(85) µ : Doxti(w0) → [0, 1]
and PE(m) =
∑
w∈Sm µ(w)
where Sm = {w : w ∈ Doxti(w0) & max(D(w)) = m} and m ∈ N
The measure function µ assigns each world in Doxti(w0) a probability between 0 and
1, resulting in the probability distribution PE. µ is constrained by the utterance,
however, in that its domain is restricted to those worlds which are linked to a
property of degrees as specified by W. The prior probability of a cardinality m
under PE is then the sum of µ applied to all doxastic alternatives to w0 whose
maximal degree in W is m. In our example, Joe would have eaten five burgers in
every world contained in S5. The prior probability of Joe eating five burgers, PE(5),
would be calculated by applying µ to all w ∈ Doxti(w0) which fulfill
(86) max(λd. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w} | ≥ d) = 5
and summing up their values. For simplicity we assume that the set Doxti(w0) is
finite8.
The final step in the derivation of the truth conditions is to determine the neutral
interval NS = [xmax, xmin] from the resulting PE following the CFK semantics in
(77). The context-independent threshold values θfew and θmany are applied to the
cumulative density mass of PE to determine xmax and xmin. If the sister of POS
surp,
the intensional set of degrees D as given in 3 , fully contains NS, the sentence is
predicted to be true. For the hypothetical prior distribution in PE in Figure 2.3
and a hypothetical value of θmany = 0.7, the sentence “Joe ate many burgers at the
barbecue” would be true if he ate four burgers or more.
In the following, we want to integrate all of these individual components into one
covert operator POSsurp, which can derive the surprise reading of few and many.
After that, we present the entire compositional analysis of our example sentence and
move on to apply the proposed version of POSsurp to a sentence with overt focus
marking.
(87) JPOSsurpµ,ti K = λw0. λD〈s, 〈d, t〉〉 : NS = [xmax, xmin] and
. xmax = max{n :
∑n
m=0 PE(m) ≤ θfew} and
. xmin = min{n :
∑n
m=0 PE(m) ≥ θmany}
. for PE(m) =
∑
w∈Sm µ(w) and m ∈ N
. and Sm = {w : w ∈ Doxti(w0) & max(D(w)) = m}
. NS ⊆ D(w0)
POSsurp predicts a sentence to be true iff the neutral interval NS is fully con-
tained in the set of degrees D denoted by the sentence. In the case of quantity
8Nothing hinges on this. For the infinite case, take a (Lebesgue-)integral instead of a sum and
require that µ satisfies the necessary properties for (Lebesgue-) integration.
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words, the boundaries of NS, xmax and xmin, are defined as the highest or lowest
number for which the cumulative density mass of the speaker’s prior expectations is
lower or higher than the threshold value θfew or θmany. Prior expectations, in turn,
are inferred via applying a measure function µ to the doxastic alternatives of w0
compatible with D, relative to ti
9. The result of applying µ to Doxti(w0) is the
probability distribution PE. µ and PE are constrained by the sentence’s intensional
comparison class W because µ’s domain is restricted to those worlds which are linked
to a property of degrees specified by W. The probability of a single cardinality m
is the sum of µ applied to all doxastic alternatives to w0 in Sm, those worlds whose
maximal degree in W = {D(w) : w ∈ Doxti(w0)} is m.
Taking all this together, we modified the positive operator to account for surprise
readings, to systematically calculate the neutral interval and to formally derive prior
expectations which are compatible with the sentence’s semantic contribution.
The compositional analysis of our example sentence “Joe ate many burgers” is
given below:
(88) a. 1 = λx. Joe ate x in w0
b. JmanycardK = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≥ d
c. 2 = λQ〈e, t〉. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩Q | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λw.λd. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w} | ≥ d =: D
e. W := {D(w) : w ∈ Doxti(w0)}
W : = {λd. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w} | ≥ d : w ∈ Doxti(w0)}
f. 4 = λw0. NS = [xmax, xmin] ⊆
. λd. | {x : x are burgers&Joe ate x in w0} | ≥ d
4 is only defined iff NS can be calculated from PE for the contextually
given, inferred or assumed µ
Next, we want to apply the developed account for surprise readings to sentences
with overt focus. In contrast to Romero’s (2015) purely extensional analysis, we
demonstrate how prior expectations can be systematically derived from both an
intensional and an extensional comparison class. Remember that one reason for
outsourcing the introduction of alternative worlds to POSsurp was to keep open the
possibility of having overt focus in the sentence, which can then be analyzed “conven-
tionally” with a semantics of focus interpretation, as we have seen in Section 2.2.1.
We assume the following LF for the sentence
(44) JoeF/CT ate many burgers.
9We add the subscripts µ and ti to POS
surp to indicate their status as free variables.
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〈s, t〉 5
λw0
POSsurp,F
〈s, 〈〈〈s, dt〉, t〉, 〈〈s, dt〉, t〉〉〉
w0
C
〈〈s, dt〉, t〉
〈s, 〈d, t〉〉 4
∼C 〈s, 〈d, t〉〉 3
λw2
λd1
〈et, t〉 2
many d1
burgers
〈e, t〉 1
λt3
JoeF
ate w2
t3
To be able to account for the surprise reading of (44), to systematically derive
PE and NS and to include an extensional comparison class C, we employ a version
of surprise-POS which has an argument slot for C: the focus-sensitive, intensional
degree modifier POSsurp,F .
(89) JPOSsurp,Fµ,ti K = λw0. λC〈〈s, dt〉, t〉. λD〈s, 〈d, t〉〉 : NS = [xmax, xmin] and
. xmax = max{n :
∑n
m=0 PE(m) ≤ θfew} and
. xmin = min{n :
∑n
m=0 PE(m) ≥ θmany}
. for PE(m) =
∑
w∈Sm µ(w) and C(w0) ∼ PE and m ∈ N
. and Sm = {w : w ∈ Doxti(w0) & max(D(w)) = m}
. NS ⊆ D(w0)
The lexical entry for surprise-POS in a sentence carrying focus, POSsurp,F, is nearly
identical to (87)10 with the exception of taking as its first argument the covert
variable C (cf. Schwarz, 2010; Hohaus, 2015). C(w0) represents the sentence’s ex-
tensional comparison class and contains the sets of degrees corresponding to the
alternatives of the focus/topic-marked constituent in the sentence. The constraint
on PE introduced by C is that C(w0) has to be a likely sample of PE. C(w0) ∼ PE
is a mild pragmatic constraint for the listener’s inference of µ/ti. This means that
the underlying epistemic state ti requires PE to be compatible with the sentence’s
extensional comparison class triggered by focus/topic-marking. Focus-marking on
10The subscripts µ and ti are also added to POS
surp,F to indicate their status as free variables.
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Joe suggests a comparison between Joe and other guests at the barbecue and indi-
cates that a priori Joe was not considered to be different from the other guests in
terms of his burger eating habits. Consequently, PE is once more the link between
the hints in the linguistic material and the underlying epistemic state ti.
Find a compositional analysis of sentence (44) below:
(90) a. 1 = λx. Joe ate x in w0
b. JmanycardK = λdd.λP〈e, t〉.λQ〈e, t〉. |P ∩Q | ≥ d
c. 2 = λQ〈e, t〉. | {x : *burgers(x)} ∩Q | ≥ d1
d. 3 = λw.λd. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w} | ≥ d =: D
e. W := {D(w) : w ∈ Doxti(w0)}
W : = {λd. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w} | ≥ d : w ∈ Doxti(w0)}
f. 4 is defined iffJCK ⊆ {λw.λd. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w} | ≥ d,
. λw.λd. | {x : x are burgers & Max ate x in w} | ≥ d,
. λw.λd. | {x : x are burgers & Sue ate x in w} | ≥ d, ...}
g. 5 = λw0. NS = [xmax, xmin] ⊆
. λd. | {x : x are burgers & Joe ate x in w0} | ≥ d
5 is only defined iff NS can be calculated from PE for the contextually
given, inferred or assumed µ
This formal semantic account of the concept of prior expectations takes the sen-
tence’s extensional comparison class C as input, but allows for a “moderately radi-
cal” influence of the pragmatics by including subjective beliefs via an independent,
intensional comparison class W, which functions like a QUD.
2.4.3 Discussion
In this section, we proposed a modified version of the positive operator POS. With
POSsurp we are able to account for surprise readings of few and many. This operator
derives prior expectations which are compatible with the sentence’s semantic contri-
bution in a systematic way and calculates the neutral interval from them. However,
there are several issues with the presented modification of POSsurp that still need
to be addressed. Not all of them can be answered in detail in the scope of this
dissertation though.
The first is how exactly the reasoning process of speaker and listener really takes
place when producing or interpreting utterances based on prior expectations PE.
Which information is taken into account and how do we get from an epistemic state
to the prior distribution PE? And how much of this is part of the semantics? This
is directly related to the question of which aspects influence the inference of the
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measure function, the free variable µ. Moreover, what happens if several epistemic
states are equally likely given the listener’s inference and world knowledge? We
have sketched a rough idea here, but future work with contributions from cognitive
science, philosophy of mind and psycholinguistics is required to test the presented
idea and factors influencing expectations in general.
Second, the surprise version of POS in (87) assumes that POSsurp takes as its
argument its sister D of type 〈s, 〈d, t〉〉. We intensionalized the property of degrees
to be also able to account for sentences which contain more than one world variable.
It would be prudent to investigate more closely in future work whether we run into
compositional problems when dealing with sentences containing other intensional
operators like modals or too. An example of a sentence containing a modal would
be
(91) Many people want to go to Paris.
λw0
POSsurp w0
λw2
λd1
many d1
people
want w2
λw3
PRO
go-to-Paris w3
As far as we can tell now, constructing the intensional comparison class via argument
insertion into D should prevent problems with different scope configurations. This
should be confirmed with more data though.
Third, the version of POS in (87) is inspired by the idea of the CFK semantics
that few and many can express surprise readings, comparing the actual degree to ex-
pected degrees. A question that suggests itself is whether this assumption transfers
to gradable adjectives as well. At first thought, it is not implausible that gradable
adjectives draw on prior expectations. Nevertheless, to what extent gradable adjec-
tives express surprise should be investigated more carefully. This also brings up the
open questions of why there are different versions of POS and how they are related.
Similarly, it is not clear whether all readings of few and many are surprise readings.
An area of future research should be to investigate if there are cases which are not
dependent on prior expectations and how to account for them. Barker (2002) claims
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that gradable expressions can have more than descriptive uses. He suggests that a
sentence like “Feynman is tall” can also have a metalinguistic use giving “guidance
concerning what the prevailing relevant standard for tallness happens to be in our
community” (Barker, 2002, 2). Whether this use of gradable adjectives really cannot
be analyzed on the basis of prior expectations requires a more thorough reflection.
Another comment in relation to POSsurp is whether the mechanism of restricting
the context relative to the speaker’s or listener’s epistemic state is not also applied
elsewhere. It would only be economical if language transferred the strategy of deal-
ing with context-dependence to other phenomena. An example would be nominal
genericity. The domain of the universal quantifier every needs to be restricted to
match the context of the utterance11.
(92) Every student managed to explain the semantics of the definite determiner.
This sentence probably does not express that every student in our universe has some
knowledge in formal semantics. Instead, the sentence would rather be interpreted
as conveying that every student in some relevant course managed to explain the
semantics of the definite determiner, even though this is not explicitly stated in the
sentence. It would be interesting to further investigate possible parallels between
POSsurp and the universal quantifier.
Last, Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) theory is not the only one making predictions
about the calculation of threshold values. Lassiter and Goodman (2015) defend a
pragmatic approach whereas Qing and Franke (2014a) opt for an explanation based
on evolutionary linguistics and optimal language use. The presented semantics of
POSsurp in (87) only incorporates the CFK semantics and does not take into account
competing theories. Which theory eventually makes the correct predictions of how
speakers and listeners use context-dependent adjectives and quantity words will
have to be tested experimentally. In the following chapters, we make a start on this
undertaking by investigating the predictions of the CFK semantics for the surprise
reading of cardinal and proportional few and many.
11Thanks to Vera Hohaus for pointing this out to me.
60 CHAPTER 2. LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND OF QUANTITY WORDS
Chapter 3
Psychological Studies on few and
many
In the previous chapter, an overview over the many readings of few and many was
provided, accompanied by several semantic theories of how to account for them.
After this rather theoretical introduction, we now want to make use of the concepts
and terminology presented above and delve into experimental data about how few
and many are used.
Section 2.3 introduced semantic theory by Fernando and Kamp (1996), which
connects the meaning of few and many with expectations of the context. We called
it the CFK semantics and a main part of this dissertation sets out to experimentally
test its predictions. Before we start this venture, however, it is wise to be famil-
iar with previous experiments on the context-dependence of few and many and,
in particular, on their interaction with prior expectations. This chapter presents
representative psychological work in this area.
Section 3.1 introduces a hypothesis by Clark (1991), which suggests to represent
prior expectations as a probability distribution on which few and many impose
a threshold. This idea was then picked up by Fernando and Kamp (1996), who
develop it into a formal semantic account as described in the previous chapter. A
large body of work produced by Moxey and Sanford is summarized in Section 3.2.
They also identify prior expectations of the contexts as a factor which influences
the use and interpretation of few and many. Newstead and Coventry (2000) and
Coventry et al. (2005, 2010) point out expectations as a possible source of variation
in the use of quantity words, too, but they explain subjects’ behavior in terms of
other factors such as visual cues. Their experiments on few and many are presented
in Section 3.3. In Section 5.1 we replicate one of their experiments and show that
the various visual factors with which they explain their findings can be summarized
into the single factor prior expectations.
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3.1 Early Work on the Context-Dependence of
few and many
Early work on quantity words1 at the interface of psychology and linguistics was
conducted by Ho¨rmann (1983) and Clark (1991). Both investigate the effects of
the context on context-dependent expressions. Clark (1991) tentatively suggests an
intuitive semantics for few and many. Clark, citing Ho¨rmann (1983), argues that
it is impossible to provide a dictionary theory for few and many. A dictionary the-
ory would assume that the meaning of a word can be listed as a “a brief, partial
description of some aspect of the world... every word has a lexical entry in memory
that pairs a phonological shape, like ’dog’, with a conventional meaning, like ’canine
animal” (Clark, 1991, 264). For the meanings of few and many, Clark (1991) argues,
it is impossible to come up with a short or even a finite list of denotations because
conditions of use and interpretations vary highly between different situations. Vari-
ation is, for example, triggered by the physical size of the discussed objects which
clearly influences how people judge possible amounts and estimate corresponding
numbers (Ho¨rmann, 1983). For example, “many people in front of the city hall” is
interpreted as a larger cardinality than “many people in front of a hut” and “many
bread crumbs” is interpreted to be more than “many mountains”. This is the first
time that the concept of prior expectations was mentioned in connection with few
and many. Another problematic issue of a dictionary theory is that the numeri-
cal denotations of few and many are not “really fixed for each item on the list”
(Clark, 1991, 270). As an alternative to a dictionary theory, Clark suggests that,
e.g., few could rather be taken to denote “the 25th percentile (range: 10th to 40th
percentile) on the distribution of items inferred possible in [the current] situation”
(Clark, 1991, 271). The idea that a quantity word can be understood as denoting a
simple function which takes a context-dependent value was taken up and formally
spelled out by Fernando and Kamp (1996), see Section 2.3. The semantic account
will be tested experimentally in the following chapters.
3.2 Influence of the Context and Expectations
A vast body of research on the use of few and many has been produced by Moxey and
Sanford. They have not only investigated whether the meanings of quantifiers can be
1Chapter 2 introduces the linguistic background of few and many and discusses the controversy
of how to classify them semantically. To remain non-committal, few and many are labeled “quan-
tity words” in the remainder of this dissertation. In this chapter, though, the term “quantifier”
will be used occasionally for consistency with the literature discussed. “Quantifier” is the common
label of few and many in the psychological literature and they are often examined on par with
other quantifiers like a few, several or lots of.
3.2. INFLUENCE OF THE CONTEXT AND EXPECTATIONS 63
mapped onto a scale but also which extralinguistic knowledge they communicate. A
word-to-scale mapping account of quantifier meaning assumes that “a mapping will
hold between a distribution of numbers and a natural language quantifier” (Moxey
and Sanford, 2000, 239-240). Even though this idea might seem appealing and
intuitive at first sight, Moxey and Sanford (2000) argue against a rigid quantifier-
to-number mapping and point out several problems. First, it is not possible to
map the large number of quantity expressions onto a scale in a distinct way. In
a study of ten quantifiers, Moxey and Sanford (1993) asked participants in a one-
shot experiment to assign a number to a single quantifier chosen randomly from
the data set. “Several quantifiers were simply not distinguishable from one another
(a few, only a few, not many, few, and very few)”. Second, there is convincing
evidence against a stable, context-independent linking function between quantifier
meaning and the cardinality scale since “values assigned by participants depend
upon context” (Moxey and Sanford, 2000, 241). Plenty of examples of few and
many ’s context-dependence are given in the course of this dissertation.
Furthermore, a quantifier-to-number mapping account cannot capture that few
and many express more than just a reference to a number or an interval on a scale.
One core finding of Sanford et al. (1994) is that “quantifiers may be differentiated in
terms of the patterns of focus which they produce”2 (Sanford et al., 1994, 153). The
example below shows that even when a few and few make reference to the same num-
ber, the difference in focus means that the sentence endings are not interchangeable
(cf. Moxey, 2006, 423).
(93) Context: 5 out of 60 passengers were killed in an accident.
a. A few of the passengers were killed in the accident, which is awful.
b. Few of the passengers were killed in the accident, which is good news.
Many and a few, being “positive quantifier”, typically make reference to the set
whose cardinality is described and made reference to. This set is calles the reference
set.
(94) Many of the football fans went to the match. They cheered loudly when the
player scored.
Here, the pronoun they describes the reference set, the fans present at the match.
The reference set is made salient by many.
Few, however, behaves differently from many being a “negative quantifier”. Few
expresses negation (cf. Heim, 2006) and thus is downward monotone and licenses
negative polarity items (cf. Sanford et al., 1994, 157). Another interesting property
2The term “focus” is used here to mark the set that is made salient by the utterance, not in the
sense of a prosodically marked constituent which triggers semantic alternatives (cf. Rooth, 1985).
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that Sanford et al. (1994) investigate is that negative quantifiers can activate the
complement set (compset) of the cardinality they describe.
(95) Few of the football fans went to the match. They watched the match at
home instead.
They does not refer to the entities quantified over by few, the football fans present at
the match. Instead, their complement set is activated: the fans who are not present.
Moxey and Sanford (1987) confirm these observations experimentally. They asked
participants in an experiment to continue sentences like
(96) Few of the football fans were at the match. They...
Negative quantifiers like not all, not very many, not many, few, very few, hardly
any turned out to be complement set licensing in most cases. This means that
they “can put focus on those As which are not Bs” (Sanford et al., 1994, 158). In
the study, participants used to make reference to the set of fans who were not at
the match and gave reasons for their absence, for example. Positive quantifiers like
nearly all, many, some, a few rather make reference to the reference set, those As
which are Bs. These interesting findings are further investigated by Moxey (2006),
see below. We will pick up these results in Section 6.7 where we discuss the effect
which surprisingly has on many but not on few.
Another study presented by Moxey and Sanford (1993) examined whether the
choice of a positive or a negative quantifier expresses more than just the quantity
and the reference set. Instead, few “might signal that the speaker’s prior beliefs
were to the effect that he expected more to be the case” (Sanford et al., 1994,
162). Subjects were presented with a quantified statement in a dialogue and were
asked about the beliefs of the speaker and the listener. The experiment showed that
negative quantifiers like very few, few, not many were associated with the listener
believing that the speaker had expected more than turned out to be the case. In
contrast, for the positive quantifier a few this did not hold. Moxey and Sanford
take away from their studies that “quantifiers may convey information about the
speaker’s beliefs as well as about the current situation” (Sanford et al., 1994, 164).
These experimental results constitute evidence for making the semantics of few and
many dependent on prior expectations, as suggested in Section 2.3.
Moxey (2006) follows up on Moxey and Sanford (1993) and Sanford et al. (1994)
and ascribes an even bigger role to prior expectations. Even though few and many
are lexically different in terms of whether they express negation and are thus down-
ward monotone, this is not the reason why few is complement set licensing and
many is not. The claim is that complement set licensing is not a general lexical fea-
ture of negative quantifiers but triggered by unfulfilled expectations. Moxey (2006)
proposes that negative quantity words like few “indicate an amount while at the
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same time denying that this amount is as large as a supposed amount” (Moxey,
2006, 424). The difference between what was expected and what is fact is called
the shortfall. Complement set focus occurs when there is a shortfall between the
cardinality that was expected and the actual cardinality. “Focus on the shortfall
leads to compset reference, and in fact this defines the complement set” (Moxey,
2006, 424). In a continuation task similar to the one presented in (96), participants’
expectations were manipulated by describing that a character expected that a prop-
erty holds for none or all objects or people in the context. The actual amount was
described by several quantity expressions, for example few and a few. Then it was
analyzed what the sentence continuation made reference to.
(97) Jill expected [none | all] of the glasses to be washed.
[Few | a few] of them were clean.
They...
The experiment confirms the hypothesis that complement set reference occurs when
there is a shortfall. Few does not always refer to the complement set, only when
the expressed cardinality is lower than expected. Moreover, positive quantifiers like
a few can refer to the complement set when it is salient enough in the context.
We interpret these experiments to show that complement set focus occurs when
the described cardinality is lower than expected whereas reference set focus is fa-
cilitated when the described quantity is higher than expected. However, it is not
easy to draw further conclusions about few or many and their interaction with prior
expectations from these results. First of all, many was not tested experimentally.
Next, the expectations triggered by contexts like (97) affect the referents of other
quantity expressions like less than three just as much, even though these quantifiers
are not attributed to express surprise readings. Furthermore, although few does
not make reference to the complement set in every case, this result does not speak
against the CFK semantics. We argue against concluding that reference to the refer-
ence set for few suggests that it might express “more than expected” or that it does
not relate to expectations at all. In contrast, we rather think, that few in Moxey’s
(2006) test sentences sounds at least marked which triggered the reference set and
that participants used repair strategy. An example sentence from Moxey’s (2006)
data set is given below:
(98) Mrs. Smith expected none of the children to finish the essay.
Few of them completed the work.
They...
We think that a few would be a much more natural choice than few in such a context
and that participants might have accommodated the sentence by replacing few with
a better alternative. This suspicion would have to be confirmed experimentally.
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(a) small balls, large container (b) large balls, large container
(c) large balls, small container
(d) large balls, small tilted container
Figure 3.1: Stimuli from the replication of Newstead and Coventry’s (2000) Super-
bowl study
To sum up, while investigating interesting properties of few and many, Moxey
and Sanford identify prior expectations as a crucial factor for the meaning and use of
few and many. That expectations play a role in linguistic experiments also supports
the main objective of this dissertation: that it is worthwhile to experimentally test
a theory like the CFK semantics, which is based on elusive concepts like prior ex-
pectations. Recent experimental methodology and a computational model as tools
to approach this challenging task are presented in Chapter 5. Moreover, Moxey
and Sanford’s experiments also show that expectations can be manipulated experi-
mentally. This methodology will be employed in Section 5.1 to challenge the claims
made by Newstead and Coventry (2000) about the influence of visual clues (see next
section) and in Chapter 7 in order to test the context-dependence of proportional
few and many.
3.3 Subtle Effects of Visual Presentation
A series of studies on the influence of contextual and visual factors on the accept-
ability of vague quantifiers was conducted by Newstead and Coventry (2000) and
Coventry et al. (2005, 2010). They found that the size and number of the objects
described, the size of their container, position of the container, grouping and spacing
of the objects as well as the number and properties of distracting objects influence
how context-dependent quantifiers are rated in a judgment tast. They suggest that
not only the actual number of objects matters but also their expected frequency.
The goal of Newstead and Coventry (2000) is to investigate the role of the phys-
ical properties size and functionality in the interpretation of the quantifiers a few,
few, several, many and lots of. Few and a few are labeled as low magnitude quan-
tifiers, many and lots of as high magnitude quantifiers. Participants saw images
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of balls of varying size and number in a bowl of varying size and position as in
Figure 3.1. The participants were then presented with sentences of the form “There
are [quantifier] balls in the bowl” and asked to rate on a 7-point scale whether the
statement is a good description of the image. The rating scale ranged from 1 (to-
tally inappropriate) to 7 (totally appropriate). Newstead and Coventry (2000) found
that, as expected, the number of balls had a significant effect on the ratings but that
also their size had an effect: “Identical numbers of balls were given different ratings
depending on ball size” (Newstead and Coventry, 2000, 243). Furthermore, the con-
tainer made a difference. Small balls appear relative large in a small container and
consequently the low magnitude quantifiers a few and few were rated lower. The
authors suggest that this is due to the relative size of the balls. “What matters is
how much space they take up of the container in which they are held” (Newstead
and Coventry, 2000, 255).
Interestingly, even the position of the bowl has an effect. When a bowl which is
filled with a high number of large balls, so many that they reach above the bowl’s
edge, was tilted, high magnitude quantifiers are rated higher than when the bowl
is in its normal position. This is the case despite the fact that the balls look as
though they should be falling out of the tilted bowl, see Figure 5.1d. The authors
ascribe the higher ratings in this case to the fact that such a tilted bowl must be a
“Superbowl” because the balls do not fall out. The authors conclude that this list of
context effects indicates that quantifiers “carry little specific meaning in themselves
but instead derive their meaning from the context in which they occur” (Newstead
and Coventry, 2000, 243).
What we take to be the most striking explanation of all of these effects but
what the authors do not pursue any further is whether “functionality reduces to
the same thing as expected frequency” (Newstead and Coventry, 2000, 256). They
suggest, just as we will do in Section 5.1, that the size of the bowl, its position and
the size of the balls raises expectations about how many balls the bowl can hold.
This is also how the surprise-based semantics by Fernando and Kamp (1996) (see
Section 2.3) would explain these effects, but Newstead and Coventry (2000) dismiss
the idea because it is “not entirely clear which way these expectations would work.
For example, does the fact that a bowl is overflowing but the balls are still intact
lead to a higher or lower expected frequency” (Newstead and Coventry, 2000, 256).
In Section 5.1 we will explicitly address the relationship between expectations
and subjects’ ratings in an experimental setup as in Figure 3.1 and replicate New-
stead and Coventry’s (2000) experiment.
Other effects of visually presented material are investigated by Coventry et al.
(2005, 2010). Visual stimuli containing varying numbers of striped and white fish
are presented by Coventry et al. (2005). The fish are either grouped or mixed and
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Figure 3.2: Example images from Coventry et al. (2005) with varying numbers of
striped and white fish, varied spacing and grouping
the numbers of both striped and white fish differ. After having seen the image,
participants are asked to rate sentences of the form
(99) There are [quantifier] striped/white fish.
with the quantifiers a few, few, several, many and lots of and a random choice of the
color of the fish on a scale from 1 (totally inappropriate) to 7 (totally appropriate).
As expected, the number of fish on the display is a significant predictor of the
appropriateness ratings. Additionally, the authors claim to have uncovered “three
new effects on both quantifier rating and number judgements” (Coventry et al.,
2005, 510). Both spacing and grouping of the objects in the scene affect quantifier
ratings and number judgement, but “only when the number of focus objects rises
above the subitizing region” (Coventry et al., 2005, 511). The subitizing region is
the number of visually displayed objects that humans can immediately recognize
without having to count them. Usually humans are able to subitize sets of the size
of up to four (cf. Dehaene, 2011). In the mixed scenes (i.e. when striped and white
fish are not grouped together), low magnitude quantifiers are rated higher and high
magnitude quantifiers are rated lower. This suggests that participants estimated
the reference set to be smaller when the grouping was mixed (see Figure 3.2), which
was confirmed by the number estimation task. Also the factor spacing interacted
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Figure 3.3: Example images from Coventry et al. (2010) with varying numbers of
men and distractor objects. Distractors were manipulated in terms of form and
function.
with the ratings of the quantifiers, but mainly for high magnitude quantifiers and
at least nine objects in the display.
The authors interpret these results as a “correspondence between estimates of
numbers of objects in a scene and context effects for quantifiers” (Coventry et al.,
2005, 511). We are in line with the authors here that “knowing how many objects
are in a set affects the likelihood that a certain number of objects from that set is
present”. What the authors do not discuss, however, is that the number of distrac-
tor objects (white fish if the quantified statement describes striped fish) is a main
factor when the listener interprets the quantifiers proportionally. Even though the
statements in (99) use the quantifiers cardinally, a proportional reading is plausible
when the set size is explicitly fixed by the number of focused and distracting objects.
Consequently, the effect of the total number of fish should be obvious.
Coventry et al. (2010) further investigate the influence of distractor objects in a
visual display on the ratings of the quantifiers a few, few, several, many and lots of.
In their experiment images of a varying number of men playing golf are presented.
Coventry et al. (2010) manipulate whether the men are presented in isolation or
whether a number of other objects is shown in the same display. The numbers of
both focus and distractor objects are chosen from the set {3,6,9,12,15,18}. The
distractor objects are of the same or a different species (women vs. crocodiles) and
of the same or a different function (playing gold vs. not playing golf). Sample
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stimuli are displayed in Figure (3.3). The images are described by sentences of the
form
(100) There are [a few | few | several | many | lots of] men playing golf.
Participants were asked to rate how appropriate a description of each of the
five sentences is (each with one of the five quantifiers) on a scale from 1 (totally
inappropriate) to 7 (totally appropriate). The authors claim that “the number of
objects in a scene impacts upon quantifiers judgments even when those objects are
in a different category to the focus objects” (Coventry et al., 2010, 221). They link
their findings to the mapping between approximate number system and language.
However, the authors do not mention the possibility of a proportional interpretation
of the quantifiers. We claim that presenting the objects as a group makes it natural
to focus on their entirety. This, in turn, makes a proportional reading salient,
although the quantifiers are presented in there-existentials. In this case, it is not
surprising that the total number of objects in the display has an effect.
In their experiment, Coventry et al. found a main effect of quantifier and a signif-
icant interaction between quantifier and number, just as expected. Consistent with
results in Coventry et al. (2005), the quantifier also interacted with the number of
distractor objects. “Low magnitude quantifiers are rated as being more appropriate
in the presence of larger numbers of other objects, and vice versa for high magnitude
quantifiers” (Coventry et al., 2010, 231). Interaction with species and function did
not reach significance.
Again, we argue against ascribing too much importance to visual cues since their
influence can be subsumed under a smaller number of more general factors. Further-
more, we once more point out that Coventry et al.’s (2005) results indicate that the
subjects interpreted the quantifiers proportionally. Even though the quantifiers are
presented in there-existentials, the display makes the total amount of objects salient.
This set size can be used as a standard of comparison for the cardinal reading but
it certainly also facilitates a proportional interpretation. Speakers make use of this
salient information and are likely to have interpreted the quantifiers proportionally.
Coventry et al. (2010) once more do not draw this conclusion.
The possibility of a proportional reading brings up plans for follow-up studies.
The test sentences could be phrased to make this reading salient by using a partitive
construction.
(101) [A few | few | several | many | lots] of the men are playing golf.
Note that the quantifier lots of was used with this construction already in the orig-
inal study, further strengthening our suspicions. When the factor number (the total
number of objects as well as the number of distractor objects) influences the ratings
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to the same extent, this would constitute evidence that also the there-existentials
were interpreted proportionally. This result would be particularly interesting be-
cause it has been claimed that there-existentials force cardinal readings (Partee,
1989). Future studies on how the context can overcome this requirement and enable
proportional reading anyway are therefore recommended. Apart from visual cues,
we suggest that the focus structure of the sentence can help facilitate the shift in
readings. Focusing a constituent that points out a difference between the described
objects (men vs. crocodiles, playing golf vs. not playing) marks the comparison class
and relevant alternatives. How the focus structure affects comparison classes was
demonstrated in the last chapter when presenting two analyses by Romero (2015,
2017).
72 CHAPTER 3. PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES ON FEW AND MANY
Chapter 4
Computational Modeling and
Bayesian Inference
In Section 2.3 the surprise-based CFK semantics was introduced. The CFK seman-
tics suggests that the lexical meaning of few and many comprises a function which
takes as input prior expectations of the context and cuts off their cumulative density
mass at a fixed percentage θfew or θmany. We have already pointed out the appeal
of this account: it makes concrete predictions of how to derive the threshold values
xmax and xmin in context and further proposes in which form contextual information
is integrated.
Nevertheless, it poses empirical problems. How should such a fixed threshold
theory and the predictions it makes be tested and verified or falsified, given that
few and many are inherently vague and context-dependent? A first complication is
that the theory is based on measures of surprise and prior expectations of contexts
which are not fully specified by the sentence. Consequently, there is uncertainty
about the exact comparison class and, depending on the speaker’s knowledge, also
uncertainty about its statistical properties. Prior expectations constitute subjective
beliefs and are not frequency distributions of objective facts. For this reason, we opt
to measure them experimentally and do not use objective statistics. Further detail
of the experimental procedure are given in Sections 5.4, 7.2 and 7.3.
Another issue that complicates testing the CFK semantics is how to investi-
gate the context-independent threshold parameters θfew and θmany. θfew and θmany
are parameters which operate on representations of subjective prior expectations
and thus determine threshold values xmax and xmin on a cardinality scale. It is ex-
ceedingly hard if not impossible to estimate the values of θfew and θmany based on
solitary introspection. And even if we did, how should these estimates be verified
in turn? Their values cannot be directly observed or measured in an experiment.
We suggest to treat θfew and θmany as latent parameters in a computational model
instead. Drawing conclusions from empirical data about values of latent variables
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in a computational model is relatively straightforward for probabilistic models in
concert with a Bayesian analysis. This is the path we trod here, as well. The basics
of Bayesian inference and computational modeling will be explained in this chapter,
mainly based on Kruschke (2011, 2014) and Lee and Wagenmakers (2013).
4.1 Terminology and Methods
Before we explain how the CFK semantics will be turned into a probabilistic model
of language use which predicts the production and interpretation of few and many
in Section 5.3, we take a step back and start by introducing relevant terminology
and concepts with simpler examples. In general, we are interested in empirical data
and the underlying processes which created and influenced it. Consider the following
example by Lee and Wagenmakers (2013): Assume that a student, Anna, is sitting a
test and has to answer 10 questions of equal difficulty. We want to estimate Anna’s
ability, which we define as the rate θ with which she answers questions correctly. θ
is not directly observable. We can only observe Anna’s score on the test (Lee and
Wagenmakers, 2013, 3). To establish a relationship between observation (the score
on the test) and its cause (the ability θ) we spell out a model. The term “model”
is used here as a mathematical description, typically involving probabilities. The
model formalizes the assumptions about exactly how the score on the test relates to
the unobservable ability. For example, we can assume that we are prepared equally
well for each question because all of them are about the same topic. P (D | θ) is
thus the probability that the observed data could be generated by the model with
parameter values θ.
So far we have not thought much about θ itself. Even though we do not know
Anna’s ability, we have some beliefs about it. First of all, θ can range from 0 to
1. We could believe that Anna is very smart and assign higher values of θ a high
probability. If we believe that she does not know much about the test’s topic, we
would find lower values more credible. But we could also not know anything about
Anna’s familiarity with the topic or about the difficulty level of the questions. In this
case “a reasonable ‘prior distribution’, denoted by P (θ), is one that assigns equal
probability to every value of θ between 0 and 1” (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013, 3).
This uniform distribution which represents P (θ) is shown by the dotted horizontal
line in Figure 4.1.
Once the likelihood of the observed data given the model and parameter values
is specified as well as prior expectations of the parameter values, we can return to
our real objective: learn about which values of θ are credible given our observations.
After observing Anna’s score on the test we have modified beliefs. These so-called
posterior beliefs are computed after taking into account a particular set of observa-
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Figure 4.1: Example of a Bayesian parameter estimation from Lee and Wagenmakers
(2013): The curve shows the posterior belief in Anna’s ability θ, after observing 9
out of 10 correct responses. “The mode of the posterior distribution for θ is 0.9,
equal to the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE), and the 95% credible interval
extends from 0.59 to 0.98” (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013, 3).
tions. The prior is simply the belief we hold by excluding a particular set of data,
whereas the posterior is the belief we hold by including the dataset (Kruschke, 2011,
13).
Bayesian inference is what gets us from prior to posterior beliefs. A mathematical
law called Bayes’ rule specifies how to combine the information from the data - the
likelihood P (D | θ) - with the information from the prior distribution P (θ) to arrive
at the updated, posterior distribution P (θ | D) (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013, 3).
P (θ | D) = P (D | θ) · P (θ)
P (D)
(4.1)
The equation is often verbalized as
posterior =
likelihood · prior
evidence
(4.2)
Bayes’ rule is a quite simple mathematical law that helps us to ‘reason back-
wards’. Since we cannot measure the values of latent parameters, we infer them
from the data they trigger. Via Bayesian inference, three goals can be obtained:
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Figure 4.2: Examples of 95% highest density intervals (HDI) from Kruschke (2014):
For each example, all the x values inside the interval have higher density than any
x value outside the interval, and the total mass of the points inside the interval is
95%. The 95% area includes the zone below the horizontal arrow and is shaded
in grey. The horizontal arrow indicates the width of the 95% HDI. The horizon-
tal arrow’s height marks the minimal density exceeded by all x values inside HDI
(Kruschke, 2014, 88).
first, we can estimate parameter values to learn about Anna’s ability or threshold
values in the lexical semantics of few and many. Second, we may want to predict
the probability of future data values, or, third, compare models which make dis-
tinct predictions about the same data generating process. Just as for parameter
estimation, we will employ Bayesian inference to compare several model variants in
Chapters 5 and 7.
Crucially, the posterior inferred via Bayes’ rule does not deliver one ‘true’ value
but another probability distribution over the parameter space. Since the prior dis-
tribution has been informed by the data, it is more peaked over the interval of
parameter values which increase the data’s likelihood. This is exemplified in Fig-
ure 4.1. To see more clearly which parameter values are most likely to have created
the data, the posterior distributions’ highest density interval (HDI) is easily calcu-
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lated. The HDI is a way of summarizing a belief distribution. It indicates which
points of a distribution we believe in most strongly. The HDI specifies an interval
which covers most of the distribution’s probability mass, for example 95% of it,
such that every point inside has a higher probability than any point outside the
interval (Kruschke, 2011). For an illustration look at Figure 4.2. Note that the
HDI does not necessarily have to be one connected interval, it can also consist of
several disjunct intervals, as can be seen in the bottom row of Figure 4.2. As a last
remark, uncertainty of beliefs can be measured by the width of the HDI. “If the
HDI is wide, then beliefs are uncertain. If the HDI is narrow, then beliefs are fairly
certain” (Kruschke, 2011). The HDI’s width and, correspondingly, the certainty of
our posterior beliefs P (θ | D) in a parameter value θ can also be dependent on the
size of the data set D with which we update the prior distribution P (θ). This point
will be taken up in another example below. In the present example, a 95% credible
interval of [0.75; 1.0] for the mean rating of Anna’s ability given that she answered
9 questions correctly would tell us that the model with its most likely parameters
predicts Anna’s test score to fall into this interval. The posterior’s 95% credible
interval is also marked in Figure 4.1.
Even though Bayes’ rule is quite simple and easy to prove, it poses practical
challenges. First of all, we need to specify our prior beliefs of the parameter values,
a reasonable prior probability distribution P (θ). “Bayesian analysis tells us how
much we should change our beliefs relative to our prior beliefs. Bayesian analysis
does not tell us what our prior beliefs should be” (Kruschke, 2011, 224). Sceptics
might argue that subjective beliefs manipulate the outcome of the data analysis to
a too large extent. But we do not see this as a problem if the prior beliefs are
made overt, are explicitly debated and consensual. The analysis will only convince
its audience, if it uses priors that the audience finds palatable (cf. Kruschke, 2011).
Often uniform prior distributions as in the exam example are employed.
Another practical problem is the exact mathematical calculation of the poste-
rior. This does not only involve spelling out a model which predicts the data’s
likelihood and specifying prior beliefs in the parameter values, but also determining
the denominator of Bayes’ formula. The evidence, P (D) is the “probability of the
data according to the model, determined by summing across all possible parameter
values weighted by the strength of the belief in those parameters” (Kruschke, 2011,
48).
P (D) =
∫
P (D | θ) · P (θ) dθ (4.3)
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The evidence P (D) is independent of θ and is a single number which normalizes the
posterior distribution to ensure that the area under its curve equals 1. Calculating
the value of the denominator in Equation 4.1 usually means computing a difficult
integral. This undertaking requires pure, analytical mathematics and can be difficult
to achieve even with the help of modern computers and algorithms which numerically
approximate the integral.
The analytical intractabilities have limited the scope of Bayesian parameter ob-
servation considerably, but they have now been overcome. The practicability of
Bayesian statistics has changed dramatically with the evolution and refinement of
computer-driven sampling methodology generally known as Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC). MCMC techniques estimate the posterior distribution by randomly
generating a high number of values from it. The approach is called a Monte Carlo
method by analogy to the random events occurring when gambling in a casino. All
that is required by this method is that for a specific value for a parameter θ, the
value of P (θ) is easily calculated, especially by a computer. The same must hold
for the likelihood P (D | θ) for any value of D and θ and the product of prior and
likelihood. “What the method produces for us is an approximation of the poste-
rior distribution P (θ | D), in the form of a large number of θ values sampled from
that distribution” (Kruschke, 2011, 98). This means that the posterior distribution
can be approximated without having to calculate the difficult integral which con-
stitutes the evidence P (D). Based on this large sample of parameter values, useful
characteristics of the posterior distribution, like its mean or credible region, can be
estimated. Samples of the posterior distribution are generated by taking a random
walk through the parameter space. A proposal distribution suggests a value for the
next sample of θ, which is accepted with a probability α which is in turn dependent
of whether the product of prior and likelihood is higher than for the previous sample
(Kruschke, 2011; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013).
“Each individual sample depends only on the one that immediately preceded it,
and this is why the entire sequence of samples is called a chain. In more complex
models, it may take some time before a chain converges from its starting value to
what is called its stationary distribution” (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013, 8f.). To
speed up the process and to not have a too fuzzy beginning of the chain, it is
common practice to run multiple chains, to discard the first samples (the burn-in
samples) from each chain and to not record every sample, but only every second or
third, for example. This is known as thinning (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013).
With the processing power of computers constantly increasing, the “current
adage is that Bayesian models are limited only by the user’s imaginations” (Lee
and Wagenmakers, 2013, 7). This quote shows the community’s enthusiasm for
MCMC sampling, which is implemented user-friendly in JAGS (Plummer, 2003),
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Figure 4.3: Comparing the HDIs of PPC samples with actual data
for example, allowing Bayesian statistics to gain practical use. JAGS is a general
and versatile programing language for the specification of probabilistic models. It
delivers a sequence of MCMC samples from the posterior P (θ | D).
After having approximated a posterior distribution, it is wise to not simply
accept the model’s predictions, but to check that the model, with its most credible
parameter values, actually mimics the data reasonably well. This sanity check is
called a “posterior predictive check” (PPC) (Kruschke, 2014). The idea of this test
is to compare data predicted by the model with the actual data. Credible values
of the parameters θ are plugged into the model to randomly generate sample data
Dsample. This can be done particularly easy when using MCMC methods because
in every link in the chain, the just sampled value for θ can be used to predict what
data would look like according to the model. The results of this chain of simulations
Dsample can then be summarized by once more calculating the 95% most credible
predicted data values. Next, the predicted intervals are compared against the actual
data.
As a simple demonstration of how to evaluate a PPC, imagine that we want to
predict from a person’s age her proportional increase in body height per year. After
having specified a model (leaving aside the details for now) and having performed a
PPC, we compare the HDIs of the PPC samples Dsample with the actual data (pair
of age and proportional increase in body height). The hypothesized results of the
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simulations are presented in Figure 4.3. The dots in the figure are the (hypothesized)
actual data points. The vertical bars show the HDIs of the sampled data. Note that
even within the same data set, the length of these intervals can vary quite a lot (for
example, first vs. second vertical bar). By visual inspection of the graph, we can see
that the decreasing tendency in the actual data seems to be well described by the
predicted data and consequently by the model. However, two data points lie outside
the PPC’s HDIs, indicated by the red color of the vertical bars. Overall, the model
manages to predict 75% of the data correctly. This suggests that it would be wise
to contemplate alternative descriptive models. For example, the actual data might
have a nonlinear trend or be better predicted by a different family of distributions
(Kruschke, 2014).
This point leads us to the concept of Bayesian model comparison. It is often
the case that several competing theories make predictions about how a certain data
set was generated. And as we have seen in Figure 4.3, not every theory fits the
data well. To discriminate between two or more theories, we can turn them into
probabilistic models which predict the data generation process. By systematically
comparing how well each model fits the data set at hand, we can draw conclusions
about the validity of the theories. As a first measure we introduced the posterior
predictive check. Another measure of the model’s fit to the data which is easy
to compute based on the output of our MCMC sampling results is the so-called
deviance information criterion (DIC) (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002; Plummer, 2008).
The DIC may be conceived of as a Bayesian cousin of classical model-choice criteria,
in particular Akaike’s information criterion (AIC). Like the AIC, the DIC weighs
goodness of fit against the model’s complexity. Where the AIC looks at a maximum
likelihood fit for the model’s free parameters, the DIC considers the full posterior
distribution over these, given the data. A high value of the DIC indicates a lot of
deviance of the model’s predictions from the data it is applied to. This is undesirable,
of course. At the same time, the model should stay as concise as possible and not
include unnecessary parameters. This is measured by the pD, the number of effective
free parameters, a measure of model complexity. Higher values of pD suggest higher
model complexity.
4.2 Example: Estimating the Bias in a Coin
In the following, we present a simple example of Bayesian inference by Kruschke
(2014, 108ff.) to see the just introduced concepts and methods at work. The example
demonstrates how to infer latent parameter values from a sample of observed data.
From the number of heads we observe when flipping a coin several times, we set out
to estimate its underlying bias θ, i.e. the underlying probability of the coin coming
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up heads. Note that we know that θ’s value is between 0 and 1, but all we can
observe is the proportion of heads coming up in a sequence of coin flips, not the bias
θ itself.
As a first step in Bayesian data analysis, we identify the data at hand. In the
present example, the data consist of heads and tails. The number of heads coming
up will be referred to as z, the total number of coin flips as N, and, consequently,
the number of tails will be N - z in a dataset called D. In a next step, Kruschke
(2014) describes the likelihood of observing z heads in N coin flips with a simple,
descriptive model containing a bias parameter θ. When the outcome of the ith flip
of a coin with bias θ is denoted as yi and the set of outcomes as {yi}, the probability
of observing a set of outcomes given bias θ is the multiplicative production of the
probabilities of the individual outcomes:
p({yi} | θ) = θz(1− θ)N−z (4.4)
After having defined a likelihood function in Equation 4.4, we specify a prior
distribution over the values of the parameter θ. The prior formalizes what we
believe about the factory’s production of coins. Kruschke (2014) decides to use
an unrealistic but illustrative prior distribution, and assume that “there are only a
few discrete values of the parameter θ”, namely the values θ = 0.0, θ = 0.1, θ = 0.2
and so forth up to θ = 1.0. “You can think of this as meaning that there is a factory
that manufactures coins, and the factory generates coins of only those 11 types”
(Kruschke, 2014, 110). Furthermore, Kruschke (2014) supposes that the factory
tends to produce fair coins, with θ near 0.5, and assigns lower prior credibility for
biases far above or below θ = 0.5. This prior distribution is shown in the top panel
of Figure 4.4.
Collecting data and applying Bayes’ rule to update our beliefs in the possible
parameter values is the next step. For a simple example, Kruschke (2014) assumes
that we flip the coin only once and observe heads (i.e. z = 1, N = 1). For these data,
the likelihood function becomes p(D | θ) = θ, as illustrated by the linear function
in the middle panel of Figure 4.4. The lower panel shows the posterior distribution,
which is computed by multiplying prior and likelihood for each possible value of θ,
divided by P (D). We can observe that the posterior distribution is different from
the prior distribution. Because the coin showed a head, our belief in higher values
of θ increases. However, the prior’s effect shows because even though we observed
100% heads, the posterior probability of high θ values is still low. “This illustrates a
general phenomenon of Bayesian inference: The posterior is a compromise between
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Figure 4.4: Bayes rule is applied to estimating the bias θ of a coin when flipping the
coin only once and observing one head. There are discrete candidate values of θ and
the posterior is computed by multiplying prior and likelihood for each θ, normalized
(Kruschke, 2014, 111).
Figure 4.5: The two columns show the influence of different sample sizes, while
keeping the proportion of heads constant. The prior is the same in both columns
but plotted on a different vertical scale. The prior’s influence is overwhelmed by
larger samples (right column), resulting in the posterior’s peak being closer to the
peak of the likelihood function. Moreover, the posterior HDI is narrower for the
larger sample (Kruschke, 2014, 113).
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the prior distribution and the likelihood function”, or, in other words, between the
prior and the data (Kruschke, 2014, 112).
The previous example has shown that the influence of the prior can be large
especially when the sample size is small. In the following we want to expand on
the influence of the sample size on the posterior. To do so, Kruschke (2014) fills
in candidate values of θ with 1,001 options, from 0.000, 0.001, 0.002, up to 1.000,
resulting in a still discrete but more dense distribution in the top row of Figure 4.5.
In the left column of the figure, the data is a small sample of N = 4 coin flips with
25% heads. In the right column, the proportion of heads is still 25%, but for a
larger sample of N = 40 coin flips. Whereas both likelihood functions (as given in
the middle row of Figure 4.5) have the same mode (peak), the posterior distributions
differ in this respect, among other things. For the small sample size, the posterior’s
mode is at θ = 0.40, which is closer to the prior’s mode than to the likelihood’s
mode. For the large sample size, we observe the opposite. With the mode of the
posterior being at θ = 0.268, it is closer to the mode of the likelihood. From this
example, we can learn that the influence of the posterior rises with a larger sample
size. This shows also in the highest density interval. Even though both samples
contained the same proportion of heads, the HDI is smaller for the larger sample
size. In general, the more data is available, the more precise is the model’s estimate
of the parameters (Kruschke, 2014).
To finalize the Bayesian data analysis, we would next conduct a PPC to test
whether the model manages to predict the data well enough. If there was another
model available which explained the data generating process differently, we would
compute each model’s DIC and pD to compare their fit to the data relative to the
model’s complexity.
With this introduction into Bayesian inference and computational modeling in
mind, we can now move on to our ultimate goal, testing the CFK semantics. In the
next chapter, the predictions of the CFK semantics are transformed into a compu-
tational model of production and interpretation behavior. We will use experimental
data and MCMC sampling to infer a posterior distribution about θfew and θmany and
to compare several models which make predictions about the same set of data.
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Chapter 5
Cardinal few and many
In this chapter we explore the cardinal reading of few and many. The general prop-
erties of this reading have been introduced in Section 2.1. This chapter’s main goal
is to test the surprise-based semantics by Fernando and Kamp (1996). They stip-
ulate that the lexical meaning of cardinal few and many comprises fixed threshold
values θfew and θmany which operate on prior expectations of the context.
Section 5.1 presents a pre-study which tests whether prior expectations really
comprise sufficient contextual information to predict the acceptability of quantifiers
across contexts. We do so by replicating the “Superbowl” study by Newstead and
Coventry (2000) and investigate whether the factor prior expectations has as much
explanatory power as the various visual cues they propose. Section 5.2 once more
presents Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) fixed threshold semantics which is translated
into testable predictions and embedded in a computational model in Section 5.3.
Section 5.4 introduces the behavioral experiments to elicit representations of a priori
expectations, as well as production and comprehension behavior of cardinal few and
many. Section 5.5 describes how we employ Bayesian inference to learn about latent
parameters and the use of Bayesian model comparison to assess the plausibility of the
hypothesis that a context-independent threshold parameter governs the production
and comprehension of few and many. The results of the model evaluation and their
implications are discussed in Section 5.6.
5.1 Pre-study: The Superbowl
As a starting point into our investigations of the cardinal reading of few and many,
this section presents a replication of the study conducted by Newstead and Coventry
(2000). We investigate the influence of the context, in this case of visual cues, on the
use of the vague and context-dependent quantifiers a few, few, several, many and
lots of. Newstead and Coventry (2000) present participants with images of bowls of
varying size and position which contain balls of varying size and number. Depend-
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ing on the number of balls in the bowl, the bowl turned into what Newstead and
Coventry (2000) labeled a “Superbowl” because even if the balls reached over the
edge of the bowl, they did not fall out. A sample of the images we used in our repli-
cation is provided in Figure 5.1. The number of balls is described by sentences which
include one of the quantifiers and participants are asked to rate the acceptability
of the statements. Our goal is to show that the variance in acceptability ratings
which Newstead and Coventry (2000) explain by the factors ball size, bowl size
and bowl position can be summarized by one other factor: the number of balls
that are expected to additionally fit into the bowl, on top of the ones which are
already in the bowl (capacity). This would constitute first experimental evidence
supporting Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) semantics which assumes that the truth
conditions of cardinal few and many are dependent on expected cardinalities in the
respective context.
Newstead and Coventry (2000) themselves point out that expected frequency is
probably a key factor, but they do not follow up on their suspicion. “It is possible
that all these effects reduce to expected frequency but we believe the picture is
more complicated than this. The concept of expected frequency is currently too
vague to make specific predictions, and hence more detailed studies of the factors
involved are necessary before any overarching theories can be adopted.” (Newstead
and Coventry, 2000, 258). We agree that expectations come with a certain vagueness
but we do not necessarily share the worry that expectations can only be elicited
in elaborate studies. For this reason, we additionally asked participants for their
best guess of the number of balls which still fit into the bowl. If this measure
turned out to not produce informative data, it is still possible to turn to more
elaborate elicitation methods. Recently, progress has been made in the methodology
of measuring expectations and their validation (see Kao et al. (2014) and Franke
et al. (2016) and the experiments presented in this and the following chapters).
In the following, we spell out a number of hypotheses and present a replication of
Newstead and Coventry’s (2000) experiment to test them.
5.1.1 Hypotheses
Uncontroversially, we predict the ratings of the quantified statements to differ by
quantifier and number of the balls in the bowl. Few and a few are expected to be
rated higher for small numbers whereas many and lots of are rated higher for higher
numbers of balls in the bowl. Furthermore, we predict that few and a few are a good
description of scenarios in which a high number of balls is expected to additionally fit
into the bowl, when the capacity of the bowl is large. capacity is defined as the
difference between the maximal expected number of balls that can fit in the bowl
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(a) small balls, large container (b) large balls, large container
(c) large balls, small container (d) large balls, small tilted container
Figure 5.1: Stimuli of the superbowl replication
scenarios of which quantifiers are a good description
quantifier number capacity
= expected number - number
few, a few small small
many, lots of large large
Table 5.1: Hypotheses of Superbowl replication
in total and the number of balls that is already in the bowl. For the sample of images
in Figure 5.1, the bowl in Figure 5.1a would have the largest capacity, Figure 5.1b a
medium capacity and Figure 5.1c and Figure 5.1d a small capacity. We take it that
the empirically measured capacity is an approximation of prior expectations, for
example in the form of a flat distribution over the interval [0, expected number].
A higher expected number would imply a lower probability for each i <expected
number. Many and lots of, on the other hand, are applicable in scenarios in which
the capacity is small and the bowl is nearly full, when the difference between the
expected number and the actual number is small. We predict that it does not
make a difference which visual cues are available to estimate the maximal number
of balls the bowl can hold.The hypotheses tested in this experiment are summarized
in Table 5.1.
Newstead and Coventry (2000) utter concerns about including expectations as
a factor because of their inherent vagueness. Even though they suggest that ”func-
tionality reduces to the same thing as expected frequency”, they dismiss the idea
because it is ”not entirely clear which way these expectations would work. For ex-
ample, does the fact that a bowl is overflowing but the balls are still intact lead
to a higher or lower expected frequency” (Newstead and Coventry, 2000, 256). We
do not see this uncertainty as a problem for our predictions though. First, whether
people are really uncertain about overflowing balls could be tested experimentally
if necessary. Second, we do not see a problem in whether balls can reach above the
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bowl’s edge or not, since this is directly related to the way the capacity is deter-
mined. If a subject expects that the balls can flow out of the bowl, this results in a
higher estimate of the balls the bowl can hold in total and consequently in a higher
capacity than for the case in which the balls are expected to not be able to reach
above the bowl’s edge. In this case, the estimated maximum and also the bowl’s
capacity decrease accordingly.
5.1.2 Experiment
This judgment task is a replication of Newstead and Coventry’s (2000) “Superbowl”
experiment. It investigates the influence of visual cues and related prior expectations
on the acceptability of context-dependent quantifiers.
Design. Participants saw one picture of a bowl varying in size and position filled
with balls of varying size and number. The balls were either small or large, just
as the bowl was either small or large. The position of the bowl was either normal
or tilted. The number of balls in the bowl was 6, 12, 18 or 24. At this point we
diverge from Newstead and Coventry’s (2000) design who included more number
conditions. When the bowl was tilted and contained a large number of balls, the
balls reached over the edge of the bowl. But instead of falling out of the bowl, the
balls sticked somewhat unnaturally together and remained in the bowl, turning the
bowl into a “Superbowl”. A sample of the stimuli depicting 12 balls is presented in
Figure 5.1. The picture participants saw was chosen randomly. Participants were
asked to look at the picture and then read five sentences as in (102). The sentences
each contained one of the quantifiers a few, few, several, many and lots of and were
presented in a random order underneath each other. Participants were then asked
to rate on a horizontal 7-point scale whether the sentence is a good description of
the picture. The value 1 was labeled “very bad”, the value 7 was labeled “very
good”. Each sentence contained a different quantifier and all quantified statements
were presented at once. The there-existential construction made a cardinal reading
of the sentences salient, as discussed in Section 2.1.3.
(102) There are [few | a few | several | many | lots of] balls in the bowl.
Additionally, participants estimated the maximal number of balls that fit in the
bowl. Note that there is uncertainty of whether the balls should be able to fit into the
bowl or whether they can reach above its edge, as was indicated in some comments.
We intensionally left the decision to the participants since it is accounted for in the
statistical analysis. A smaller maximal expected number (when the balls cannot
reach above the bowl’s edge) is directly coarrelated with a smaller capacity.
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Figure 5.2: Mean ratings of the Superbowl replication
Participants. 126 subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with
US-IP addresses. Each subject participated only once.
Materials & Procedure. After initial instructions that explained the task, each
subject saw one image and five quantified statements presented in a random order.
In addition to the rating task and the estimation of the bowl’s capacity, we asked
participants for the color of the balls. Participants could choose between the answers
green and black. This tested whether participants paid minimal attention to the
task. The correct answer was black because only black balls were presented.
Results. Since every subject answered the question for the balls’ color correctly,
no data had to be excluded. The mean rating of each quantifier per condition is
visualized in Figure 5.2. A high mean rating corresponds to a high acceptability of
the sentence.
To analyze the data, we specified a linear mixed effects regression model pre-
dicting acceptability ratings. During a guided search through the model space, we
started out with a model containing only the random effect participant and added
fixed effects if this significantly increased the model’s fit to the data (measured by
AIC). The final model includes the fixed effect quantifier (levels few, a few, sev-
eral, many, lots of ) and its interaction with the number of balls presented and the
expected capacity of balls that the bowl can additionally hold. The capacity
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(a) Interaction between quantifier and
number
(b) Interaction between quantifier and
capacity
Figure 5.3: Interactions with quantifier in the Superbowl replication
was calculated as the difference between the maximal expected number of balls
the bowl can hold and the number of balls in the bowl.
Participants gave the lowest ratings for the quantifier few (β = 2.39, SE =
1.59, p < 0.001). The ratings for a few are not significantly different (β = 0.42, SE =
0.281, p = 0.066), but the quantifiers several (β = 2.60, SE = 0.23, p < 0.001), many
(β = 2.90, SE = 0.23, p < 0.001) and lots of (β = 2.90, SE = 0.23, p < 0.001) were
rated significantly higher than few. This effect is modulated by an interaction be-
tween quantifier and number of balls and quantifier and capacity. The in-
teraction of quantifier and number of balls reaches significance for the difference
between few and the high magnitude quantifiers many (β = 0.22, SE = 0.03, p <
0.001) and lots of (β = 0.26, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001). For higher numbers of balls, few
and a few were rated lower, whereas the ratings for lots of and many increased. The
interaction is visualized in Figure 5.3a. In comparison to few, the quantifiers several
(β = −0.03, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001), many (β = −0.04, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001) and
lots of (β = −0.05, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001) were rated significantly lower for a larger
capacity of the bowl. For a few the difference is not significant, see Figure 5.3b.
The fixed effects ball size, bowl size and bowl position do not significantly
increase the model’s fit to the data.
5.1.3 Discussion
The data support the hypotheses from Section 5.1.1, as summarized in Table 5.2.
Few and a few are applicable to small cardinalities whereas many and lots of describe
large cardinalities. Several seems to sojourn in the middle. This is confirmed by the
interaction between quantifier and number. Further support is provided for the
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scenarios of which quantifiers are a good description
quantifier number results capacity results
few, a few small X small X
many, lots of large X large X
Table 5.2: Results of Superbowl replication
hypothesis that vague quantifiers express expectations towards a cardinality: low
magnitude quantifiers can be interpreted to express that a number is lower than
expected, whereas high magnitude quantifiers state that a number is higher than
expected. This is predicted by the factor capacity, the difference between the
estimated maximum of balls the bowl can hold and the actual number of balls in
the bowl. Many and lots were rated higher when the bowl was expected to not be
able to hold more balls. Few and a few ’s acceptability increased when the bowl’s
capacity was high.
These two factors, number and capacity manage to account for the variance
in the data. The predictors ball size, bowl size and bowl position did not
reach significance when the factors number and capacity were included in the
model. This supports the hypothesis that these visual cues can be subsumed in
the predictor expectations. The size and position of the presented objects naturally
influence prior expectations, but it is not necessary to include each of them as a
separate predictor or to ascribe the tilted bowl the magical properties of a “super-
container” (Fernando and Kamp, 1996, 254). This role is better filled by the more
general factor prior expectations.
Prior expectations are also a major factor in the surprise based semantics pro-
posed by Clark (1991) and Fernando and Kamp (1996). In the following sections
we investigate prior expectations in real-world contexts and learn how context-
dependent expressions are assigned meaning based on them. The ultimate goal is
to quantitatively predict the production and interpretation of few and many based
on experimentally measured prior expectations of the respective context.
5.2 The CFK Semantics and How To Test It
In Chapter 2, we noted an omission in the semantic literature, which does not
specify how the threshold values which determine the use of few and many are
calculated. One theory that makes concrete predictions for sentences exhibiting a
cardinal surprise reading, however, is the surprise-based semantics by Clark (1991)
and Fernando and Kamp (1996). The CFK semantics was introduced in Section 2.3
and will be briefly summarized in the following. This theory stipulates that few and
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many comprise fixed threshold values θfew and θmany operating on prior expectations
of the context. According to this approach, a sentence of the form “Many As are
B” is true if the actual cardinality n = |A ∩B | exceeds a fixed threshold θmany on
a measure of surprise, which is derived from a a priori expectations PE about likely
values of n provided by the context. In simpler terms, “Many As are B” is true if
the actual number of n = |A ∩B | is surprisingly high, higher than xmin. The truth
conditions are repeated from above:
(77) CFK Semantics
a. JFew As are BK = 1 iff |A ∩ B | ≤ xmax
where xmax = max {n ∈ N | PE(|A ∩ B | ≤ n) < θfew}
b. JMany As are BK = 1 iff |A ∩ B | ≥ xmin
where xmin = min {n ∈ N | PE(|A ∩ B | ≤ n) > θmany}
Even with a fixed and contextually-stable threshold for what counts as sufficiently
surprising, whether a certain n counts as surprisingly high can still vary dramatically
with the context. For example, for numbers of children a family has and points
scored in a basketball match, we may have dramatically different prior expectations
PE. For this reason context-dependence and vagueness can be possible despite a
systematic, calculable and learnable stable core meaning.
To assess whether the CFK semantics in (77) is on the right track is a challenge to
classical methods from theoretical linguistics because they require intuitions about
truth, entailment and the like as input. This is because, in almost all cases, a
precise conception of what we consider to be “likely” is hard to get hold of. Still,
it could be the case that (77) captures speakers’ non-introspective use of many and
few well enough. What can we do? Certainly, we can probe intuitions (be it our
own, or those of informants in a controlled experiment) about applicability and
interpretation of relevant sentences in laboratory conditions that provide perfect or
near-perfect information. This approach poses practical problems that may or may
not be solvable by clever design.
But there is also an alternative that is worth exploring: data-oriented computa-
tional modeling, introduced in the previous chapter. Focusing for now on few and
many and the CFK semantics for their cardinal surprise uses, our main goal here
is to give one constructive example of how data-oriented computational modeling
could be useful for formal semantic theory. For one, we demonstrate how recent ex-
perimental methodology (e.g., Kao et al., 2014; Franke et al., 2016) can help obtain
approximate empirical measures of introspectively inaccessible “prior expectations.”
For another, we show how the core semantics in (77) can be turned into probabilistic
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models of speaker production and listener interpretation behavior. Finally, feeding
empirically measured prior expectations into production and interpretation models,
we show that production and interpretation data from suitable experimental tasks
can be used to infer plausible values of θmany and θfew.
We will propose a relatively simple computational model in the next section. For
instance, we will not consider genuine pragmatic competition between alternative
expressions. Other models are conceivable and may or may not give rise to similar
conclusions about the tenability of a CFK semantics. We believe that this is normal:
testing an abstract hypothesis (like the CFK semantics) alongside empirical data will
require auxiliary assumptions about how the hypothesis relates to data observations
(e.g., Quine, 1951). Yet, given data and a model about how latent variables generate
possible observations, we can then draw inferences about the unobservable latent
variables of interest.
In the following pages we want to test the CFK semantics by contrasting two
competing hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 assumes one fixed, context-independent pair of
threshold values θfew and θmany, which apply to probability distributions representing
prior expectations about the respective context. This is what the CFK semantics
predicts. Hypothesis 2 assumes that the thresholds θfew,i and θmany,i vary for each
context i. There is no deeper theoretical motivation for this hypothesis except
that it is the negation of the fixed-threshold hypothesis. Since thresholds on prior
expectations cannot be directly observed, we use computational modeling to infer
their most credible values. We will spell out one model for each hypothesis and
compare their fit to an experimentally-gathered data set. But not only the fit to
the data is a crucial factor for discriminating between two models, their complexity
matters, too. A model with less free parameters (in our case less threshold values
which need to be inferred) is less complex and therefore ceteris paribus preferable.
5.3 Computational Model: The Fixed Thresholds
Model
Evaluating the CFK semantics in (77) is a challenge for standard methods from
theoretical linguistics insofar as they rely on intuitions about truth, entailment and
the like. This is because, in almost all real-world cases, a precise enough determina-
tion of prior expectations PE seems to elude solitary introspection. To test a CFK
semantics, we therefore turn to data-driven computational modeling.
This approach effectively considers the contextually stable thresholds θmany and
θfew as latent parameters : their values cannot be directly observed but must instead
be reconstructed from observable behavior. Bayesian inference is one way to do
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so. Given values for latent parameters, a probabilistic model makes predictions
about how likely certain observable choices in production and comprehension of
relevant sentences are. In technical terms, the model specifies a likelihood function
P (observation | θmany, θfew) mapping values of latent parameters onto a probability
of seeing a particular choice in a suitable experiment. We will use data from a
production and a comprehension task to infer, via Bayes rule, which values of the
latent parameters are credible, given the likelihood function and some prior over
latent parameters:1
P (θmany, θfew | observation) ∝ P (θmany, θfew) P (observation | θmany, θfew) (5.1)
Our goal, then, is to see whether a single pair of threshold values θmany and θfew
explains our empirical data well enough. We focus on many in the exposition, but
the case for few is parallel.
Our computational model consists of a production and a comprehension rule,
both probabilistic. A probabilistic production rule is a function that assigns a prob-
ability distribution over expressions or utterances to any given meaning, while a
probabilistic comprehension rule is the same in reverse, assigning a probability dis-
tribution over meanings or interpretations for each possible utterance that needs
to be interpreted (e.g., Franke and Ja¨ger, 2016; Goodman and Frank, 2016). Here,
a production rule should give us the probability PS(“many” | n, PE) with which a
speaker, or speakers in general, would find the sentence “Many As are B” applicable
to n = |A ∩B | under prior expectation PE. A comprehension rule should give us
the probability PL(n | “many”, PE) with which a listener, or listeners in general,
would believe in interpretation n when they hear the relevant statement with many
in a context where PE captures the relevant statistical properties of the assumed
comparison class.
A production rule that implements the CFK semantics in (77) is straightforward:
PS(“many” | n, PE ; θmany) = 1 if n ≥ xmin and otherwise 0, where xmin is derived
from PE, as in (77), based on θmany, which is a free parameter for this rule (indi-
cated by writing it after a semicolon). This probabilistic production rule is only a
degenerate probabilistic rule: it only assigns the extreme values 0 and 1; it does
not allow for slack, mistakes or other trembles. As such, it would not apply well
1The notation “∝” for “proportional to” says that the expression on the right must yet be
normalized. So, P (x) ∝ f(x) for some function f is short for P (x) = f(x)∑
x′ f(x′)
.
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of production and comprehension rules for the example from
Figure 2.2
to noisy empirical data. So, instead of a step-function we look at a parameterized,
smoothed-out version.
PS(“many” | n, PE ; θmany, σ) =
n∑
k=0
∫ k+0.5
k−0.5
N (y;xmin, σ)dy (5.2)
PS: the probability of producing “many” to describe a cardinality n given
PE, θmany, σ is a smoothed-out version of a step function with a step at xmin
Here, σ is another free model parameter that regulates the steepness of the curve,
and N (y;xmin, σ) is the probability density of y under a normal distribution with
mean xmin and standard deviation σ. Essentially, this gives us a noisy implemen-
tation of speaker behavior under a CFK semantics where the amount of noise is
controlled by σ. Illustrations of this probabilistic production rule are shown in Fig-
ure 5.4a for the example started in Figure 2.2. The degenerate, non-noisy production
rule is the case of σ = 0.
The idea behind Equation (5.2) is this. Assume that a hypothetically true value
of θmany exists. Then, given a prior expectation PE over the contextually relevant
domain, the CFK semantics in (77) gives a clear cutoff for the minimum number xmin
of, say, cups of coffee that some particular Andy must minimally drink per week to
license applicability of many in a sentence like (76). We should assume that speakers
do not know for sure the actual xmin that is entailed by θmany and PE, most likely
because they do not know PE for certain, but that speakers nonetheless approximate
it2. More concretely, we assume that when a speaker decides whether some n licenses
many, she “samples”, so to speak, a noise-perturbed “subjective threshold” x′min
2For most contexts, speakers do not know the exact statistical properties, but nevertheless they
are able to approximate them (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006). How much knowledge we have
and how certain we are of it is very domain-specific. Estimating can be facilitated by asking for
measurements which are often stated explicitly, relevant in daily life and in restricted domains with
little variation. For example, it is easier to estimate the length of a radio song than the size in acres
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from a Gaussian distribution whose mean is xmin and whose standard deviation σ
is a free model parameter that captures speaker uncertainty (about θmany, PE, and
perhaps other things). If the sampled value is below n, the speaker finds many
applicable to cardinality n; otherwise, she does not. This gives us a probabilistic
prediction of how likely a speaker would, on occasion, find many applicable to n as
a probabilistic function of θmany, PE and noise parameter σ.
A derivation of a reasonable probabilistic comprehension rule follows suit:
PL(n | “many”, PE ; θmany, σ) ∝ PE(n) · PS(“many” | n, PE ; θmany, σ) . (5.3)
PL: the probability of choosing a cardinality n as the interpretation of “many”
given PE, θmany and σ is the prior probability PE(n) of n weighted by PS
(probability of producing ”many” to describe n)
This rule, which is illustrated in Figure 5.4b, can be motivated in two conceptu-
ally distinct ways that yield the same mathematical result. For one, we can think
of Equation (5.3) as an application of Bayes’ rule. Under this interpretation, the
listener tries to infer likely world states based on a model of reverse production by
taking into account how likely each world state is and how likely the speaker would
use the observed many-statement in these states. But since the production rule
in Equation (5.2) is just encoding “noisy truth-conditions” (rather than a genuine
pragmatic choice of which out of several alternatives to use), the formulation in
(5.3) also follows from the same considerations that motivated the production rule
in (5.2): the formula in (5.3) captures interpretation based on the CFK semantics,
given (Gaussian) uncertainty about threshold xmin.
5.4 Experiments
To test the CFK semantics through the lens of the computational model from the
previous section we need two types of empirical data. First, we need estimates
of subjects’ prior expectations PE. Second, we need data on how sentences with
few and many are used and interpreted. This section presents three experiments
aimed to give us such data. All three experiments use the same 14 contexts about
everyday events, objects or people which all involve a quantity of some sort (see
Appendix 5.A for the full list of test items). Test items were designed so as to make
a cardinal reading salient by choosing sentences with stage-level or existential pred-
icates (Partee, 1989; Solt, 2009) and by not providing contexts in which an upper
bound could be inferred. Test items are aimed to tap into general expectations of
of a park in the US. Uncertainty about a distribution could, for example, also reflect uncertainty
about potential mechanisms which generate the distribution beyond mere noise.
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common, every-day situations, not specific expectations about some possibly ab-
normal or non-stereotypical individual. We did not include fillers and no subject
participated in more than one experiment.
5.4.1 Elicitation of Prior Expectations
Design. To get an empirical estimate of participants’ prior expectations, we used
the binned histogram task of Kao et al. (2014). Participants saw descriptions of a
context as in (103a) and a question as in (103b). Subjects were presented with 15
intervals per item and rated the likelihood that the true value lies in each interval,
by adjusting a slider labeled from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely”. The
intervals’ ranges were determined by a pre-test. For each context, the pre-test asked
20 participants for the most likely, the lowest and the highest possible cardinality.
Based on their answers, we determined a range of plausible values which we divided
into 15 equally spaced intervals. For example, they would adjust a slider each for
the probability that Andy drank 0–1, 2–3, . . . , 26–27 or more than 28 cups of coffee
last week.
(103) Prior elicitation example
a. Background: Andy is a man from the US.
b. Question: How many cups of coffee do you think Andy drank last
week?
Participants. 80 subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with US-
IP addresses.
Materials & Procedure. After initial instructions that explained the task, each
subject saw all of the 14 contexts from Appendix 5.A one after another. For each
context, the 15 intervals were presented horizontally on the screen in ascending order
from left to right. On top of each interval was a vertical slider. Participants had to
adjust or at least click on each slider before being able to proceed.
Results. We excluded one participant for not being a self-reported native speaker
of English. Another participant was excluded for blatantly uncooperative behav-
ior because she had not adjusted any slider. To convert likelihood judgments into
probability distributions, participants’ ratings for each item were normalized and
these normalized ratings were then averaged across participants and once more nor-
malized. The outcome is visualized in Figure 5.5. These probability distributions
can be conceived of as approximations to the central tendencies of the beliefs held
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Figure 5.5: Empirically measured prior expectations. Error bars are estimated 95%
confidence intervals.
within the population of participants (Franke et al., 2016). This average measure of
PE from Figure 5.5 will be input to the model.
5.4.2 Production Study: Judgment Task
Design. In a binary judgment task we measured participants’ production behavior
of few and many. Participants were presented with a context which introduced a
situation and an interval as in (104a). The interval was randomly chosen from 8 of
the 15 intervals from the prior elicitation task, for example 10-12; see Appendix 5.A.
We presented only every other interval to avoid too large a number of combinations.
The context was described by a statement as in (104b) which contained either few or
many. Participants were asked to rate whether the statement is a good description
of the context by clicking on true or false.
(104) Production study example
a. Context: Andy is a man from the US who drank [2–3 | 6–7 | . . . |
26–27] cups of coffee last week.
b. Statement: Compared to other men from the US, Andy drank [few |
many] cups of coffee.
c. Question: Is this statement a good description of the context?
Participants. We recruited 301 participants with US-IP addresses via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.
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Figure 5.6: Proportion of true answers from Experiment 2
Materials & Procedure. After reading a short explanation of the task, each
subject saw all of the 14 contexts from Appendix 5.A one after another. For each
context, one of 8 intervals and few or many were assigned randomly. Participants
had to click on one of two radio buttons labeled with true or false before being
able to proceed to the next item.
Results. Data was excluded of nine participants who reported not to be native
speakers of English. Figure 5.6 shows the proportion of true answers. We want
the production rule PS in Equation (5.2) to predict the data from this experiment.
The decision to produce few or many to describe a certain number in the respective
context is binary. Our production rule from Equation (5.2) tries to capture exactly
this: the probability of whether few or many fit a given context.
5.4.3 Interpretation Study
Design. To measure how participants interpret few and many in different con-
texts, we used a forced-choice task. Participants saw descriptions of a context con-
taining one of the quantifiers as in (105a) and a question as in (105b). They were
presented with all 15 intervals for the given context and were asked to choose the
interval that they thought is most likely given the background information.
(105) Comprehension task example
a. Background: Andy is a man from the US who drank [few | many]
cups of coffee last week.
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Figure 5.7: Proportions of interval choices from Experiment 3
b. Question: How many cups of coffee do you think Andy drank last
week?
c. Intervals: 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-19,
20-21, 22-23, 24-25, 26-27, 28 or more
Participants. 200 subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with
US-IP addresses.
Materials & Procedure. First participants read a short introduction that ex-
plained the task. Then each subject saw all of the 14 contexts in a random order.
For each context, the quantifier was selected randomly and the 15 intervals were pre-
sented horizontally on the screen in ascending order from left to right. Participants
had to select one interval before being able to proceed.
Results. Data from two subjects who did not identify themselves as native speak-
ers of English was excluded. Figure 5.7 shows the proportions of interval choices.
The comprehension rule PL in Equation (5.3) is to predict the data from this exper-
iment.
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5.5 Model Evaluation
As explained in Section 5.3, our goal is to learn about θmany and θfew from the
observed experimental data. To this end, we feed the empirically measured prior
expectations PEi for each item i (see Figure 5.5) into the production and compre-
hension rules in (5.2) and (5.3). This gives us likelihood functions for the production
and comprehension data, which are visualized in the graphical model in Figure 5.8
and described presently. We only explicitly cover the case of many wherever that
for few is analogous.
Let Opmij be the number of true answers for item i and interval j in production
experiments for many and let Ocmij be the number of times interval j has been selected
as the interpretation for the relevant many-statement about item i in comprehension
experiments. Let Npmij be the number of participants that saw a production trial for
many, item i and interval j. Likewise, N cmi is the number of participants that saw
a comprehension trial for many and item i. O
pf
ij , O
cf
ij , N
pf
ij and N
cf
i hold the same
information for conditions involving few. Finally, let Iij be the j
th interval of numeric
values for item i. Let | Iij | be the length of interval Iij. The probabilistic rules from
Section 5.3 then give us (parameterized) likelihood functions for observable data.
P (Opmij | θmanyi , σi) = Binomial
Opmij , Npmij , ∑
n∈Iij
PS(“many” | n, PEi ; θmanyi , σi)
| Iij |

P (Ocmij | θmanyi , σi) = Binomial
Ocmij , N cmi , ∑
n∈Iij
PL(n | “many”, PEi ; θmanyi , σi)

Here, Binomial(k, n, p) is the probability of observing k instances of a coin coming
up heads out of n coin tosses when each toss has an (independent) chance p of
coming up heads.
Using Bayes rule, we can therefore make inferences about credible parameter
values given the data that we observed.
P (θmanyi , θfewi , σi | Opm , Ocm , Opf , Ocf ) ∝ P (θmanyi , θfewi , σi) · (5.4)∏
j
P (Opmij | θmanyi , σi) · P (Ocmji | θmanyi , σi) · P (O
pf
ij | θfewi , σi) · P (Ocfji | θfewi , σi)
Two remarks. Firstly, we assume here that each item has its own σi, but that
σi is the same for production and comprehension, as well as for many and few.
This is because we think of σi (and the vagueness it brings) as mainly affected
by uncertainty about the contextual distribution PEi . Secondly, the formula above
contains as a factor the joint prior probability P (θmanyi , θfewi , σi) of parameter values
102 CHAPTER 5. CARDINAL FEW AND MANY
P
E
i
σ
i
P
f
e
w
S
,ij
θ
f
e
w
i
O
P
f
ij
N
P
f
ij
i
co
n
tex
t
j
in
terv
a
l
P
p
ro
d
u
ctio
n
P
f
e
w
L
,ij
O
C
f
ij
N
C
f
i
i
co
n
tex
t
j
in
terv
a
l
C
co
m
p
reh
en
sio
n
P
m
a
n
y
S
,ij
θ
m
a
n
y
i
O
P
m
ij
N
P
m
ij
i
co
n
tex
t
j
in
terv
a
l
P
p
ro
d
u
ctio
n
P
m
a
n
y
L
,ij
O
C
m
ij
N
C
m
i
i
co
n
tex
t
j
in
terv
a
l
C
co
m
p
reh
en
sio
n
O
C
m
ij
∼
B
in
o
m
ia
l(P
m
a
n
y
L
,ij
,N
C
m
i
)
O
P
m
ij
∼
B
in
o
m
ia
l(P
m
a
n
y
S
,ij
,N
P
m
ij
)
O
C
f
ij
∼
B
in
o
m
ia
l(P
f
e
w
L
,ij
,N
C
f
i
)
O
P
f
ij
∼
B
in
o
m
ia
l(P
f
e
w
S
,ij
,N
P
f
ij
)
x
m
in
,i
=
m
in{
n
∈
N
|
P
E
i (|A
∩
B
|≤
n
)
>
θ
m
a
n
y
i }
x
m
a
x
,i
=
m
ax{n
∈
N
|
P
E
i (|A
∩
B
|≤
n
)
<
θ
f
e
w
i }
P
f
e
w
/
m
a
n
y
S
,ij
= ∑
jk
=
0 ∫
k
+
0
.5
k−
0
.5 N
(y
;x
m
a
x
/
m
in
,i ,σ
i )d
y
P
f
e
w
/
m
a
n
y
L
,ij
∝
P
E
i ·P
f
e
w
/
m
a
n
y
S
,ij
θ
f
e
w
i ,θ
m
a
n
y
i ∼
U
n
ifo
rm
(0
,1)
σ
i ∼
U
n
ifo
rm
(0
,10
)
F
igu
re
5.8:
G
rap
h
ical
m
o
d
el
of
th
e
C
F
K
sem
an
tics
5.5. MODEL EVALUATION 103
few many
book
bus
calls
class
coffee
cook
facebook
friends
hair
movies
poem
restaurants
shoes
tshirts
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
HDI of indiviual thresholds
Ite
m
s
(a) 95% HDIs of the estimated posteriors
for thresholds for different contexts i. The
vertical lines give the biggest interval in
which most contexts’ HDIs overlap.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
lllll
ll
llll
l
lllll
l ll ll ll l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l ll lllll
l
ll
l
l lll l lll
l
ll lll l
few
interpretation
few
production
many
interpretation
many
production
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
observation
pr
ed
ict
io
n
(b) Correlation of GTM’s predictions and
observations. For production we plot the
proportion of true ratings, for interpreta-
tion the proportion of interval choices.
Figure 5.9: Model Predictions
θmanyi , θfewi and σi for each item i. Here, we simply assume that θmanyi , θfewi and σi
are independent of each other and that they have uniform priors over a large-enough
interval of a priori plausible values.
P (θmanyi , θfewi , σi) = Uniform[0;1](θmanyi) · Uniform[0;1](θfewi) · Uniform[0;10](σi)
To approximate the joint posterior distribution defined in (5.4), we used MCMC
sampling, as implemented in JAGS (Plummer, 2003). We collected 10,000 sam-
ples from 2 MCMC chains after a burn-in of 10,000. This ensured convergence, as
measured by Rˆ (Gelman and Rubin, 1992). Figure 5.9a shows the estimated 95%
credible intervals for the marginalized posteriors over θmanyi and θfewi for all items.
3
3A 95% credible interval is, intuitively put, an interval of values that are sufficiently plausible
to warrant belief in (see Kruschke, 2014), see Section 4.1. For example, a 95% credible interval for
θmanyi of [0.6; 0.8] for some item i would tell us that, given the data used to condition the inference,
we should be reasonably certain that the true value of θmanyi is in [0.6; 0.8].
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If for all i the credible intervals for θmanyi in Figure 5.9a overlapped, and likewise
for θfewi , then this would very clearly speak in favor of a CFK semantics. Such clear
evidence is not forthcoming. For many, 13 of the 14 items’ credible intervals overlap
in [0.687 , 0.699]. For few, 12 of the 14 items’ credible intervals overlap in [0.148 ,
0.151]. This is close to uniformity, but there are exceptions: “movies watched per
year” for many as well as “students in class” and “facebook friends” for few. In
effect, we do not see clear evidence in favor of a uniform CFK semantics, but we
also do not see clear evidence against it.
Another possibility of assessing the idea of a uniform CFK semantics is to com-
pare different models. The approach in (5.4) assumes that each item i has its own
semantic threshold values θmanyi and θfewi . Let us call it the Individual Threshold
Model (ITM). It incorporates what we called hypothesis 2 at the end of Section 5.2.
We can compare the ITM with the outcome of a model that allows for only one
θmany and one θfew, call this the General Threshold Model (GTM). GTM represents
hypothesis 1. Its posterior is defined as follows:
P (θmany, θfew, σi | Opm , Ocm , Opf , Ocf ) ∝ P (θmany, θfew, σi) ·∏
j
P (Opmij | θmany, σi) · P (Ocmji | θmany, σi) · P (Opfij | θfew, σi) · P (Ocfji | θfew, σi) .
It is also possible to use information from either only the production or the com-
prehension data to make inferences about latent thresholds. We will make use of
that possibility too in order to see whether a uniform CFK semantics might work
well for production or comprehension only. For example, an inference about likely
item-specific thresholds based on production data only would use the posterior dis-
tribution given by:
P (θmanyi , θfewi , σi | Opm , Opf ) ∝ P (θmany, θfew, σi) · (5.5)∏
j
P (Opmij | θmany, σi) · P (Opfij | θfew, σi) .
The question we are interested in is then: which model is better suited to explain
the data? This question can be addressed by statistical model comparison. There are
different measures for model comparison, all based on different purposes and reasons
for preferring one model over another (Vehtari and Ojanen, 2012). Given our modest
theoretical purposes here, we use an approach that is easy to compute based on the
output of our MCMC sampling results, the so-called deviance information criterion
(DIC) (see Chapter 4). The DIC weighs goodness of fit (here: the likelihood of the
data given the model “trained” on the data) against the model’s complexity (here:
the number of its effective free parameters). A high value of the DIC indicates
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data used
model production interpretation both
GTM DIC = 4191.6, pD = 16 DIC = 2239.6, pD = 17 DIC = 6546.7, pD = 17
ITM DIC = 4196.0, pD = 40 DIC = 2182.4, pD = 46 DIC = 6529.5, pD = 40
Table 5.3: Estimated DIC values and effective free parameters
a lot of deviance of the model’s predictions from the data it is applied to. This
is undesirable, of course. At the same time, the model should stay as concise as
possible and not include unnecessary parameters. This is measured by the pD, the
number of effective free parameters, a measure of model complexity. Higher values
of pD suggest higher model complexity.
Table 5.3 gives estimated DICs for the GTM and the ITM, based only on pro-
duction data, based only on comprehension data and based on both data sets at
once. We see that the GTM is roughly equal to, if not better than the ITM based
on the production data only. It is a bit worse based on interpretation data and
both data sets combined. Still, both models are clearly in the same ballpark. What
the GTM misses in terms of goodness of fit, it makes up in terms of reduced model
complexity. Based on our data alone, there is no clear reason to prefer either model
in terms of DICs. That means that there is no reason, provided by our data, to
reject the “null assumption” that a single θmany and a single θfew governs the use of
many and few. The alternative model ITM did not do any better.
What is more, the ITM allows no possibility to generalize beyond the 14 items
used here. Put differently, the ITM would assume that θmany would be anywhere
between 0 and 1 (its prior) for a context which was not part of the data used to
condition it on. The GTM would be able to use its posterior distribution for θmany.
The utter lack of generalizability in ITM speaks, at least conceptually, in favor of
GTM. Whether this is an empirical advantage would have to be tested. Given the
data at hand and the fact that the ITM is not obviously better for this data set,
there is no good reason to dismiss the hypothesis that a single pair of fixed thresholds
θmany and θfew may have generated the production and interpretation data that we
have seen.
Figure 5.9b shows the correlation between the GTM’s predictions and the ob-
served data. For production task, the correlation between predicted and observed
data is 0.89 for many and 0.92 for few. For the interpretation task, we find a corre-
lation of 0.54 for many and 0.73 for few. The GTM’s predictions are less accurate
for the interpretation data because in this task participants had much more free-
dom. They could choose between 15 intervals, whereas in the production task, only
two options (true and false) were available. The posterior values of the noise
parameters σi for each item i are given in Table 5.4. They express the steepness of
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the production probability’s curve formalized as the standard deviation of a normal
distribution. σi ranges over the 15 intervals, whose length is dependent on the item
(see Section 5.4.1).
5.6 Discussion
This chapter tried to make a methodological contribution, exemplifying a potential
use of data-driven computational modeling in formal semantics/pragmatics. By
measuring subjects’ prior expectations about real-world events experimentally, we
set out to test a proposal for a semantics of few and many that is hard to assess
introspectively. We showed how to couch the CFK semantics for few and many in a
probabilistic model for production and comprehension. With the help of this model,
we inferred a posteriori credible values for latent threshold parameters θmany and
θfew from experimental data that aimed to measure production and comprehension
behavior. Posterior credible values of individual threshold parameters θmanyi and
θfewi for different experimental items i are very similar, with overlap in the 95% HDIs
of almost all items. Moreover, statistical model comparison in terms of DICs does
not favor a model with individual thresholds for each item over a more parsimonious
model that assumes only one fixed threshold for many and one for few. The model
comparison based on fit to the data and model complexity supports Hypothesis 1.
Consequently, the question whether a fixed threshold CFK semantics is plausible can
be answered positively, at least for the data set at hand. This finding is especially
credible in the light of language acquisition because it is not a plausible assumption
that the meaning of few and many would have to be learned anew for each context.
Factors that might be responsible for the observed finding that not all credible
intervals do fully overlap could be a methodological issue in the elicitation of priors,
too much uncertainty about the threshold or that not all speakers shared the same
comparison classes. For now, we are not able to solve all of these factors. Instead,
we want to point out some of them as questions for further investigation.
The benefits of theoretically informed statistical modeling of this kind are many.
The computational model makes explicit all modeling assumptions including any
linking hypotheses regarding how theoretical notions relate to each other in produc-
ing the observable data (e.g. Chemla and Singh, 2014; Franke, 2016). The model
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considered here, for instance, assumes that the production and comprehension data
are only driven by considerations of truth. In other words, this quite simple seman-
tic model assumes that participants in, say, Experiment 3 would not reason about
what other expressions a speaker may have used other than many or other than
few. However, alternative utterances containing a few, lots of or surprisingly few
are very likely also taken into account during the speaker’s precision process.
Furthermore, some experimental items from Scho¨ller and Franke (2015) revealed
other relevant factors which can influence the use of few and many and might want
to be included in a more elaborate model. The first is the grammatical number
feature which requires that the quantity words combine with a plural noun. This
constraint turned out to be a stronger factor than participants’ prior expectations.
(106) John is a man from the US who has few children.
How many children do you think John has?
Even though the prior elicitation task confirmed that participants consider it very
likely that an American man has 0 or 1 children, few was nevertheless not interpreted
as describing a singular noun. This issue is also related to a pragmatic competition
of few with the quantifiers none and one.
Another observation from Scho¨ller and Franke (2015) is that participants do not
only employ their expectations of the statistical properties in some contexts, but
also their moral standards of which cardinalities are considered too low or too high.
For the context of a smoker’s cigarette consumption, the model’s inferred threshold
values differed to a large extent from those of the remaining items
(107) Margaret is a woman from the US who smokes few/many cigarettes a day.
How many cigarettes do you think Margaret smokes a day?
Participants’ answers were very low, compared to the prior expectations measured.
Most people judged a sentence with few true only for the lowest presented interval
and true for a sentence with many for all of the other intervals. Maybe participants
did not use the prior expectations as they did for the other context. Since smoking
has fallen in disrepute in the US, people might not only use their plain “statistical”
prior expectations when they form a judgment about “few or many cigarettes.”
They might factor in their “moral expectations” as well (cf. E´gre´ and Cova, 2014).
In principle, a CFK semantics is compatible with this idea. The prior expectations
PE would not only have to be sensitive to statistical beliefs about, in this case,
actual number of cigarettes smoked, but also to a deontic dimension about how
many cigarettes should be smoked.
A last issue directly related to the model is the role of the noise parameters σi.
We introduced them as capturing uncertainty about PE “and perhaps other things”.
What these other things might be is not answered by the model and should also
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receive more attention since the values of σ given in Table 5.4 are quite large. The
posterior distribution predict a standard deviation of roughly five intervals, which
makes up one third of the quantity word’s scale in the experiment. If σ really
turned out to capture uncertainty about PE, this uncertainty could be reduced by
backing away from population-level expectations. The prior expectations which
are input into the model were obtained by measuring the subjective beliefs of 80
subjects and then averaging across the (normalized) observed slider ratings. These
representations might not be adequate for the individual subject carrying out a
production or interpretation task resulting in a worse fit to the data and maybe
even wrong model predictions. One way to address this problem is to replicate the
experiments from the Section 5.4 as a within-subjects design and have the same
individual complete all three tasks: give her expectations and subsequently produce
and interpret few and many. This way, the CFK semantics could be tested based
on individual expectations and not on average beliefs held within a sample of the
population. If σ, however, accounts for uncertainty about other factors as well,
say the threshold values or alternative utterances, the noise parameter could be
split up and made explicit in the model to help us learn about the vagueness and
context-dependence of few and many
Taken together, we see that the model presented here is a stark simplification.
Nevertheless, it fits the data surprisingly well given its simplicity and contributes
to our understanding of few and many. The benefit of probabilistic modeling is not
only in bringing these assumptions and simplification to the fore, but in providing
direct means of testing whether they are correct or, by means of model comparison,
which linking hypotheses may actually be better suited to explain the data. An
interesting next step is therefore to develop further model variants which include
pragmatic, grammatical or moral considerations and compare their predictions.
Besides considerations of how to further develop and improve the present model,
the methodological approach introduced here opens even more interesting venues
for future research. Firstly, inference of latent thresholds could naturally be applied
beyond our example case of few and many. Context-dependent threshold values are
also assumed to form part of the semantics of gradable adjectives (Kennedy and
McNally, 2005; Kennedy, 2007) and of other vague quantifiers like most (Hackl,
2009). Computational models in combination with experimental data put them-
selves forward as a promising method to investigate these phenomena within a uni-
form framework.
Secondly, we can use probabilistic modeling to compare the CFK semantics
against alternatives. For example, a different account for the meaning of few and
many was proposed by Solt (2011b). Here, the threshold is derived as a positive or
negative deviation from the median of the comparison class. This theory can just as
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well be couched in a probabilistic model and its predictions can then be compared
against the CFK semantics, using statistical model comparison.
Thirdly, it is an open issue whether a CFK semantics, as formulated here, can
also account for other readings of many and few. Fernando and Kamp (1996) ap-
ply a similar idea to proportional readings. The key feature of the proportional
reading is the existence of an upper bound on the scale few and many operate on.
Consequently, also the prior expectations PE are a distribution on a bounded inter-
val. In contrast to the cardinal reading, this opens the possibility of employing an
uninformed, uniformly distributed prior expectation which captures whether the de-
scribed proportion is small or large. This idea is linked to the question whether the
proportional reading expresses a fixed proportion. We set out to address this ques-
tion in Chapter 7. But there may be even more potential readings of few and many,
such as the inverse proportional reading, as already discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
This reading makes sentence (108) true if the proportion of Scandinavians among
Nobel prize winners was bigger than the proportion of people from other contextu-
ally salient alternative world regions who won a Nobel prize (c.f. Westerst˚ahl, 1985;
Eckardt, 1999; Cohen, 2001; Romero, 2015).
(108) Many SCANDINAVIANS won the Nobel prize.
(109) Inverse proportional reading of “Few/Many As are B”
a. Few : |A∩B||A| ≤ |
⋃
Alt(A)∩B|
|⋃Alt(A)| b. Many : |A∩B||A| ≥ |
⋃
Alt(A)∩B|
|⋃Alt(A)|
It could be hypothesized that it is just a matter of specifying the right PE to ac-
count for these cases as well within a CFK-approach. For the inverse proportional
reading of (108) in (109) we would need to consult the cumulative probability of
the actual number of Scandinavians with a Nobel prize to an expectation PE that
takes, presumably, the average number of Nobel laureates in the set of all relevant
world regions. It would need to be seen how far the CFK-approach can be pushed
in this direction (c.f. Fernando and Kamp, 1996). Still, data-driven computational
modeling seems like just the right tool to help in this investigation.
Finally, it would be interesting to not only infer plausible threshold values but
to try to explain why we see the threshold values that we apparently see. Focus-
ing on the case of gradable adjectives, Lassiter and Goodman (2015) give a model
that suggests that threshold values are the result of pragmatic inferences; another
approach tries to explain why particular threshold values are evolutionarily optimal
for successful communication (Franke, 2012; Qing and Franke, 2014a). Testing these
theoretical accounts with data-driven inferences of credible thresholds and applying
statistical model comparison would be a natural next step.
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5.A Experimental material
1. book — A friend’s favorite book has been published only recently (and
has few/many pages). — How many pages do you think the book has? —
intervals: 0-40, 41-80, 81-120, 121-160, 161-200, 201-240, 241-280, 281-320,
321-360, 361-400, 401-440, 441-480, 481-520, 521-560, 560 or more
2. bus — Vehicle No. 102 is a school bus (which has seats for few/many pas-
sengers). — How many passengers do you think can sit in Vehicle No. 102?
— intervals: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49,
50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70 or more
3. calls — Lisa is a woman from the US (who made few/many phone calls
last week). — How many phone calls do you think Lisa made last week? —
intervals: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54,
55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70 or more
4. class — Erin is a first grade student in primary school. (There are few/many
children in Erins class.) — How many children do you think are in Erin’s
class? — intervals: 0-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-17, 18-20, 21-23, 24-26,
27-29, 30-32, 33-35, 36-38, 39-41, 42 or more
5. coffee — Andy is man from the US (who drank few/many cups of coffee last
week). — How many cups of coffee do you think Andy drank last week? —
intervals: 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-19, 20-21, 22-23,
24-25, 26-27, 28 or more
6. cook — Tony is a man from the US (who cooked himself few/many meals
at home last month). — How many meals do you think Tony cooked himself
at home last month? — intervals: 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, 12-15, 16-19, 20-23, 24-27,
28-31, 32-35, 36-39, 40-43, 44-47, 48-51, 52-55, 56 or more
7. facebook — Judith is a woman from the US (who has few/many Facebook
friends). — How many Facebook friends do you think Judith has? — intervals:
0-69, 70-139, 140-209, 210-279, 280-349, 350-419, 420-489, 490-559, 560-629,
630-699, 700-769, 770-839, 840-909, 910-979, 980 or more
8. friends — Lelia is a woman from the US (who has few/many friends). —
How many friends do you think Lelia has? — intervals: 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7,
8-9, 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-19, 20-21, 22-23, 24-25, 26-27, 28 or more
9. hair — Betty is a woman from the US (who washed her hair few/many times
last month). — How many times do you think Betty washed her hair last
month? — intervals: 0-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-17, 18-20, 21-23, 24-26,
27-29, 30-32, 33-35, 36-38, 39-41, 42 or more
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10. movie — Nick is a man from the US (who saw few/many movies last year).
— How many movies do you think Nick saw last year? — intervals: 0-2, 3-5,
6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-17, 18-20, 21-23, 24-26, 27-29, 30-32, 33-35, 36-38, 39-41,
42 or more
11. poem — A friend wants to read you her favorite poem (which has few/many
lines). — How many lines do you think the poem has? — intervals: 0-3,
4-7, 8-11, 12-15, 16-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35, 36-39, 40-43, 44-47, 48-51,
52-55, 56 or more
12. restaurants — Sarah is a woman from the US (who went to few/many
restaurants last year). — To how many restaurants do you think Sarah went
last year? — intervals: 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, 12-15, 16-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35,
36-39, 40-43, 44-47, 48-51, 52-55, 56 or more
13. shoes — Melanie is a woman from the US (who owns few/many pairs of
shoes). — How many pairs of shoes do you think Melanie owns? — intervals:
0-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-17, 18-20, 21-23, 24-26, 27-29, 30-32, 33-35, 36-38,
39-41, 42 or more
14. tshirts — Liam is a man from the US (who has few/many T-shirts). — How
many T-shirts do you think Liam has? — intervals: 0-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12-14,
15-17, 18-20, 21-23, 24-26, 27-29, 30-32, 33-35, 36-38, 39-41, 42 or more
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Chapter 6
Surprise Readings
The previous chapter demonstrated how the CFK semantics can be tested, a theory
which makes concrete predictions about the calculation of the threshold values for
the applicability of few and many in context. The computational modeling approach
supports the idea that speaker and listener behavior can be explained by a fixed pair
of thresholds θmany and θfew which apply to a probability distribution representing
prior expectations of the context.
We have claimed that such a semantics is able to account for the so-called “car-
dinal surprise reading”. This reading of cardinal few and many in a sentence like
(110) compares the cardinality described by the quantity word with quantitative
expectations about cardinalities in the respective context, as exemplified below, and
thus makes few and many dependent on prior expectations. This assumption is in
line with a long tradition in psychology which has acknowledged the role of prior
expectations in the use of vague and context-dependent expressions like tall, heavy,
few and many (e.g. Clark, 1991; Sanford et al., 1994; Lassiter and Goodman, 2013;
Qing and Franke, 2014b).
(110) For a man from the US, Chris saw few/many movies last year.
 Chris saw less/more movies than expected for a US male.
Apart from the question of how to test the semantic account of surprise readings,
the theory brings up further interesting questions: So far the assumption that few
and many receive a surprise reading has not been challenged. In Section 6.1, we
discuss how the surprise reading can be made salient by a compared to-phrase (111).
(111) Compared to what you would expect for a man from the US, Chris saw few
/ many movies last year.
One question arises: if sentences with few and many express that a cardinality is
surprising anyway, are they different from sentences in which the surprise element
is overtly marked?
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In Section 6.2, few and many are modified by surprisingly as in (112).
(112) For a man from the US, Chris saw surprisingly few / many movies last year.
Whether this adverb functions as a marker of surprise or as an intensifier and whether
the surprise reading is the most salient reading of few and many is tested with an
experiment and a computational model in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. The computational
model is essentially the same as in the previous chapter. It incorporates the CFK
semantics and infers plausible threshold values on a cumulative probability distribu-
tion of contextual expectations. After an interim summary in Section 6.5, we present
a follow up experiment in Section 6.6 and discuss the findings and in particular the
semantics of few in Section 6.7.
6.1 Making Surprise Readings Overt
As briefly mentioned above, language has several means of making the surprise
element overt that we assume to be part of the reading of few and many. In this
chapter, some options are introduced, in particular the compared to construction
and the adverb surprisingly. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to learn about the
meaning contribution of surprise and to test whether the surprise reading is really
the salient reading of few and many. We will do so by contrasting unmodified few
and many with constructions in which surprise is explicitly made salient.
The first construction which can mark surprise is the frame setter compared to.
The compared to-phrase “serves to indirectly (contextually) fix the intended value
for the comparison standard” (Beck, 2009) and its function is to “set the context
for the following sentence” (Beck et al., 2004).
(111) Compared to what you would expect for a man from the US, Chris saw few
/ many movies last year.
Loosely following Hohaus (2015), (111) (repeated from above) is true iff the car-
dinality of movies seen by Chris is lower/higher than some contextually provided
standard and only defined for situations in which comparison is with expectations
about men in the US. I refer the reader to Hohaus (2015) for an in-depth introduction
into the semantics of compared to constructions.
Under the assumption of a surprise reading of few and many, the meaning of
sentence (111) should be very similar if not identical to sentence (110) in which
the comparison class, namely US men, is marked by a for -phrase but the surprise
component is contributed by the quantity word. For -phrases denote comparison
classes which affect the standard involved in the semantics of positive forms of
gradable adjectives and they presuppose that the subject of the gradable predicate
is included in the comparison class set (Klein, 1980; Kennedy, 2007).
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hypothesis
intensifier marker of surprise salient surprise reading
predictions
many ≤ surprisingly many
few ≥ surprisingly few
surprisingly = incredibly
many = surprisingly many
few = surprisingly few
surprisingly = compared to
many = compared to... many
few = compared to... few
Table 6.1: Hypotheses for sentences expressing surprise readings
(110) For a man from the US, Chris saw few / many movies last year.
This sentence is defined iff Chris is a man from the US and true iff the number
of movies seen by Chris is lower/higher than the standard number of movies an
American man is expected to watch.
In a nutshell, when assuming that few and many express a surprise reading and
make reference to expectations, sentences like (110) are predicted to have very similar
truth conditions to sentences in which expectations are overtly marked by a compared
to-phrase as in (111). For this reason, we expect no difference in a judgment task
when either (110) or (111) is used to describe the same cardinality. In the following
we spell out this claim in terms of its predictions about the threshold values θfew
and θmany as assumed by Fernando and Kamp (1996). A first hypothesis about the
influence of a compared to phrase marking surprise in sentences with few and many
is given below (salient surprise reading). In the next section, hypotheses of the
interaction between surprisingly and the quantity words are developed (marker
of surprise, intensifier). The hypotheses are tested with a computational model
which infers these threshold values on the basis of experimental data in the remainder
of this chapter and are summarized in Table 6.1.
Salient surprise reading. We cannot exclude that few and many may also de-
note a small or large cardinality, independent of prior expectations. Nevertheless,
we assume that the most salient readings of our experimental test sentences (see
Appendix 6.A) are cardinal surprise readings given the comparison class for which
we measure information about subjects’ prior expectations (see below). To test this
assumption, we contrast sentences with bare few and many with sentences modified
by the compared to phrase in (111) which makes the relevant expectations overt.
It is necessary to test this because if few and many did not have the intended
surprise reading, differences between few/many and surprisingly few/many could
be due to different readings and possibly different threshold values associated with
them. Alongside few and many ’s intrinsic surprise reading, we test another related
assumption: the for - phrase used to mark the comparison class triggers the same
prior expectations PE as the compared to phrase which openly addresses expecta-
tions, see (111) and (112).
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6.2 Surprisingly : Marker of Surprise Readings or
Intensifier
Another way of marking surprise in sentences with few and many is by adding the
adverb surprisingly. Surprisingly can appear in two positions in the sentence.
(113) a. Surprisingly, Chris saw few / many movies last year.
 It is surprising that Chris saw few/many movies last year.
b. Chris saw surprisingly few / many movies last year.
 The number of movies which Chris saw last year is surprisingly
low/high.
In a sentence initial position, surprisingly takes over the role of a sentence adverbial,
as we can see in example (113a). It marks the entire proposition as being surprising.
When uttering (113a), the speaker expresses his surprise about the fact that Chris
watched few/many movies. Which number of movies counts as few or many is
determined independently of the adverb. For this reason, the second occurence is
more interesting in the scope of this dissertation. When surprisingly precedes the
quantity word, it functions as a degree modifier as in (113b). In its most salient
reading (113b) expresses that the number of movies watched by Chris is surprisingly
low or high.
With respect to our assumption that few and many express a surprise reading,
two views are prima facie plausible for the meaning contribution of the adverb
surprisingly. Note that our hypotheses for surprisingly apply to sentences with
a salient cardinal surprise reading and a restricted comparison class. On the one
hand, surprisingly can be taken to intensify the meaning of few and many just like
other intensifiers like incredibly or very do. As a result, surprisingly many might be
associated with a threshold θsurpr. many higher than θmany. The contrasting view is to
classify surprisingly as a marker of the surprise reading, which overtly marks that
truth-conditions must draw on a threshold on a measure of surprise. In this view,
the threshold of surprisingly few/many should not be different from unmodified
few/many under a surprise reading. The later view is supported by the semantic
literature.
Katz (2005) and Nouwen (2011) discuss the relation between a gradable adjective
modified by surprisingly and its unmodified positive form.
(114) a. Jasper is surprisingly tall.
b. Jasper is tall.
For the relation between the sentences (114a) and (114b), Nouwen (2011) suggests
that “being surprisingly tall comes to mean taller than expected”. Crucial to his
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proposal is the role of inferences and the assumption that gradable predicates are
monotone. If Jasper is surprisingly tall, this means that there exists a degree to
which Jasper is tall that is surprising (for someone like Jasper). Had Jasper been
taller, he would also have been tall to a surprising degree (by monotonicity). So we
infer that had Jasper been taller, he would also be called surprisingly tall. ”This is
why we can only use [surprisingly tall ] to refer to someone who is taller than (what
is considered) [expected]” (Nouwen, 2011, 154). Note that statements about degrees
actually license downward directed inferences, but adverbs like surprisingly reverse
such inferences and license upward directed inferences. If Andy is tall to degree d,
then he is also tall do any degree lower than d. For surprisingly tall, the opposite
holds. If Andy is surprisingly tall, his height would still be surprising if he were
taller, but not necessarily if he were shorter.
Furthermore, Katz (2005) and Nouwen (2011) agree that sentences with surpris-
ingly do not entail the positive form of the same gradable predicate. Sentence (114a)
does not entail (114b), since even though Jasper may be surprisingly tall (given
that his parents are very short, for example) he is not necessarily tall for general
standards. Note that this argument can be misunderstood as evidence against the
intensifier hypothesis. However, the entailment relation between (114a) and (114b)
only fails, when the comparison class is changed, for example from people with short
parents to people in general. For this reason, Katz’s (2005) and Nouwen’s (2011)
observation does not constitute evidence for or against the intensifier hypothesis.
Semantically, the degree modifier surprisingly is analyzed as a propositional mod-
ifier of type 〈st, st〉 or 〈st, t〉 (Nouwen, 2011; De Vries, 2012), which expresses the
speaker’s surprise about the information she is conveying. A sample denotation by
Nouwen (2011) is given below:
(115) Nouwen (2011)
a. JsurprisinglyK = λp.λw.p(w)& surprisingw(p)
 via type-shift and existential closure
b. Jsurprisingly tallK = λx.λw.∃d[tallw(x, d)& surprisingw(λw′.tallw′(x, d))]
c. JAnn is surprisingly tallK(w) = 1
iff ∃d[tallw(A, d)&surprisingw(λw′.tallw′(A, d))]
Nouwen (2011) predicts (115c) to be true if there exists a degree d such that Ann
is d-tall and it is surprising that Ann is d-tall. In other words, the sentece is true
if Ann is taller than expected. Surprisingly in (115b) functions like POS by being
type-shifted to be able to apply the modifier semantics in (115a) to gradable predi-
cates. The adjective’s degree variable is existentially bound before combining with
the subject. Since the standard of comparison is only inferred on the basis of the
monotonicity assumption described above, there is no explicit prediction of how the
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expected degrees are determined in the respective context. I take it that POS and
(115b) function in a parallel way by defining which degrees count as significantly
higher than the contextual standard.1 Sentences like (113a) in which surprisingly
functions as a sentence adverbial can be accounted for by applying (115a) to the
entire sentence. De Vries’s (2012) and Pin˜o´n’s (2005) proposals are similar in spirit:
surprisingly is a modifier of propositions and expresses that the proposition (that
the gradable predicate holds for a certain degree) is surprising. All in all, the three
accounts (Pin˜o´n, 2005; Nouwen, 2011; De Vries, 2012) derive essentially the same
result. Suprisingly is semantically a modifier of propositions and expresses that
the proposition is surprising. We do not find predictions about its influence on the
threshold of a gradable predicate; it is not explicitly classified as an intensifier which
raises the threshold of applicability. The semantic literature can be interpreted to
predict that surprisingly only marks the surprise reading, just like the compared to
phrase in (111) is expected to do.
At the same time, the suspicion that surprisingly functions as an intensifier
cannot be ruled out. It behaves parallel to other intensifiers like incredibly, extremely
or very which also modify gradable predicates and with which surprisingly is in
complimentary distribution. Note that the following linguistic test does not only
apply to few, but also to many and other gradable predicates like tall.
(116) a. Liam has surprisingly few T-shirts.
b. Liam has incredibly few T-shirts.
c. ?? Liam has surprisingly incredibly few T-shirts.
d. ?? Liam has surprisingly very few T-shirts.
e. ?? Liam has incredibly very few T-shirts.
The following two paragraphs develop an intensifier semantics for surprisingly
which can only account for its degree modifier variant. The sentence adverbial can-
not be explained with this lexical entry.
Even though the semantics does not make explicit predictions about the influence
of surprisingly on the threshold of the gradable predicate it modifies, there is an
interesting parallel to the semantics of intensifiers. Heim (2006) and von Stechow
(2006) both assume that very also takes over the role of POS with which it stands
in complimentary distribution. Very raises the boundaries of the neutral interval.
“The very interval must be a superinterval of the neutral interval of N(S) that sym-
1Nouwen (2011) does not further comment on the consequences of assuming that surprisingly
takes over the role of POS. He does not spell out whether the same scope interaction that we see
for surprisingly in (113a) and (113b) would also be predicted for POS. It is not elaborated on what
exactly triggers the type shift and the binding of the degree argument when surprisingly combines
with a gradable adjective.
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metrically includes both bounds or N(S)” (von Stechow, 2006, 7) and it is possible
to iterate the very-operation (for example, in very very many).
(117) von Stechow (2006)JveryN,SKc = λD〈d, t〉 : c specifies an Interval I that symmetrically includes
. N(S) and is considerably bigger than N(S). (∀d ∈ I)D(d)
I understand a symmetrical inclusion to mean that the distance from the lower
bound of I to the lower bound of N(S) must be the same as from the upper bound
of N(S) to the upper bound of I.
The semantics for very can be extended to surprisingly to form an intensifier
which functions like POS and is compatible with surprise readings and the CFK
semantics, see our proposal for POSsurp in (87) in Section 2.4.
(118) JsurprisinglyK = λD〈s, 〈d, t〉〉.λw0 : I symmetrically includes NS = [xmax, xmin],
. xmax = max{n :
∑n
m=0 PE(m) ≤ θfew} and
. xmin = min{n :
∑n
m=0 PE(m) ≥ θmany}
. for PE(m) =
∑
w∈Sm µ(w) and m ∈ N
. and Sm = {w : w ∈ Doxti(w0) & max(D(w)) = m}
. I ⊆ D(w0)
The neutral interval N(S) is the result of determining the cut-off points xmax
and xmin based on prior expectations PE, θfew and θmany. Surprisingly would then
impose a superinterval I on N(S), just like von Stechow’s (2006) very does. This way
we don’t contradict the stable core meaning hypothesis since θfew and θmany as the
lexical meaning of few and many can remain unchanged. Surprisingly only modifies
the already determined N(S) to intensify the meaning of few or many. What remains
to be tested is whether surprisingly keeps up the symmetrical inclusion requirement
from (117). This is why for now we only tentatively suggest the semantics in (118).2
From a pragmatic point of view, an intensifying effect of surprisingly is plausible
since a speaker makes the effort of uttering a longer and thus more costly sentence
when she could also only have used unmodified few or many. Consequently, a
speaker who adds surprisingly can be taken to assume that this utterance is more
informative. For example, surprisingly would rise the threshold of many and make
it thus applicable to a smaller range of cardinalities, which results in a stronger
statement than the alternative with bare many. This is in line with work about the
pragmatic effects of intensifiers.
The intensifier hypothesis is further supported by a pragmatic theory by Bennett
and Goodman (2015). They explain the strength of an intensifying degree adverb
2Note that this preliminary lexical entry only captures occurrences of surprisingly as a degree
modifier.
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as “pragmatic inference based on differing cost [(their length and frequency)] rather
than differing semantics” (p. 1). Bennett and Goodman (2015) test 40 intensifiers,
like amazingly, terribly or seriously, which have a high frequency in the Google
Web 1 T 5grams corpus and do not signal affect (like depressingly would). Each
intensifier was paired with the adjective expensive to describe three categories of
objects (laptop, watch and coffee maker). In a free production task, 30 participants
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were asked to give their estimate of the prize of
the objects as described by “[intensifier] expensive”. Bennett and Goodman (2015)
find a linear relationship between the meaning of intensifiers and their length and
frequency. The adverb surprisingly is not part of their set of intensifiers though.
From the adverbs tested by Bennett and Goodman (2015), incredibly comes closest
to surprisingly, as they have the same number of syllables and the most similar
frequency in an updated version of the corpus Bennett and Goodman (2015) used,
the Google Web 1 T 5grams corpus (4,987,059 occurrences of incredibly as compared
to 4,373,670 occurrences of surprisingly).
To discriminate between the two views on surprisingly, we deduce two experi-
mentally testable hypotheses. Another auxiliary hypothesis of incredibly is tested
alongside to complement our understanding of modified few and many, see Table
6.1. In what follows, we again spell out these general hypotheses in terms of their
predictions about the threshold values θfew and θmany. We run a judgment task to
gather experimental data, which will be input to a theory-driven, computational
model.
Marker of surprise. If the function of surprisingly is to mark a cardinal surprise
reading, thresholds are the same as for unmodified few/many, where these cardinal
surprise readings are most salient anyway (see above). Furthermore, sentences with
surprisingly should not be different from sentences with compared to, as in (111).
Intensifier. Modification by surprisingly raises the threshold of many and makes
it applicable to a smaller range of cardinalities, resulting in a stronger statement
than the alternative with bare many. Few ’s threshold decreases.
Bennett & Goodman. The intensifier hypothesis is in line with work by Bennett
and Goodman (2015) who explain the strength of an intensifying degree adverb as
“pragmatic inference based on differing cost [(their length and frequency)] rather
than differing semantics” (p. 1). Following Bennett and Goodman (2015), we hy-
pothesize that the thresholds of surprisingly few/many are roughly the same as for
incredibly few/many.
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6.3 Experiments
To test the hypotheses in Table 6.1, two experiments were conducted to gather
acceptability ratings of sentences with (modified) few and many and to measure
representations of participants’ prior expectations. The prior expectations task and
its results are the same as in Section 5.4.1. It is summarized briefly. Prior expecta-
tions will be input to the computational model from 5.3, which is presented again
briefly in the next section.
6.3.1 Elicitation of Prior Expectations
Design. To get an empirical estimate of participants’ prior expectations, we used
a binned histogram task. A sentence as in (119a) introduced a comparison class
and a question as in (119b) asked about typical cardinalities of every-day situations.
Subjects rated the likelihood that the true value lies in the 15 intervals, by adjusting
a slider each labeled from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely.”
(119) Prior elicitation example
a. Background: Chris is a man from the US.
b. Question: How many movies do you think he saw last year?
Participants. 80 subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with US-
IP addresses.
Materials & Procedure. Materials and procedures were the same as in Sec-
tion 5.4.1, see Appendix 5.A.
Results. For each item, each participant’s ratings were normalized and these nor-
malized ratings were then averaged across participants. The results displayed in
Figure 6.1 were already reported in Section 5.4.1.
6.3.2 Production Study: Judgment Task
Design. In a binary judgment task we measured acceptance of sentences with few
and many with and without modifiers (surprisingly, incredibly or compared to). Par-
ticipants were presented with a context which introduced a situation and an interval
as in (120a). The interval was randomly chosen from 8 of the 15 intervals from the
prior elicitation task (see Appendix 6.A). We presented only four low intervals for
few and four high intervals for many to avoid a large number of combinations. The
context was described by a statement as in (120b) which contained either few or
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Figure 6.1: Empirically measured prior expectations from Section 5.4.1. Error bars
are estimated 95% confidence intervals.
many. We elicited data of four groups of participants which each saw a different
modifier.
(120) Production study example
a. Context: Chris is a man from the US who saw [0–2 | 6–8 | . . . | 42 or
more] movies last year.
b. Statement: [For | Compared to what you would expect for] a man
from the US, Chris saw [- | surprisingly | incredibly] [few | many] movies
last year.
Materials & Procedure. Each participant was randomly assigned to one modi-
fier condition (unmodified, compared to construction, surprisingly, incredibly). After
reading a short explanation of the task, each subject saw all of the 14 contexts from
Appendix 6.A one after another in random order. Sentences with unmodified few
and many or incredibly or surprisingly were introduced by a for -phrase which made
the intended comparison class overt. The fourth group saw a compared to phrase
which additionally made expectations salient. For each context, a quantity word
and one of its four associated intervals were assigned randomly. Participants had to
click on one of two radio buttons labeled with true or false before being able to
proceed to the next item.
Participants. We recruited 787 participants with US-IP addresses via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, among them 301 participants in the unmodified condition and 162
participants each in the other three conditions. The unmodified condition had more
6.3. EXPERIMENTS 123
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
book bus calls class coffee cook facebook
friends hair movie poem restaurants shoes tshirts
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15
3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 9 12 15
interval
TR
UE
 ra
tin
gs
modifier
l compared
incredibly
surprisingly
unmodified
l
l
few
many
Figure 6.2: Proportion of true answers per modifier condition
participants because it was part of the production experiment from Section 5.4.2 in
which we presented 8 of 15 intervals for both few and many. For the analysis only
data from those intervals presented in the other three conditions was used.
Results. Data was excluded of 25 participants who reported not to be native
speakers of English or to not have understood the task. Figure 6.2 shows the pro-
portion of true answers.
For each of the quantity words few and many we specified a linear mixed effects
regression model predicting the proportional acceptance of statements as in (104b).
During a guided search through the model space, we started out with a model
containing only the random effect item and added fixed effects if this significantly
increased the model’s fit to the data (measured by AIC).
For many, the final model includes the fixed effects interval and modifier
and their interaction. Significantly more participants accepted the statements for
higher intervals (β = 0.02, SE = 0.007, p < 0.01). The modification of many by
surprisingly leads to a lower acceptance (β = −0.59, SE = 0.12, p < 0.001) than
of sentences with unmodified many. This suggests that surprisingly intensifies the
meaning of many. The same is the case for sentences with incredibly, which were
also rated lower than unmodified many (β = −0.53, SE = 0.12, p < 0.001). There
is no difference between sentences with a compared to phrase and unmodified many
(β = −0.17, SE = 0.12, p < 0.15), which suggests that many receives a surprise
reading in both cases. Surprisingly and compared to are rated significantly different
(β = −0.42, SE = 0.12, p < 0.001), but there is no difference between surprisingly
and incredibly. Furthermore, there is a significant interaction between interval
and modifier for surprisingly (β = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001) and incredibly
(β = 0.02, SE = 0.01, p < 0.01).
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For few, the final model, obtained by the same procedure, includes the fixed ef-
fects interval and modifier. The proportion of participants accepting the state-
ment is significantly lower for higher numbers (β = −0.12, SE = 0.004, p < 0.001).
Among the modifiers only incredibly is significantly different from bare few (β =
−0.05, SE = 0.02, p < 0.05); for surprisingly and compared to this is not the case.
No significant difference between surprisingly and compared to is found, but incred-
ibly is rated significantly lower than surprisingly (β = −0.05, SE = 0.02, p < 0.05).
These results are expected under the “salient surprise reading” hypothesis. While
surprisingly seems to behave like an intensifier for many, it seems to redundantly
mark surprise for few.
6.4 Computational Model and Model Evaluation
The regression models reported above include a random effect for items, but do not
constrain these to reflect prior expectations. Moreover, regression models do not pre-
dict judgments as a function of thresholds on expectations. It is therefore insightful
to complement regression modeling with an explicit theory-driven model of a possible
data-generating process. We use the computational model of Section 5.3 for this pur-
pose. The model takes empirically measured prior expectations as input and treats
θ[i]few and θ[i]many for each modifier condition i (unmodified, surprisingly, incredibly,
compared to) as latent parameters, whose values will be estimated from experimen-
tal data. The model specifies a likelihood function P (Observation | θ[i]many, θ[i]few)
which assigns to values of latent parameters a probability of seeing a particular ex-
perimental observation. Bayesian inference is one way to infer plausible threshold
values, given the likelihood function and a prior distribution on parameter values:
P (θ[i]many, θ[i]few | O) ∝ P (θ[i]many, θ[i]few) · P (O | θ[i]many, θ[i]few) (6.1)
Our goal, then, is to see for each modifier which pairs of threshold values θ[i]many
and θ[i]few are likely given the data. We estimate the a posteriori credible threshold
values and compare how similar they are across conditions. We focus on many in
the exposition, but the case for few is parallel.
(77) CFK Semantics
a. JFew As are BK = 1 iff |A ∩ B | ≤ xmax
where xmax = max {n ∈ N | PE(|A ∩ B | ≤ n) < θfew}
b. JMany As are BK = 1 iff |A ∩ B | ≥ xmin
where xmin = min {n ∈ N | PE(|A ∩ B | ≤ n) > θmany}
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Figure 6.3: Estimated 95% credible intervals for θfew,i & θmany,i
Straightforwardly, the CFK semantics repeated from (77) translates into a prob-
abilistic rule P (“[modifier i ] many” | n, PE ; θ[i]many) = δn≥xmin,i , where xmin,i is
derived from PE, as in (77), based on θ[i]many. This is a degenerate probabilistic rule
because it maps the applicability of “many” to 0 and 1 only. To allow for noise, we
look at a parameterized, smoothed-out version.
P (“[i ] many” | n, PE; θ[i]many, σj) =
n∑
k=0
∫ k+ 1
2
k− 1
2
N (y;xmin,i, σj)dy (6.2)
The steepness of the curve is regulated by another free model parameter σj.
N (y;xmin,i, σj) is then the probability density of y under a normal distribution with
mean xmin,i and standard deviation σj. This rule predicts noisy acceptability ratings
under a surprise-based semantics where the amount of noise is controlled by σj, see
Figure 5.4a from the previous chapter. Noise can be caused by uncertainty about
the exact shape of PE and the amount of uncertainty differs across contexts. This is
why we allow an individual value of σj for each context j. Furthermore, we assume
that the parameter values θ[i]many, θ[i]few and σj are independent of each other and
that they have uniform priors over an interval that is large enough to accommodate
a range of plausible values without weighting them.
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hypothesis
intensifier marker of surprise salient surprise reading
predictions
many ≤ surprisingly many
few ≥ surprisingly few
surprisingly = incredibly
many = surprisingly many
few = surprisingly few
surprisingly = compared to
many = compared to... many
few = compared to... few
results few : × many: X few : X many: × few : X many: X
Table 6.2: Results for sentences expressing surprise readings
P (θ[i]many, θ[i]few, σj) =Uniform[0;1](θ[i]many) · Uniform[0;1](θ[i]few) · Uniform[0;10](σj)
(6.3)
To approximate the joint posterior distribution, we used MCMC sampling, as
implemented in JAGS (Plummer, 2003) and briefly introduced in Chapter 4. We
collected 10,000 samples from 2 MCMC chains after a burn-in of 10,000. This
ensured convergence, as measured by Rˆ (Gelman and Rubin, 1992). Figure 6.3 shows
the estimated 95% credible intervals for the marginalized posteriors over thresholds
per modifier. Where intervals (clearly) do not overlap, there is reason to believe that
thresholds differ. For example, θsurpr.many ∈ [0.863, 0.903] tells us that surprisingly
many describes cardinalities which are higher than at least 86% of the cumulative
density mass of PE. This threshold is higher than bare many ’s, θmany ∈ [0.657, 0.701].
Taken together, the model predicts that surprisingly many is restricted to describe
higher cardinalities than unmodified many.
6.5 Interim Summary
Table 6.2 summarizes the results from regression and theory-driven modeling. The
data supports the “salient surprise reading” hypothesis assumed by Fernando and
Kamp (1996) and suggests that an expectation-based reading is the canonical in-
terpretation of cardinal few and many in our test sentences. There is no difference
between unmodified sentences and sentences in which expectations are made salient
by a compared to-phrase.
For surprisingly, the picture is less clear. Sentences with many provide support
for the intensifier hypothesis. Speakers prefer it for higher cardinalities than those
which render unmodified many or sentences with a compared to construction true.
Furthermore, we do not find a difference to incredibly. When combined with few,
however, surprisingly does not appear to be an intensifier. Sentences with few, sur-
prisingly few and compared to are rated equally, speaking in favor of a “marker of
surprise” hypothesis. For the comparison between surprisingly and incredibly, we get
conflicting results from the regression and the theory-driven model. The regression
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analysis finds that incredibly few is rated lower than surprisingly few, but the com-
putational model identifies an overlap in the estimated credible intervals. However,
we want to once more stress that we are here comparing conclusions based on models
which are decidedly different. Whereas the computational model is theory-driven
and includes experimentally measured prior expectations, the regression model only
looks at numerical differences in the average ratings. If we were forced to make a
decision, we would believe in the computational model.
Keeping in mind that few only applies to small cardinalities, the lack of a dif-
ference could also be due to a floor effect. In the judgment task, participants were
presented with intervals instead of single numbers and moreover, we only presented
four out of 15 intervals per quantity word. This setup might not be adequate to
reveal a potential difference between surprisingly few and few. Due to the lower
bounded scale, the difference for few is probably more subtle than the difference
between surprisingly many and many. This is where future research should tie in.
Few should be presented in contexts like book or facebook (see 6.A), in which
large cardinalities are plausible and few can operate away from 0. Additionally,
the presented intervals should be more fine-grained. We opt for a third option and
follow up on the presented judgment task with an interpretation experiment. To
investigate a possible floor effect which might conceal an intensifying effect of sur-
prisingly on few, we present the same items in a free choice interpretation task.
Such a task gives participants much more freedom in their choice. If the lack of a
difference between surprisingly few and few was due to a floor effect, we hope to be
able to reveal it with this task type. The follow-up experiment is presented in the
next section.
6.6 Follow-up study: Refining Modified few
The production task discussed in the previous sections produced puzzling results.
The adverb surprisingly seems to function like an intensifier in combination with
many, but not with few. This is very surprising under the assumption that surpris-
ingly contributes the same meaning in both cases. To learn whether the lack of a
difference between few and surprisingly few was really due to a floor effect, we run
an interpretation task as a follow-up experiment. We hope to gain more insight into
the interaction between surprisingly and few by allowing participants to choose a
single number, instead of an interval as we did in the judgment task presented in
Section 6.3.2. We expect to see more fine-grained results in this free choice interpre-
tation task which could identify a difference between surprisingly few and few that
could previously not be revealed due to a floor effect.
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6.6.1 Interpretation Task
Design. In a free choice task we measured participants’ interpretation of modified
and unmodified few and many. Participants saw the same 14 contexts as in the
production study, see Appendix 6.A. Each item was paired with either few or many
and one of the four modifier conditions (unmodified, compared to, surprisingly, in-
credibly). Participants were asked to give their interpretation of the quantifier term
by adjusting a slider on a scale. The sliders were presented on a horizontal scale on
the screen. The slider’s label on the lower end was 0, the label on the upper end
was the highest of the 15 intervals, which were already used in the prior elicitation
task (for example ‘28 or more’). The interim interval boundaries were not marked
on the scale, however and participants could select any number, not just intervals.
(121) Interpretation study example
a. Context (unmodified, surprisingly, incredibly):
Andy is a man from the US who drank [ - | surprisingly | incredibly] [few
| many] cups of coffee last week.
Context (compared to):
Andy is a man from the US. Compared to what you would expect for a
man from the US, Andy drank [few | many] cups of coffee last week.
b. Question: How many cups of coffee do you think Andy drank last
week? (0 - 28 or more)
Participants. We recruited 170 participants with US-IP addresses via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.
Materials & Procedure. After reading a short introduction, each subject saw
all of the 14 contexts from Appendix 6.A one after another in a random order.
Participants saw each context in the same modifier condition. For each context, few
or many were assigned randomly. Participants had to adjust the slider or at least
click on it before being able to proceed to the next item.
Results. The data of four participants were excluded because they reported not
to be native speakers of English. The interpretations per condition as well as the
median answer is plotted in Figure 6.4.
For each of the quantity words few and many we specified a linear mixed effects
regression model predicting interpretations. The model contained the random effect
item and the fixed effect modifier. Note that there were no other factors.
The modification of many by surprisingly leads to significantly higher interpre-
tations (β = 28.37, SE = 6.66, p < 0.001) than of sentences with unmodified many.
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(a) Interpretion data of few
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(b) Interpretation data of many
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Figure 6.4: Interpretation data of modified few and many
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This supports the production study’s finding that surprisingly intensifies the mean-
ing of many. The same is the case for sentences with incredibly, which also received
higher interpretations than unmodified many (β = 29.66, SE = 6.93, p < 0.001).
There is no significant difference between sentences with a compared to phrase and
unmodified many (β = 13.12, SE = 6.79, p = 0.06). We interpret this result as sug-
gesting that the most salient reading of many is the surprise reading. Surprisingly
and compared to are rated significantly different (β = −15.25, SE = 6.42, p < 0.05),
but there is no difference between surprisingly and incredibly.
For few, no modifier triggered a significantly different interpretation from bare
few (β = −0.05, SE = 0.02, p < 0.05). Furthermore, no significant difference be-
tween surprisingly and compared to nor between surprisingly and incredibly is found.
These results are expected under the “salient surprise reading” hypothesis. While
surprisingly seems to behave like an intensifier for many, for few it seems to redun-
dantly mark surprise.
6.6.2 Computational Model
The interpretation data was also analyzed with a theory-driven model of listener
behavior. The interpretation rule developed in Section 5.3 specifies a likelihood
function which assigns to each interval the probability of being chosen as the inter-
pretation of “[modifier] few/many”.
PL(n | “[i ] many”, PE ; θ[i]many, σj) ∝ PE(n) · PS(“[i ]many” | n, PE ; θ[i]many, σj)
(6.4)
Via Bayesian inference we again infer a pair of threshold values θ[i]many and θ[i]few
for each modifier i, which are most likely to have generated the observed data. Note
that for this purpose participants’ answers were fused into the respective intervals
to be able to relate them to the prior data from Section 6.3. The 95% highest
density intervals of the posterior distribution of θ[i]many and θ[i]few are displayed in
Figure 6.5. Unfortunately, these results do not allow us to see the picture more
clearly. For many, the findings of the production experiment could be replicated.
We do not find an overlap between θsurpr.many and θmany (even though the two HDIs
come very close), suggesting that surprisingly intensifies the meaning of many, like
incredibly does. For few, however, the HDIs of surprisingly few and few overlap,
suggesting that surprisingly does not raise few ’s threshold.
To get a more nuanced quantitative measure for the likelihood of θsurp being
more extreme than θunmodified, we used another version of the model which jointly
infers the threshold values on both production and interpretation data in these two
modifier conditions.
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Figure 6.5: Estimated 95% credible intervals for θfew,i & θmany,i for interpretation
data
P (θmany, θfew, θsurp.many, θsurp.few | O) ∝ (6.5)
P (θmany, θfew, θsurp.many, θsurp.few) · P (O | θmany, θfew, θsurp.many, θsurp.few)
For each sample of θmany and θsurp.many and of θfew and θsurp.few we calculate their
difference. From the posterior distribution of θsurp.many− θmany and θsurp.few− θfew we
then calculate their highest density interval. If the HDI of the differences does not
contain 0, the model supports the hypothesis that the threshold values are really
different from each other, resulting in an intensifier interpretation of surprisingly.
For many, the model once more supports the intensifier hypothesis for surpris-
ingly. The HDI of the difference between the thresholds of surprisingly many and
many, θsurp.many − θmany, does not contain 0. It is estimated to be [0.101, 0.145].
This suggests that the value of θsurp.many is credibly higher than the value of θmany.
For few, the HDI of the difference between the thresholds of surprisingly few and
few, θsurp.few − θfew, is and [-0.074, 0.022] and does contain 0. Strictly speaking, the
model does not constitute clear evidence for an intensifying effect of surprisingly
in combination with few. Nevertheless, we find that 80% of the difference’s values
which carry the highest density mass are below 0. In other words, the posterior
probability is 80% that θsurp.few is lower than θfew after all. Even though this result
cannot be taken as strong evidence for the intensifier hypothesis, it encourages us
collect more data on surprisingly few, hoping to arrive at a definite verdict.
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6.7 Discussion
If the lack of an intensifying effect of surprisingly on few was due to a floor effect,
the free choice task could not resolve it even though it allowed for more freedom by
not restricting the choices to intervals. In contrast, even the significant difference
between incredibly few and few vanishes. Apart from this, the interpretation task’s
results replicate the production task’s findings. In both production and interpreta-
tion, there is no significant difference between sentences with bare few and many
and sentences in which expectations are made overt with a compared to-phrase as
in (121a). We conclude that the surprise reading is the most salient reading of few
and many in our test sentences. This result constitutes experimental support for an
expectation-based semantics of few and many.
For surprisingly, the interpretation task does not provide new insights. There
is no difference between surprisingly few and few, but in combination with many
the adverb still has an intensifying effect. As mentioned above, these results are
unexpected under the assumption of an unambiguous surprisingly that contributes
the same meaning in combination with both few and many.
For now, we can only speculate about possible reasons and will have to back off
from further promoting the lexical entry of an intensifier version of surprisingly, sug-
gested in (118). In contrast to von Stechow’s (2006) semantics for very, surprisingly
does not seem to maintain the symmetrical inclusion presupposition from (117). So
far the experimental data suggests that surprisingly raises the boundary for many,
but for few the evidence is not clear enough to draw the same conclusion.
A first explanation of the missing intensifying effect on few could be a decom-
positional analysis of few, as introduced in Section 2.2.4. If few decomposes into
many and a scopally mobile, negative operator little, the negation could prevent sur-
prisingly ’s intensifying effect. What exactly this might look like in a compositional
semantic analysis is not clear though. The only meaning component of surprisingly
that would have to be negated is its intensifying effect, not the entire sentence. For
example, the sentence ”Chris saw surprisingly few movies last year” still expresses
that the number is small, even though the number is maybe not very small. It is
not obvious how little could only negate the intensifying effect of surprisingly while
not affecting anything else. This technical problem may be solvable, but for now it
remains a puzzle what a compositional analysis would have to look like.
Nevertheless, the idea that the semantics of few blocks an intensifying effect of
surprisingly is supported by several observations in which few behaves differently
from many. A series of experiments by Moxey and Sanford (1987) and Sanford et al.
(1994) shows that few licenses a complement set reference whereas many makes
reference to the set whose cardinality it describes. For example, in a continuation
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task repeated from Section 3.2, participants associate the pronoun with a different
set for few than for many.
(96) Few of the football fans were at the match. They...
Participants would associate they not with the entities quantified over by few, the
football fans present at the match. Instead, the complement set is activated: the fans
who are not present. For example they would continue the sentence with “watched
the match at home instead”. For many and other positive quantifiers, like a few,
this is not the case (cf. Moxey and Sanford, 1987). Transferring these results to the
present case in a sentence like (122), surprisingly few tends to shift the attention
to, say,the students who had not passed whereas surprisingly many does not, as
exemplified by a continuation similar to Sanford et al.’s (1994) items.
(122) a. Surprisingly many students passed the test. They... had a big party to
celebrate their success.
b. Surprisingly few students passed the test. They... had underestimated
the test’s difficulty.
Surprisingly many ’s reference set is not only part of the utterance’s asserted mean-
ing, it is additionally highlighted by the cardinality word. For this reason, surpris-
ingly many might be perceived as a stronger description than surprisingly few. For
now, these speculations can only be put on the agenda for future research, however.
Furthermore, many uses of bare few are perceived as sounding marked. For
example, when presented with alternatives, many speakers prefer not many, only
few or a few to bare few. See the example below:
(123) a. Andy drank few cups of coffee.
b. Andy drank only few cups of coffee.
c. Andy drank not many cups of coffee.
d. Andy drank a few cups of coffee.
This was the feedback that we often got from participants, especially for the items
in Scho¨ller and Franke (2015).
All of these features of few confirm the difficult undertaking of providing a se-
mantics for few. As already pointed out in Section 2.2.4, the semantics of few is
quite elusive and will have to be further investigated. The open issues in the se-
mantics of few will have to be answered on par with the more general question of
whether antonyms are really decomposed in the syntax or not, see Section 2.2.4.
When looking at the computational model’s inferred threshold values, we see that
they are in general more “extreme” in interpretation tasks than in production tasks.
For few, θ[i]few are slightly lower in the interpretation task, and for many, θ[i]many are
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higher in the interpretation task. The same could be observed in the experiments
on cardinal few and many in the previous chapter. We believe that the reason
for the difference between the tasks is the range of choices participants have. The
judgment task, on the one hand is a binary rating task in which participants only
have two options; either the quantity word is a felicitous description of the presented
cardinality or it is not. On the other hand, an interpretation task leaves participants
with a much broader range of choices. Even though the quantity word might also
have been used to describe lower cardinalities, participants seem to play it safe and
choose a higher number as many ’s interpretation (or a lower number for few). For
this reason we do not yet want to reject the floor effect hypothesis for surprisingly
few. We cannot exclude that we just have not yet found the right method to test
it. This suspicion is also fueled by the model version which estimates the difference
between θsurp.few and θfew and assigns a probability of 80% to a potential difference
of the threshold values.
Apart from the puzzle of whether surprisingly is an intensifier, another interest-
ing area of future research is to investigate which kind of knowledge is necessary
to be able to form the expectations which are required to license surprisingly. A
surprising observation is that surprisingly is felicitous in (124), but not in (125).
(124) Grandma walked into a bar. Even though she didn’t have many drinks, she
had surprisingly many.
(125) ?? A random Joe walked into a bar. Even though he didn’t have many
drinks, he had surprisingly many.
In (124), we both communicate expectations about people in general ( not many)
and about the well-known individual Grandma ( surprisingly many). But in
(125) there is not sufficient information to form special expectations about a “ran-
dom Joe”. Why a stereotypical Joe renders surprisingly infelicitous remains to be
elucidated.
6.A Experimental Material
1. book — A friend’s favorite book has been published only recently and has
[0-40, 81-120, 161-200, 241-280, 321-360, 401-440,481-520, 560 or more] pages.
— [For | Compared to what you would expect for] a recently published book,
the book has [- | surprisingly | incredibly ] [few | many] pages.
2. bus — Vehicle No. 102 is a school bus which has seats for [0-4, 10-14, 20-24,
30-34, 40-44, 50-54, 60-64, 70 or more] passengers. — [For | Compared to
what you would expect for] a school bus, Vehicle No. 102 has seats for [- |
surprisingly | incredibly ] [few | many] passengers.
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3. calls — Lisa is a woman from the US who made [0-4, 10-14, 20-24, 30-34,
40-44, 50-54, 60-64, 70 or more] phone calls last week. — [For | Compared to
what you would expect for] a woman from the US, Lisa made [- | surprisingly
| incredibly ] [few | many] phone calls last week.
4. class — Erin is a first grade student in primary school. There are [0-2, 6-8,
12-14, 18-20, 24-26, 30-32, 36-38, 42 or more] children in Erin’s class. — [For
| Compared to what you would expect for] a primary school class, there are [-
| surprisingly | incredibly ] [few | many] children in Erin’s class.
5. coffee — Andy is man from the US who drank [0-1, 4-5, 8-9, 12-13, 16-17,
20-21, 24-25, 28 or more] cups of coffee last week. — [For | Compared to
what you would expect for] a man from the US, Andy drank [- | surprisingly
| incredibly ] [few | many] cups of coffee last week.
6. cook — Tony is a man from the US who cooked himself [0-3, 8-11, 16-19,
24-27, 32-35, 40-43, 48-51, 56 or more] meals at home last month. — [For
| Compared to what you would expect for] a man from the US, Tony cooked
himself [- | surprisingly | incredibly ] [few | many] meals at home last month.
7. facebook — Judith is a woman from the US who has [0-69, 140-209, 280-349,
420-489, 560-629, 700-769, 840-909, 980 or more] Facebook friends. — [For
| Compared to what you would expect for] a woman from the US, Judith has
[- | surprisingly | incredibly ] [few | many] Facebook friends.
8. friends — Lelia is a woman from the US who has [0-1, 4-5, 8-9, 12-13, 16-17,
20-21, 24-25, 28 or more] friends. — [For | Compared to what you would
expect for] a woman from the US, Lelia has [- | surprisingly | incredibly ] [few
| many] friends.
9. hair — Betty is a woman from the US who washed her hair [0-2, 6-8, 12-14,
18-20, 24-26, 30-32, 36-38, 42 or more] times last month. — [For | Compared
to what you would expect for] a woman from the US, Betty washed her hair
[- | surprisingly | incredibly ] [few | many] times last month.
10. movie — Chris is a man from the US who saw [0-2, 6-8, 12-14, 18-20, 24-26,
30-32, 36-38, 42 or more] movies last year. — [For | Compared to what you
would expect for] a man from the US, Chris saw [- | surprisingly | incredibly ]
[few | many] movies last year.
11. poem — A friend wants to read you her favorite poem which has [0-3, 8-11,
16-19, 24-27, 32-35, 40-43, 48-51, 56 or more] lines. — [For | Compared to
what you would expect for] a poem, the poem has [- | surprisingly | incredibly
] [few | many] lines.
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12. restaurants — Sarah is a woman from the US who went to [0-3, 8-11, 16-
19, 24-27, 32-35, 40-43, 48-51, 56 or more] restaurants last year. — [For |
Compared to what you would expect for] a woman from the US, Sarah went
to [- | surprisingly | incredibly ] [few | many] restaurants last year.
13. shoes — Melanie is a woman from the US who owns [0-2, 6-8, 12-14, 18-20,
24-26, 30-32, 36-38, 42 or more] pairs of shoes. — [For | Compared to what
you would expect for] a woman from the US, Melanie owns [- | surprisingly |
incredibly ] [few | many] pairs of shoes.
14. tshirts — Liam is a man from the US who has [0-2, 6-8, 12-14, 18-20, 24-26,
30-32, 36-38, 42 or more] T-shirts. — [For | Compared to what you would
expect for] a man from the US, Liam has [- | surprisingly | incredibly ] [few |
many] T-shirts.
Chapter 7
The Proportional Reading of few
and many
The previous chapters focused on the experimental investigation of the cardinal sur-
prise reading of few and many. We found evidence for Fernando and Kamp’s (1996)
theory that the quantity words comprise stable core meanings θfew and θmany, which
operate on prior expectations of the context. To determine which cardinalities count
as few or many in the respective context, the cumulative density mass of said prior
expectations is cut off at a fixed percentage θfew or θmany, deriving thresholds on
the cardinality scale. In this chapter we turn to another very prominent reading
of few and many, the proportional reading. We investigate whether the stable core
meaning hypothesis can be transferred to this reading. To do so, we briefly sum-
marize the characteristics of the proportional reading and test whether proportional
few and many are equally context-dependent, by manipulating prior expectations
in an interpretation task in Section 7.1. Minimal pairs of sentences are compared
which introduce contrasting properties. For example, the number of muffins eaten
by hungry person vs. the number of muffins eaten by a person feeling full. Comple-
menting experiments in real-world contexts are presented in Section 7.2, eliciting the
production of proportional few and many and prior expectations of the presented
contexts. By real-world contexts we refer to contexts which deal with every-day
situations and proportions, like the proportion of all muffins on the table a person
ate or the ratio of tennis matches a player lost. Whether world knowledge is all that
matters or whether the sheer size of the described proportion has to be taken into
account as well is investigated by testing few and many in an abstract urn scenario
in Section 7.3.
Experimental findings suggest that the proportional reading can both express
that a proportion is (i) numerically high and (ii) surprisingly high. Consequently,
we assume that the contextual contribution is two-fold: the first is an uninformed,
uniform belief about proportions and the second is an informed prior expectation
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about likely proportions based on world knowledge. For this reason, the computa-
tional model from the previous Chapter 5.2 does not manage to predict the data in
a satisfying way. Nevertheless, we assume that few and many have a stable core
meaning. We propose a linear combination model in Section 7.5 which incorporates
that the amount of world knowledge employed depends on its saliency in the con-
text. We are interested in whether the estimated threshold values θmany and θfew are
the same as those inferred for cardinal few and many. This could provide further
evidence for a potential lexical ambiguity between the proportional and the cardinal
reading, as discussed in Section 2.1.1. The model is evaluated in Section 7.6 before
concluding with a discussion in Section 7.7.
7.1 The Proportional Reading in Context
In Section 2.1.1, the two most prominent readings of few and many were introduced:
the cardinal and the proportional reading. Whereas the cardinal reading describes
the cardinality of a set of objects, the proportional reading describes the proportion
of a set relative to its superset. This section briefly calls to mind the key semantic
properties and presents an interpretation study from Scho¨ller and Franke (2016).
The study investigates whether the size of the proportions which count as few or
many is fixed or whether it varies with the context. If proportional few and many
turned out to express that a proportion is lower or higher than expected, a natural
next step would be to transfer the CFK semantics from the previous chapters to
this reading.
7.1.1 Proportional few and many
Since proportional few and many describe a proportion, the existence of an upper
bound on the quantity word’s scale is required for this reading to arise. This upper
bound can be implicit or it can be spelled out overtly with a partitive construction,
as exemplified below:
(126) a. Many of the 1,000 women testing the new contraceptive became preg-
nant.
b. Many Germans love bread.
(127) a. Few of Cornwall’s residents speak more than four languages.
b. Few of the 28 students passed the exam.
According to Partee (1989), sentence (126b) is true if a large proportion of the
German citizens like bread; at least k, where “[w]e may think of k either as a
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fraction between 0 and 1 or as a percentage” (Partee, 1989, 2). Truth-conditions of
“Few/Many A are B” under a proportional reading are repeated from above.
(11) Proportional reading
a. Few : |A ∩B | : |A | ≤ kmax
b. Many : |A ∩B | : |A | ≥ kmin
This simple semantics is intuitively appealing (see Chapter 2 for an extensive discus-
sion of the semantics of proportional few and many), but it leaves several questions
unanswered. How to define the size of the fraction kmin/max which determines the
use of few and many is left unspecified. Furthermore, (11) does not tell us what the
influence of the context on thresholds kmin/max is, or whether it is assumed to be a
fixed proportion. In contrast to the cardinal reading whose scale is not bounded, it
would theoretically be possible to hardwire a value for a fixed proportion kmax and
kmin in the semantics, but already the few examples in (126) suggest to dismiss this
idea as being implausible. The proportion of women needed to make (126a) true is
much lower than the proportion of Germans that are needed to make (126b) true.
Similarly, the proportion of Cornwall residents for (127a) to be true is much lower
than the proportion of students in (127b). With an interpretation experiment, we
confirm the suspicion that proportional many is dependent on expectations of the
context and that its use cannot be captured by a fixed threshold on proportions.
7.1.2 Interpretation Experiment: the Context-Dependence
of Proportional many
The objective of this interpretation experiment of sentences with proportional many
is to verify the hypothesis that also the proportional reading is influenced by ex-
pectations of the context. Furthermore, we aim to find out whether it makes a
difference to use many in the plain form (“many”) or in the partitive construction
(“many of the”) and whether the number of objects in the context influences the
interpretation.
Design A sentence introduced the context and the amount of the objects under
discussion, see (128) and (129) for sample items. Each item was randomly paired
with one of two numbers of the form [3/4N | N] (labeled as low or high number
condition below). The number in the context sentence was described by a sentence
containing either “many” or “many of the”. The sentence was randomly chosen
from two probability conditions [HP | LP], high probability or low probability.
The two conditions differed in the comparison class set in the relative clause. We set
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the comparison classes in a way that we expect higher answers in high probability
contexts. We made sure that the two relative clauses per item are a minimal pair.
Most of them differed only in contrasting adjectives. Participants were asked to
guess the number that they think “many” or “many of the” refers to.
(128) Context: There were [9|12] muffins on the kitchen table in Eds flat.
HP: Ed, who arrived feeling hungry, ate [many|many of the] muffins.
LP: Ed, who arrived feeling full, ate [many|many of the] muffins.
How [many|many of the] muffins do you think Ed ate?
(129) Context: When moving flat, Martha packed [15|20] big boxes.
HP: Martha, who is a strong woman, carried [many|many of the] boxes
herself.
LP: Martha, who is a weak woman, carried [many|many of the] boxes herself.
Question: How [many|many of the] boxes do you think Martha carried?
Participants The experiment was conducted via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and
elicited data from 160 participants. Participants who are not self-reported native
speakers of English were excluded. No participant participated more than once.
Methods & Material At the beginning of the experiment, each participant was
randomly assigned to the partitive condition [-|+ partitive]. [-partitive] means,
that every sentence was presented with plain “many”, whereas in the [+partitive]
condition “many of the” was used. Every participant saw all 16 items from Ap-
pendix 7.A.1 in a random order. The probability and the number condition were
assigned randomly. Participants could only proceed to the next item after having
entered a number into a text box. In this experiment, only many is presented. The
following experiments in this chapter, however, test few as well.
Results Figure 7.1 displays the mean proportions of N that were given as the
interpretation of many. A first visual inspection of the data suggests a difference
between LP and HP condition, which supports the hypothesis that prior expec-
tations influence interpretation of proportional many. Furthermore, the difference
between low and high probability seems to be greater in the plain condition than
when the partitive is used. Whether these differences are statistically significant will
be analyzed in the following.
At first we specified a mixed linear effects regression model predicting propor-
tional interpretations for many which included the factors probability (high or
low probability sentence), number (number in context), partitive (plain or par-
titive “many”) and a 3-way interaction as well as three 2-way interactions of these
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condition mean rating
plain & low 0.55
plain & high 0.68
partitive & low 0.58
partitive & high 0.67
Figure 7.1: Mean ratings for the interpretation of many in proportions of the total
number of objects N
three predictors. In terms of random effects, the initial model had the maximal
random effects structure as justified by the design (Bates et al., 2013). We removed
redundant random effects by running a principle component analysis and arrived at
a parsimonious model (Bates et al., 2015).
The final model included both varying intercepts for participant and item, as
well as a random participant slope for probability. In terms of the fixed effects,
only probability was included as a main effect. We found that participants gave
significantly lower ratings in the low-level condition (β = −0.128, SE = 0.013, p <
0.001). The data suggests that participants interpret many as a lower proportion
of N when it is presented in a low probability context than when many occurs in a
high probability context. We can interpret the fact that the factor probability was
identified as a main effect as evidence that the context influences the interpretation
of proportional many. This effect was modulated by an interaction of probability
with partitive (β = −0.052, SE = 0.018, p < 0.005).
The linear mixed effects regression model suggests that the comparison class has
a significant effect on the interpretation of many. This contradicts a theory which
assumes one fixed value for the proportion kmax and kmin respectively. Rather, the
semantics should comprise many ’s interaction with the context. Interestingly, nei-
ther the factor number nor the factor partitive were significant main effects. This
result leaves open the possibility of a unified semantics. Cardinal many cannot be
combined with the partitive and our results show that this construction does not
lead to a significant difference in interpretations when combined with the propor-
tional use of many. Furthermore, cardinal many ’s range is not restricted by an upper
bound. An upper bound is available for the proportional reading, but its exact nu-
meric value is not decisive. It is the size of the proportion that matters. Overall,
we see that even though an upper bound as well as the partitive construction are
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only available with the proportional reading, these two factors do not disqualify a
unified semantics.
The CFK semantics postulates a stable core meaning for cardinal few and many.
For the proportional reading, this stable core meaning cannot be a fixed proportion,
as the experimental data shows. However, we do not yet want to rule out the idea of
a fixed threshold on expectations, as proposed by Fernando and Kamp (1996). As
a next step, we examine more closely how the interpretation of proportional many
is affected by the context. To do this, we measure data from people’s prior expecta-
tions of typical cardinalities in the contexts we used and also apply a computational
model to the data. Then, we set out to test whether the CFK semantics can be
transferred to the proportional reading. This undertaking might appear straight-
forward for real-world contexts as tested in the recent experiment and in another
study presented in Section 7.2. As we have discussed in the context of the Super-
bowl experiment presented in Sections 3.3 and 5.1, the proportional reading can also
appear in very abstract contexts though. To take a look at the big picture, we also
present an experiment in which draws of colored balls from an urn are described by
proportional few and many. In this abstract context, we predict that expectations
can be manipulated in a more controlled way because they are not influenced by
participants’ probably differing world knowledge. We want to learn whether also in
such a case, in which world knowledge does not play a role, prior expectations are
sufficient to capture the use of proportional few and many or whether the actual
size of the proportion needs to be taken into account.
It turns out that the computational model from the previous chapters does not
make correct predictions and conclude that the size of the described proportion
cannot be neglected. For this reason, an extension of the CFK model is proposed in
Section 7.5, which preserves the hypothesis of a stable core meaning of few and many,
but allows for two different kinds of prior expectations: an uninformed, uniform
distribution over proportions and a distribution informed by world knowledge. By
applying this model to the data, we test whether the fixed threshold hypothesis
from Chapter 5 can be confirmed also for the proportional reading. Furthermore, it
will be interesting to see whether the same values for the threshold values θmany and
θfew apply to both kinds of prior expectations. This would provide further evidence
for the CFK semantics’ fixed threshold theory. Moreover, if the cardinal and the
proportional threshold turn out to be the same, this would speak against the much
debated lexical ambiguity hypothesis of proportional and cardinal few and many
(see Partee (1989), Krasikova (2011) and references therein).
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7.2 Experiments in Real-World Contexts
These experiments on proportional few and many in real-world contexts follow up on
the interpretation experiment reported in the previous section. The interpretation
task confirmed that prior expectations matter when proportional few or many are
produced or interpreted. In a next step, we test whether the CFK semantics can
be transferred to this reading and measure PE for both probability conditions per
item. We decided to continue with a smaller set of items and chose those items from
the previous experiment whose ratings were most sensitive to the manipulation of
the probability condition. We elicit prior expectations of the contexts and set a
judgment task to measure the production of the proportional reading. Note that in
these two follow-up experiments only one total amount per item is presented and
few and many are used in a partitive construction.
7.2.1 Elicitation of Prior Expectations
This experiment gathers data about people’s prior expectations concerning the con-
texts used in the interpretation task reported above. The obtained probability
distributions will be input to a computational model being an empirical measure of
PE, see below.
Design. We used a slider-rating task to collect data about the participants’ prior
expectations about likely world states relevant for each experimental context. Par-
ticipants saw a description of a context as in (130a), which introduced the total
quantity of objects and the probability condition, and a question as in (130b).
We again manipulated the probability condition of the context by presenting one
of two statements which influenced expectations of the context. For a high prob-
ability condition we expect higher proportional answers than in a low probability
condition. For example, we expect that a strong woman carries more boxes than
a weak woman. Depending on the quantity, we presented participants with 10, 13
or 16 slider-interval pairs and asked them to rate the likelihood of each interval
by adjusting a slider labeled from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely”. For
example, participants would adjust a slider for the probability that Martha carried
0, 1, 2, ...15 boxes. The task was the same as before (Kao et al., 2014; Franke et al.,
2016), see Section 5.4.1.
(130) Prior elicitation example
a. Background: When moving flat, Martha packed 15 big boxes. Martha
is a [strong | weak] woman.
b. Question: How many of the boxes do you think Martha carried?
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Participants. We elicited data from 160 participants with US-IP addresses via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Materials & Procedure. After having read an explanation of the task, each
participant saw all of the 10 contexts from Appendix 7.A.2 in a random order, one
after another. For each of the contexts, the probability condition was assigned
randomly. For each context, the 10, 13 or 16 intervals were presented horizontally
on the screen in ascending order from left to right. On top of each interval was a
vertical slider. Participants had to adjust or at least click on each slider before being
able to proceed (Kao et al., 2014; Franke et al., 2016).
Results. We excluded data from one participant who reported to be a native
speaker of Russian. We normalized each subject’s rating by item and condition and
then averaged each item-condition pair over all subjects, as before in Section 5.4.1.
Figure 7.2 displays the probability distributions for each item in both conditions.
7.2.2 Production Study: Judgment Task
Design. To assess production behavior of proportional few and many in real-
world contexts we presented participants with a binary judgment task. They read a
context as in (131a) which introduced the total quantity of objects, the probability
of the context condition, and a proportion of objects. The contexts differed in
the probability condition specified in the relative clause. The relative clauses
were minimal pairs and differed in most cases only in the adjective. To make the
prior expectation salient, a statement was paired with a for -phrase, see (131b).
The quantity words were included in a partitive construction (“many/few of the”)
to hint at a proportional use. Participants rated whether the statement is a good
description of the sentence by clicking on true or false.
(131) Production study example
a. Context: When moving to a new flat, Martha packed 15 boxes. Martha
is a [strong | weak] woman. She carried [1 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 14 ] of
the boxes herself.
b. Statement: For a [strong | weak] woman, Martha carried [few | many]
of the boxes herself.
c. Question: Is this statement a good description of the context? true
/ false
Participants. On Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we elicited data from 456 partici-
pants with US-IP addresses.
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Figure 7.2: Proportional many, prior expectations for both context conditions. Error
bars are estimated 95% confidence intervals.
Materials & Procedure. After reading instructions that explained the task,
participants saw each of the 10 contexts one by one. Few or many as well as
the probability condition and the proportion were assigned randomly for each
context. We presented only 7 proportions per context and hence not every number
in the interval from 0 to the total quantity (10, 13 or 16) to avoid too many
combinations. Participants had to rate each statement before being able to proceed.
Results. We excluded 9 participants for not being self-reported native speakers of
English. We calculated the proportion of true answers for each context-quantifier-
number-prior combination. The proportion of true answers per combination is
presented in Figure 7.3. The computational model’s production rule will have to
predict these data.
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Figure 7.3: Proportion of TRUE responses in real-world contexts. Black lines show
the high, gray lines the low prior condition.
For each of the quantifiers few and many we again specified a mixed linear effects
regression model predicting the percentage of true answers. During a guided search
through the model space, we started out with a model containing only the random
effect item and added fixed effects if this significantly increased the model’s fit to
the data (measured by AIC).
few. For few, the final model included the fixed effect proportion and
probability. We found that participants gave significantly lower ratings for a
higher proportion (β = −1.07, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001). The sentences were rated
significantly lower in the low probability condition (β = −0.21, SE = 0.03, p <
0.001). The factor quantity did not turn out to be significant main effect. The
regression suggests that few is used to describe numerically and surprisingly low
proportions.
many. For many, we found the same pattern in reverse. Participants gave sig-
nificantly higher ratings in the low probability condition (β = 0.23, SE = 0.03, p <
0.001) and for higher proportions (β = 1.10, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001). Many seems to
convey that a proportion is numerically and surprisingly high.
7.3. EXPERIMENTS IN ABSTRACT CONTEXTS 147
7.3 Experiments in Abstract Contexts
As pointed out above, the proportional reading of few and many does not only occur
in real-world contexts, in which the world knowledge is very salient, thereby making
Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) theory plausible. We have seen in Sections 3.3 and 5.1
that the proportional reading suggests itself in abstract contexts, too, for example
when proportions of balls in a bowl are described. We propose that in such abstract
scenarios, not only statistical information about real-world events is available, but
also abstract probabilistic beliefs about pure chance processes. The latter kind of
beliefs can be better manipulated, but subjects may have trouble to get clear about
these abstract expectations.
Data of proportional few and many is elicited in an abstract scenario in which
balls are drawn from an urn. We test whether the computational model from Sec-
tion 5.2 is able to account for the proportional reading in an abstract setting in which
the sheer size of the proportion might play a greater role than world knowledge. It
turns out that prior expectations only based on world knowledge are not sufficient
to explain the proportional reading in abstract contexts. We propose an extension
of the model in Section 7.5. In the following, a judgment task using various images
and the underlying prior expectations we assume are presented.1
7.3.1 Production Study: Judgment Task
Design. In a rating task we measured participants’ production behavior of propor-
tional few and many in an abstract context. We assume that contextual information
is represented as prior expectations about which quantities are considered typical or
normal. In order to restrict the influence of real-world knowledge and correspond-
ing opinions and personal experiences, which are hard to control, we present a very
abstract setting. A sample of the material can be found in Figure 7.4. Participants
were presented with a situation in which a character draws balls from an urn of
varying content. The character describes the draw with a statement about the pro-
portion of blue balls. The statement contained either few or many, as exemplified
in (132b). Participants were then asked to rate on a 7-point scale whether the sen-
tence is a good description of the situation, see (132d). The value 1 was labeled
“disagree”, the value 7 was labeled “agree” (see Figure 7.4).
(132) Production study example
a. Context: visual display as in Figure 7.4.
1Note that no interpretation experiment has been conducted because this task would require
an extensive display of a large number of images. We leave this experiment as a follow-up study
for future research.
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Figure 7.4: Sample item in the rating task
b. Statement: For a draw from an urn with that content, [few|many] of
the balls I drew are blue.
c. Filler: For a draw from an urn with that content, this number of
[blue|red] balls is [impossible |unexpected|surprising|expected].
d. Question: Is this statement a good description of the situation?
We manipulated the factors prior expectations, proportion, and draw. To
manipulate prior expectations, picture of the urn was presented from which the
balls were drawn. The urn’s content varied. From a total of 100 balls either [25, 50,
75 or 90] balls were blue, the rest red. Depending on the proportion of blue balls
in the urn, we hypothesize that participants expect a similar proportion of blue
balls in their draw. These prior expectations can be formalized as a draw without
replacement. This is discussed in detail in Section 7.3.2. The content of the urn was
explicitly mentioned in a for -phrase to make the prior salient.
A character draws balls from the urn. We varied the size of the draw. The
character either draws [10] or [20] balls from the urn. We investigate if the quantity
of the superset has an influence on subjects’ behavior. The outcome of the draw
is presented visually and the balls are randomly placed on the screen. The charac-
ter describes the proportion of blue balls drawn [10% to 90%] with a statement
including the quantity word few or many as in (132b).
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quantity word prior expectation draw proportion of blue balls in draw
few, many
[25, 50, 75, 90] blue balls
out of 100 balls in urn
10, 20
few : [0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7]
many : [0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9]
Table 7.1: Experimental conditions in production study
Participants. 300 subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with
US-IP addresses.
Materials & Procedure. After reading a short explanation of the task, each
subject saw 16 items, one after another in a random order. Eight of them are fillers
which draw attention to expectations, the remaining eight are target items with few
or many. The arrangement of the balls in the urn and the gender and name of
the characters were chosen randomly. All items were presented with either 10 or 20
drawn balls. For each item, one of four prior expectation conditions and a statement
were assigned randomly. The statements included either few, many or one of the
fillers impossible, unexpected, surprising and expected. The quantity words few and
many were presented four times each just as the prior expectation conditions, see
(132b) and (132c). For few we presented the proportions [0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5,
0.6, 0.7] of blue balls among the drawn balls, for many [0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9].
Participants had to click on one of the radio buttons before being able to proceed to
the next item. An overview of all experimental conditions is provided in Table 7.1.
Results. Data was excluded of 9 participants who reported not to be native speak-
ers of English. Figure 7.5 shows the mean rating of the prior-proportion pairs. We
also plot the hypothesized underlying prior distribution, as described in the next sec-
tion. Note that the scale of this graph is stretched but its shape remains unchanged.
A computational model is to account for the data from this experiment.
A first visual inspection of the mean ratings of each number-prior pair suggests
that the manipulation of the urn content makes a difference. In general, the manip-
ulation seemed to have worked out for few and many, see Figures 7.5a and 7.5b.
For each of the quantifiers few and many we specified a mixed linear effects
regression model predicting ratings for the quantified statements. During a guided
search through the model space, we started out with a model containing only the
random effect participant and added fixed effects if this significantly increased the
model’s fit to the data (measured by AIC). Possible factors which could turn out
to be a main effect are proportion of blue balls (10%-70% for few, 40%-90% for
many), prior expectations (25, 50, 75 or 90 blue balls out of 100 in the urn)
and draw (10 or 20 balls drawn from the urn).
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Figure 7.5: Mean rating of sentences with proportional few or many in the urn
scenario. Lines are the hypothesized underlying prior distributions (stretched for
presentation), bars are mean ratings of each prior-proportion pair, error bars are
estimated 95% confidence intervals.
For few, the final model included the fixed effects proportion, prior and
draw. We found that participants gave significantly lower ratings for a rising pro-
portion of balls (β = −6.80, SE = 0.34, p < 0.001). The factor draw was significant
as well (β = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p < 0.01). This suggests that proportional few is not
necessarily applicable to low numbers (see mismatch in number feature discussed in
Section 7.7) but rather to low proportions. prior expectations turned out to be
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significant, too. We found that a higher prior (say 75 or 90 blue balls in the urn)
led to higher ratings (β = 0.02, SE = 0.003, p < 0.001). This once more confirms
the idea of the surprise semantics that few applies to surprisingly low cardinalities
or proportions.
For many, the final model included the fixed effects proportion, prior, and
draw. We found that participants gave significantly higher ratings for an increasing
number of balls (β = 7.10, SE = 0.29, p < 0.001). draw did not turn out to be
significant, which suggests that in contrast to few, many applies to numbers which
count as both large quantities and large proportions. We found a significant effect
of the factor prior expectations as well. We found that a higher prior condition
led to lower ratings (β = −0.01, SE = 0.002, p < 0.001). As expected, many can
express that a cardinality is surprisingly high.
7.3.2 Prior Expectations
In order to use Bayesian inference to estimate likely threshold values, the underlying
prior expectation of the outcome of the draws is necessary. As mentioned in the
previous subsection, we chose an abstract scenario for the experiment with the goal
that the participants’ prior expectations are not influenced by real-world knowledge
or personal experiences. Consequently, we expect that there is very little variance
in the prior expectations based on which participants form their judgments. These
expectations may be formalized as a hypergeometrical probability distribution, see
below:
P (X = k) =
(
K
k
) · (N−K
n−k
)(
N
n
) (7.1)
where
(
n
k
)
=
n!
(n− k)! · k! (7.2)
The hypergeometrical distribution is introduced in stochastics using the example
of a draw from an urn without replacement, exactly what we find in the experiment
from the previous section. n balls are drawn from an urn containing N balls, K
of them blue. The distribution states the probability of having drawn k blue balls.
Let us illustrate this by calculating the probability of Alexander’s draw from Figure
7.4. Alexander drew k=5 blue balls in a draw of n=10 balls from an urn containing
K =90 blue balls and N =100 balls in total:
P (X = 5) =
(
90
5
) · (100−90
10−5
)(
100
10
) = 0.0006 (7.3)
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The probability of this outcome is 0.06%, so it is extremely unlikely to draw
only five blue balls in a draw of 10 balls when there are 90 blue balls in the urn. If
the participants make use of these prior expectations and if many expresses that a
quantity is higher than expected, then many is not a good description of Alexander’s
draw. We expect that this item receives a low rating.
Once more, the prior expectations for each possible prior-proportion combina-
tion, which are input into the computational model, are assumed to be hypergeo-
metrically distributed. Whether this is really a valid assumption is scrutinized in
Section 7.7.3.
7.3.3 Data Evaluation with Computational Model
Before we set out to analyze both data sets (real-world and abstract context) with
a computational model, we first test whether the computational model from Sec-
tion 6.4 is applicable at all. Does this model, which assumes that the production
of few and many is dependent on prior expectations informed by world knowledge,
also make good predictions for the proportional reading in abstract contexts? Note
that this model variant is a special case of the model presented in Section 5.2 be-
cause it only predicts production data and not also interpretation data. Data from
the urn scenario is tested in isolation first because we expect that this context is a
particularly hard case for the model. The size of the proportion is not taken into
account by the model, and if it manages to capture the data anyway, this can be
taken as evidence that the proportional reading is also only dependent on world
knowledge. If the model’s predictions do not match the experimental data though,
we learn that the size of the proportion might have to be included as another factor
in the computational model.
The computational production model from Section 6.4 is applied to the urn data
from Section 7.3.1 while taking the hypothesized priors from the previous section
as input. Since the rating were given on an ordinal ratings scale and not on a
binary scale as before, we used a link function to be able to predict ordinal data
from the model’s binary predictions. This link function for ordinal data is adopted
from Kruschke (2014, Chapter 23) and Franke (2016) and explained in detail in
Section 7.6. Via Bayesian inference we test which threshold values θmany and θfew
are most likely after having seen the production data of proportional few and many.
We assumed the same priors for θmany and θfew and assumed one noise parameter σi
per urn condition (25, 50, 75 or 90 blue balls in urn). The prior over σi is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0 ; 1] because it ranges over proportions this time.
P (θmany, θfew, σi) = Uniform[0;1](θmany) · Uniform[0;1](θfew) · Uniform[0;1](σi) (7.4)
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Figure 7.6: PPC of the production model from Section 6.4 applied to the urn data.
Bars are the 95% HDIs of the model’s predicted mean ratings, points are mean
ratings as measured with the judgment task in Section 7.3.1. Bars are printed in
red if the experimentally measured mean ratings do not fall into the PPC’s HDIs.
To approximate the joint posterior distribution defined in Equation (5.4), we used
MCMC sampling, as implemented in JAGS (Plummer, 2003). We collected 10,000
samples from 2 MCMC chains after a burn-in of 10,000. This ensured convergence,
as measured by Rˆ (Gelman and Rubin, 1992).
The highest density intervals predicted by the model are [0.002 , 0.003] for θfew
and [0.659 , 0.831] for θmany. For few, this model makes very implausible predictions.
If the threshold on the use of few were really this low, few could only be applied
to the lowest proportions, at most 10%. This is not what we see in the data. The
results of the judgment task visualized in Figure 7.5 show clearly that few is also
used to make reference to higher proportions. The mean correlation between the
observed data and the model’s predictions is 0.72 for few and 0.66 for many which
is lower than for the cardinal data from Section 5 (0.92 for few and 0.89 for many,
see Section 5.5). As a further sanity check of the model’s predictions, we conducted
a posterior predictive check (PPC), as introduced in Chapter 4. In each step of the
chain, we created a sample set of ratings, as predicted by the model and the sampled
parameter values. From these sampled ratings, we calculated the mean ratings and,
next, their 95% HDI. When comparing the sample mean ratings with the mean
ratings from the judgment task in Section 7.3.1, we find that the model manages to
predict 32% of the data for few correctly and 28% for many. These numbers show
clearly, that the model does not describe the experimental data well. Find the PPC’s
results visualized in Figure 7.6. The bars show the 95% HDIs of the predicted mean
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ratings, the points experimentally measured mean ratings. When the bar’s color is
red, we see that prediction and actual data do not match. Last also the model’s
fit to the data as measured by DIC = 1857.2 and pD = 62.1 is not convincing (in
contrast to a much better fit of DIC = 1347.5 with a mean posterior deviance of
28.1 by the linear combination model to the same data set, see Section 7.5).
7.4 Adapting the CFK Semantics to the Propor-
tional Reading
From the urn data reported in the previous sections and the predictions the com-
putational model from Section 5.3 makes, we conclude that a version of the CFK
semantics which makes its predictions only based on prior expectations informed by
world knowledge is not apt to account for the use of the proportional use in such an
abstract context. We propose that also the size of the described proportion needs to
be taken into account. As mentioned above, we therefore assume that the contex-
tual contribution for the proportional reading is two-fold: the first is an uninformed,
uniform distribution about proportions and the second is an informed prior belief
about likely proportions based on world knowledge. Consequently the proportional
reading can express that a proportion is numerically high or surprisingly high.
Prior expectations informed by world-knowledge have been employed in the pre-
vious chapters as the contextual input into the CFK semantics. Fernando and Kamp
(1996) formulate their expectation-based semantics also for the proportional reading
by adding the assumption of a bounded scale. The proportional surprise reading
of few and many expresses that a proportion is surprisingly high or low, see the
sentence below taken from the experimental material in Appendix 7.A.1.
(133) There were 12 muffins on the kitchen table in Ed’s flat. Ed, who arrived
feeling hungry, ate few / many of the muffins.
 Ed ate fewer/more muffins than expected.
To briefly summarize once more, the idea behind the CFK semantics is that, e.g.,
few could be taken to denote “the 25th percentile (range: 10th to 40th percentile)
on the distribution of items inferred possible in [the current] situation” (Clark, 1991,
271). The CFK semantics are repeated from above:
(77) CFK Semantics
a. JFew As are BK = 1 iff |A ∩B | ≤ xmax
where xmax = max {n ∈ N | PE(|A ∩B | ≤ n) < θfew}
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Figure 7.7: Illustration of the CFK-semantics
b. JMany As are BK = 1 iff |A ∩B | ≥ xmin
where xmin = min {n ∈ N | PE(|A ∩B | ≤ n) > θmany}
This approach explains the surprise reading of few and many in sentences like
above as a comparison between the actual proportion of muffins that the hungry Ed
ate and a probabilistic belief PE about the expected proportion of consumed muffins
in some contextually provided comparison class (say, hungry American males rele-
vantly similar to Ed). This prior belief PE is very individual and clearly dependent
on the speaker’s world knowledge, see Figure 7.7a for a sample distribution. A
probability is assigned to any natural number n in the interval [0,12], indicating
how likely the speaker thinks it is that hungry Ed ate n of the 12 muffins on the
table.
In addition to this context-dependent input, the CFK semantics proposed a
context-independent lexical meaning of few and many. A pair of fixed thresholds
θfew,E and θmany,E applies to the cumulative distribution of PE, see Figure 7.7. Fig-
ure 7.7b shows the cumulative distribution of the distribution in Figure 7.7a. If
θmany,E was fixed to, say, 0.8, then the CFK-semantics would identify kmin,E to be 6.
Accordingly, for this PE, the many-sentence in (133) would be false for any n < 6
and true for any n ≥ 6.
Figure 7.7 shows an example of a prior expectation which a speaker might have
in mind when talking about a real-world context in which she can make use of her
knowledge and experience. That proportional few and many are context-dependent
has been shown by the interpretation experiment in Section 7.1.2. We now set up a
way of making the underlying idea of the CFK semantics work for the proportional
use of the quantity words. We will propose that two kinds of prior expectations, PE
and PU are required as input. Note that this is just one possibility of adapting the
CFK semantics to the proportional reading. We explore this variant in the following.
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In contrast to the cardinal reading, the reasoning process about the use of pro-
portional few and many is not necessarily only dependent on surprise though; in
theory it can be completed without employing world knowledge. An uninformed,
flat prior expectation PU about the proportions of the total amount |A | could be
used as input2. This is not (easily) possible and usually quite implausible for the
cardinal reading where no upper bound on the interval exists. For mathematical rea-
sons, a uniform distribution on an unbounded interval is peculiar. Consequently, the
speaker cannot remain ignorant and must employ world knowledge when deciding
whether cardinal few or many are a true description of a certain cardinality.
Coming back to the proportional reading, we predict that in the abstract urn
scenario (Section 7.3), the sheer size of the proportion has a greater effect on the
production of few and many than prior expectations informed by world knowledge.
In these abstract contexts it seems natural that the contextual input is a uniform dis-
tribution about proportions of |A |. Just like the informed prior, this distribution
can be input into the CFK semantics, which determines the proportional thresh-
old kmax and kmin in exactly the same fashion. The context-independent threshold
θfew,U and θmany,U apply to the cumulative density mass of this distribution. For a
flat prior, it does mathematically not make a difference whether the threshold is
applied to distribution PU or directly to |A |, resulting in some proportion m|A | . For
a total number of 12 muffins as in example (133) and an uninformed distribution
as in Figure 7.8b, the CFK semantics would predict that few can be felicitously
used to describe cardinalities up to 4, for hypothetical threshold θfew,U of 0.35 on
the cumulative density mass. Similarly, many would apply to cardinalities 10 and
higher, if θmany,U were 0.8 (note that this cut-off point is higher for PU than for PE
even though the threshold value is 0.8 in both cases). See Figure 7.8 for an illus-
tration. Such a view on the proportional reading seems to be especially appropriate
in abstract contexts in which we cannot rely on world knowledge. But also for real-
world examples like (133) there is reason to believe that the size of the described
proportion matters. Just think of example (12) from Section 2.1.1 again, for which
Partee (1989) argued that few can never mean all.
Finally, an open issue is how the proportional and the surprise-based threshold
are combined in the proportional reading. Once more, we hypothesize that when
the proportional reading is formed, two kinds of prior expectations are available: (i)
PU expresses a context-independent, flat distribution about proportions of |A | and
(ii) PE is informed by world knowledge about likely proportions in the situation.
2Note that in contrast to PE , the prior expectations PU over proportions are uniformly dis-
tributed because mathematically there is no reason to prefer one proportion over the other; the
bare proportions are independent of expectations of the context. Contextual information comes in
in the form of N , however, because the total quantity obviously determines the cardinality which
the proportion corresponds to.
7.5. LINEAR COMBINATION MODEL 157
theta_few = 0.35
k_max
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 4 8 12
n
few
(a) Few
theta_many = 0.8
k_min
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 4 8 12
n
many
(b) Many
Figure 7.8: Illustration of a fixed threshold theory
The speaker is probably uncertain about which contextual information she should
draw on. Depending on which prior the speaker makes use of, the cut-off points
kmax and kmin can differ. This is why we suggest that the proportional reading of
few and many is best described by a linear combination of both readings. The
linear combination contains a weight parameter, a contextually free variable α. α
expresses the salience of world knowledge in the respective context. When α is high,
the speaker cannot rely on his world knowledge and forms his judgment based on the
numerical size of the proportion. When α is low, world knowledge is very salient and
the proportional reading expresses that a proportion is surprisingly high or low. This
extension is not as dramatic as it might look at first sight. The computational model
from Section 5.2 is just a special case of the linear combination model proposed in
the following with α = 0. The next section explains how the idea of integrating two
kinds of contextual contribution can be translated into a computational model.
7.5 Linear Combination Model
This section shows how the idea that the proportional reading is influenced by two
kinds of prior expectations can be turned into a probabilistic, linear combination
model of speaker production behavior.
In technical terms, the model specifies a likelihood function P (observation |
parameters) mapping values of latent parameters onto a probability of seeing a
certain behavior in a suitable experiment, parallel to Section 5.3. The latent param-
eters contained in this model are the weight parameter α and contextually stable
thresholds θmany,E, θmany,U, θfew,E and θfew,U. θmany,E and θfew,E apply to the prior
distribution PE which is based on world knowledge. θmany,U and θfew,U express the
cut-off point of the uninformed, flat prior distribution PU . By applying Bayes rule,
credible values of the latent parameters will be inferred from the data from the
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judgment tasks reported above, given the likelihood function and some prior over
latent parameters.
P (α, θmany,U, θmany,E, θfew,U, θfew,E | observation) ∝ (7.5)
P (α, θmany,U, θmany,E, θfew,U, θfew,E) · P (observation | α, θmany,U, θmany,E, θfew,U, θfew,E)
In order to test the predictions of a fixed threshold semantics which takes two
distinct prior distributions as input, we once more draw on Bayesian inference.
Our goal is to see whether a quintuplet consisting of a linear combination weight
and threshold parameters for different quantity words and readings explains the
empirical data well enough. If this is the case, it would constitute experimental
evidence for the assumption that the proportional reading is a weighted combination
of thresholds based on an uninformed and an informed prior distribution and also
that proportional few and many have a stable core meaning. Moreover, we are
interested in P (θmany,E = θmany,U | observation). If the two thresholds θmany,E and
θmany,U are the same, this would speak against a lexical ambiguity theory.
The computational model consists of two probabilistic production rules, one for
few and one for many. We focus on many in the exposition, but the case for few is
parallel. Just as for the previous model, a production rule should give the probability
PS(“many” | n,N, PU , PE) with which a speaker would produce sentence “Many of
the As are B” to describe n = |A ∩B | as a proportion of N = |A | under prior
expectations PU and PE, where PU is a flat distribution over numbers n ∈ [0, N ]
and PE captures the relevant statistical properties of the assumed comparison class.
Pspeaker(”many” | n,N, PU , PE) = α · Pspeaker,U + (1− α) · Pspeaker,E (7.6)
The idea behind (7.6) is this: a speaker reasons about using many to describe n
as a proportion of N given his prior expectations PU and PE of the situation. The
production probability Pspeaker of proportional many is then the weighted sum of the
production probability Pspeaker,U of a speaker who reasons in terms of a flat prior PU
about proportions of the total quantity N and the production probability Pspeaker,E
of a speaker whose input are his informed prior expectations PE of likely proportions
in the respective context. The weight parameter α regulates the amount of world
knowledge expressed in the respective context.
Let us now have a more detailed look at the two summands of Pspeaker. The CFK
semantics in (77) is once more translated into a production rule. The production
rule Pspeaker,E implements the surprise-based CFK semantics. Pspeaker,E(”many” |
n,N, PE; θmany,E) = 1 if n ≥ kmin,E and otherwise 0, where kmin,E is derived from
PE, as in (77b). Pspeaker,U(”many” | n,N, PU ; θmany,U) is derived in a parallel fashion
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Figure 7.9: Illustration of production rule for the example from Figures 7.7 and 7.8..
but uses θmany,U, derived from a uniform prior distribution PU . Once more, Pspeaker,U
and Pspeaker,E are smoothed-out versions of a binary production rule. Both contain
a free model parameter σ that regulates the steepness of the curve.
Pspeaker,U(”many” | n,N, PU ; θmany,U, σ) =
n∑
k=0
∫ k+0.5
k−0.5
N (y; kmin,U, σ)dy (7.7)
Illustrations of the probabilistic production rule Pspeaker,U can be found in Figure 7.9a
for the example started in Figure 7.8b.
The production rule Pspeaker,E implements the surprise-based CFK semantics as
well and applies to an informed prior distribution PE.
Pspeaker,E(”many” | n, PE; θmany,E) = 1 if n ≥ kmin,E and otherwise 0, where kmin,E is
derived from PE, based on θmany,E. θmany,E is a free parameter just like the noise pa-
rameter σ, which again controls the steepness of the smoothed-out curve. Examples
of various values for σ are presented in Figure 7.9b.
Pspeaker,E(”many” | n,N, PE; θmany,E, σ) =
n∑
k=0
∫ k+0.5
k−0.5
N (y; kmin,E, σ)dy (7.8)
Equations (7.7) and (7.8) express the following idea. For Y ∈ {U,E}, assume
that a hypothetically true value of θmany,Y exists. Then, given a total number N and
prior expectations PY over the contextually relevant domain, the CFK semantics in
(77) gives a clear cutoff for the minimum number kmin,Y of, say, muffins Ed must have
eaten to license applicability of many in a sentence like (133). We should assume
that speakers do not know for sure the actual kmin,Y that is entailed by θmany,Y
and PY , most likely because they do not know PE for certain, but that speakers
nonetheless approximate it. The same holds for N , when it is not provided by the
context. More concretely, we assume that when a speaker decides whether some n
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Figure 7.10: Linear Combination of Pspeaker,U and Pspeaker,E with σ = 2
licenses many, she “samples”, so to speak, a noise-perturbed “subjective thresholds”
from a Gaussian distribution whose mean is kmin,Y and whose standard deviation σ
is a free model parameter that captures speaker uncertainty (about θmany, N , PE,
and perhaps other things). If kmin,Y is below n, the speaker finds many applicable
to proportion n under the respective reading; otherwise, she does not.
In a next step, reasoning based on proportion and world knowledge are fused,
when the general production probability Pspeaker is derived as a linear combination
of Pspeaker,U and Pspeaker,E, as in Equation (7.6) with weight parameter α capturing
the amount of world knowledge expressed. This gives us a probabilistic prediction of
how likely a speaker would, on occasion, find many applicable to n as a probabilistic
function of θmany,U, θmany,E, PU , PE and noise parameter σ. See Figure 7.10 for an
example of a linear combination of Pspeaker,U and Pspeaker,E with several α values.
When α = 1, only the production probability of many is just Pspeaker,U and world
knowledge is not employed. For α = 0, only Pspeaker,E determines the use of many
and we see that many is also applicable to lower cardinalities. For values of α
between 0 and 1, Pspeaker,U and Pspeaker,E are combined resulting in the curves in the
middle.
7.6 Model Evaluation
After having defined a computational model which makes predictions about the
production of proportional few and many, it will be used to find out to what extent
which prior expectations, flat or informed, influence the production of proportional
few and many. Furthermore, we test whether proportional few and many comprise
a fixed threshold on prior expectations as well. We do this by testing whether a
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model which incorporates the production rule in (7.6) can explain data from two
very different contextual settings, real-world situations and abstract urn scenarios.
Is one pair of threshold values, θmany and θfew, applied to PU and PE enough to
explain the two data sets? Or is it necessary to differentiate between θmany,U and
θmany,E and between θfew,U and θfew,E? In terms of the two data sets, do the model’s
predictions only differ in the salience of world knowledge represented by α? These
questions will be addressed in the course of this section.
We want to learn about α, θmany and θfew from the observed experimental data.
To do so, we feed the total quantity N , PU and the hypothesized prior expectations
P urnEi for each number of blue balls i in the urn (see Figure 7.5) or respectively the
experimentally measured PRWEi about real-world contexts (see Figure 7.2) into the
partitive production rules in (7.7) and (7.8) which are then combined to form the
general production rule in (7.6). This gives us likelihood functions for the production
data as described presently. We only explicitly cover the case of many wherever that
for few is analogous. Note that from this point on we will differentiate between σU
and σEi . These noise parameters apply to the production rules in (7.7) and (7.8)
respectively. We do so because the parameters are assumed to be independent of each
other. Moreover, since σU expresses the standard deviation in proportions between
0 and 1 and σEi in intervals 0-14 of the respective item, their prior distributions are
different. See more below.
For the real-world data, let Opm,RWij be the number of true answers for item i
and proportion j in production experiments for many. Let Npm,RWij be the number
of participants that saw a production trial for many, item i, interval j and total
number N (see Section 7.2). O
pf ,RW
ij and N
pf ,RW
ij hold the same information for
conditions involving few. The probabilistic rules from the previous section then give
a (parameterized) likelihood function for observable data. Binomial(k, n, p) gives
the likelihood of observing k true ratings among n with probability p.
P (Opm,RWij | θmany, σU , σEi) = Binomial(Opm,RWij , Npm,RWij ,
PS(“many” | j, PU , PRWEi ; αmany, θmany, σU , σEi))
For the urn data from Section 7.3, let ~Opm,Uij be the vector of length 7 which
contains the number of times a rating d ∈ 1, ..., 7 has been selected for a proportion
j and a prior i in production experiments for many. Let Npm,Uij be the number of
participants that saw a production trial for many, proportion j and prior i. The same
information is contained in
~
O
pf ,U
ij and N
pf ,U
ij in the case of few. Multinomial(
~k, n, ~p)
gives the likelihood of observing a vector of counts k (here: ~Opm,Uij ), where kd are
the number of choices of rating d ∈ 1, ..., 7, for n (here: Npmi ) observations and ~p is
a probability vector of length 7. Remember, however, that the observations ~Opm,Uij
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are ordinal data, whereas our production rules predict binary data, namely whether
many is true or not for a certain k. Consequently, a link function needs to transform
the binary predictions of (7.6) to the multinomial distribution which predicts ratings
on a 7-point scale.
The basic concept of this link function for ordinal data is borrowed from Kruschke
(2014, Chapter 23). Each rating d is associated with an interval Id. The boundaries
of (some of) these intervals are free model parameters. Intervals for all ratings form a
partition of the range of the scale. For the choice of a certain interval Id (i.e. rating)
for a prior-proportion pair, the binary predictor Pspeaker(”many” | n,N, PU , PE)
from the previous section is perturbed by Gaussian noise with standard deviation
σ. Finally, the rating is chosen which corresponds to the interval into which the
perturbed value falls. This means that the probability pd that rating d on the rating
scale is chosen in the experiment is the probability that the Gaussian perturbation
of Pspeaker(”many” | n,N, PU , PE) lies in Id (Franke, 2016). Via this link function
we arrive at (parameterized) likelihood functions for data from the urn experiment.
P ( ~Opm,Uij | αmany, θmany, σU , σEi) =
Multinomial
(
~Opm,Uij , N
pm,U
ij ,
~Pspeakeri(“many” | j, PU , P urnEi ; αmany, θmany, σU , σEi)
)
We can make inferences about credible parameter values given the data that we
observed by applying Bayes rule, see Equation 7.9. A graphical model version can
be found in Figure 7.11.
P (αfew, αmany, θmany, θfew, σU , σEi | Opm,RWij , Opf ,RWij , ~Opm,Uij , ~Opf ,Uij ) ∝ (7.9)
P (αfew, αmany, θmany, θfew, σU , σEi) ·
P (Opm,RWij | αmany, θmany, σU , σEi) · P (Opf ,RWij | αfew, θfew, σU , σEi) ·
P ( ~Opm,Uij | αmany, θmany, σU , σEi) · P ( ~Opf ,Uij | αfew, θfew, σU , σEi)
Several remarks about Equation 7.9. Firstly, we assume here that each summand
in Equation 7.6 has its own standard deviation, σU or σEi , and that the surprise-
based one differs again for each prior condition i, but that the parameters are the
same for many and few. This is because we think that uncertainty about world
knowledge connected to PE is distinct from uncertainty about which proportion
counts as high or low independent of the context, as captured by PU . Secondly, the
formula above contains as a factor the joint prior probability P (αfew, αmany, θmany,prop,
θmany θfew, σU , σEi) of parameter values αfew, αmany, θmany, θfew, σU and σEi . Here, we
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simply assume that these parameters are independent of each other and that they
have uniform priors over a large-enough interval of a priori plausible values.
P (αfew, αmany, θmany, θfew, σU , σEi) = (7.10)
Uniform[0;1](αfew) · Uniform[0;1](αmany) · Uniform[0;1](θmany)·
Uniform[0;1](θfew) · Uniform[0;1](σU) · Uniform[0;10](σEi)
Thirdly, we allow for two distinct weight parameters αfew and αmany to discover
whether the influence of the two prior expectations is different for each of the quan-
tity words. Last, we want to learn about θmany and θfew and whether the fixed
threshold hypothesis holds also for the proportional reading. Can one pair account
for the data from the two very distinct experiments? Another interesting aspect is
a potential ambiguity between thresholds applying to PU or PE.
To address these questions, different model variants are compared regarding
their fit to the experimental data. The formula in (7.9) assumes that one pair of
threshold values θmany and θfew is sufficient. Let us call it the Uniform Threshold
Model (UTM). The UTM assumes the CFK semantics’ fixed threshold hypothesis of
one pair of context-independent threshold values, which apply equally to PU and PE.
The UTM can be compared with another model’s fit to the data, which allows for
one pair of thresholds per prior (θmany,U, θmany,E, θfew,U and θfew,E), the Ambiguous
Threshold Model (ATM). This model still assumes context-independent threshold
parameters but leaves open the possibility of an ambiguity. This ambiguity, however,
would not differentiate the cardinal from the proportional reading, but a judgment
based on world knowledge from an uninformed judgment based on the numerical size
of the proportion. If the thresholds on PU and PE converge to the same value, we
take this as evidence for fixed threshold semantics a` la Fernando and Kamp (1996).
The ATM’s posterior is defined as follows (see Figure 7.18 in Appendix 7.B for a
graphical model version):
(7.11)
P (αfew, αmany, θmany,U, θmany,E, θfew,U, θfew,E, σU , σEi | Opm,RWij , Opf ,RWij , ~Opm,Uij , ~Opf ,Uij )
∝ P (αfew, αmany, θmany,U, θmany,E, θfew,U, θfew,E, σU , σEi) ·
P (Opm,RWij | αmany, θmany,U, θmany,E, σU , σEi) · P (Opf ,RWij | αfew, θfew,U, θfew,E, σU , σEi) ·
P ( ~Opm,Uij | αmany, θmany,U, θmany,E, σU , σEi) · P ( ~Opf ,Uij | αfew, θfew,U, θfew,E, σU , σEi)
Finally, it is also imaginable that the proportional reading cannot be captured
by a stable core meaning, contradicting the CFK semantics. In such a case the
data would be explained best by a model variant which does not only allow for a
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threshold per prior distribution but also further differentiates between the data sets.
We will call this model the Individual Threshold Model (ITM) (see Figure 7.19 in
Appendix 7.B for a graphical model version).
(7.12)
P (αfew, αmany, θ
U
many,U, θ
U
few,U, θ
RW
many,U, θ
RW
few,U, θ
U
many,E, θ
U
few,E, θ
RW
many,E, θ
RW
few,E, σU , σEi
| Opm,RWij , Opf ,RWij , ~Opm,Uij , ~Opf ,Uij ) ∝
P (αfew, αmany, θ
U
many,U, θ
U
few,U, θ
RW
many,U, θ
RW
few,U, θ
U
many,E, θ
U
few,E, θ
RW
many,E, θ
RW
few,E, σU , σEi) ·
P (Opm,RWij | αmany, θRWmany,U, θRWmany,E, σU , σEi) · P (Opf ,RWij | αfew, θRWfew,U, θRWfew,E, σU , σEi) ·
P ( ~Opm,Uij | αmany, θUmany,U, θUmany,E, σU , σEi) · P ( ~Opf ,Uij | αfew, θUfew,U, θUfew,E, σU , σEi)
We see that for each model variant a higher number of free parameters needs
to be inferred. This is not theoretically motivated, rather it makes the model more
complex and is thus not desirable. We see that we are facing the same problem as in
Section 5.5, where we compared the GTM and the ITM to test the CFK semantics
for the cardinal reading.
The question we are interested in is then: which model is best suited to explain
the data? Statistical model comparison is the methodology of choice to address this
question. Different arguments for preferring one model over another make use of
different measures for model comparison (Vehtari and Ojanen, 2012). Given our
modest theoretical purposes here, we use the same approach as in Chapter 5, the
deviance information criterion (DIC) (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002; Plummer, 2008).
This measure is easy to compute based on the output of our MCMC sampling
results. The DIC weighs goodness of fit (here: the likelihood of the data given the
model “trained” on the data) against the model’s complexity (here: the number of
its effective free parameters). A high value of the DIC indicates a lot of deviance of
the model’s predictions from the data it is applied to. This is undesirable, of course.
At the same time, the model should stay as concise as possible and not include
unnecessary parameters. This is measured by the pD, the number of effective free
parameters, a measure of model complexity. Higher values of pD suggest higher
model complexity.
To approximate the joint posterior distribution defined in (7.6) and compute the
DIC, we used MCMC sampling, as implemented in JAGS (Plummer, 2003). Per
model variant, we collected 10,000 samples from 2 MCMC chains after a burn-in of
10,000. This ensured convergence, as measured by Rˆ (Gelman and Rubin, 1992).
Table 7.2 gives estimated DICs for all three model variants. Given its high DIC
value, the UTM has the worst fit to the data. The two candidates that are still in
the running, ATM and ITM, are roughly equal in their DIC. The difference is less
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UTM ATM ITM
DIC = 2879.7, pD = 42.7 DIC = 2761.7, pD = 40.6 DIC = 2751.5, pD = 53.3
Table 7.2: Estimated DIC values and effective free parameters for the three variants
of the linear combination model
αurns αreal-world θU θE
few 0.687 0.383 0.374 0.046
many 0.713 0.388 0.596 0.623
Table 7.3: Estimated posteriors for weight and threshold parameters by the Am-
biguous Thresholds Model (ATM)
than 1%. What the ATM misses in terms of goodness of fit, it makes up in terms
of reduced model complexity. Consequently, there is no clear reason to prefer either
model in terms of DICs. We follow the same line of reasoning as in Section 5.5
and interpret the result as there being no reason, provided by our data, to reject the
“null assumption” that proportional many and few have a stable core meaning. The
alternative model ITM did not do any better. Parallel to the cardinal reading, the
ITM does not allow to generalize beyond the 24 contexts used here. Put differently,
the ITM would assume that θmany would be anywhere between 0 and 1 (its prior)
for a context which was not part of the data used to condition it on. In contrast,
the ATM would be able to use its posterior distribution for θmany,U and θmany,E. The
utter lack of generalizability in ITM speaks, at least conceptually, in favor of ATM.
Whether this is an empirical advantage would have to be tested. Given the data at
hand and the fact that the ITM is obviously not better for this data set, there is
no good reason to dismiss the hypothesis that also the proportional reading has a
stable core meaning. The data suggests that single quadruplet of fixed thresholds
θmany,U, θmany,E, θfew,E and θfew,U may have generated the production data that we
have seen. The posterior credible values inferred by the ATM are presented in Table
7.3.
We find that the influence of world knowledge is different for the two data sets,
but its effect is the same for both few and many. The urn data is more influenced by
the uninformed, flat prior PU with a weight α of about 0.70. In the abstract scenario,
the participants seemed to have used few and many to express that a proportion
is numerically high or low, rather than being guided by their expectations of likely
proportions (triggered by the ratio of balls in the urn). For the real-world contexts,
we find that the influence of world knowledge rises, which corresponds to a lower α
of about 0.38.
Even though we have concluded that the ATM is the model with the best data
fit, this does not necessarily mean that its predictions describe the data well. A
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sanity check of the model’s fit to the data is a Posterior Predictive Check (PPC),
see Section 4.1. A PPC tests whether the parameter values inferred in each step
of the chain manage to predict the observed production behavior. For each set of
parameter values inferred in one step of the MCMC chains, we have the likelihood
function ~Pspeaker predict a set of sampled observations. ~O
pf ,U
sample and
~Opm,Usample are vec-
tors containing sampled counts of ratings on a 7-point scale, for the same number of
participants as in the production experiment. ~O
pf ,RW
sample and
~Opm,RWsample contain sampled
counts of true ratings. For this chain of simulated data sets, we calculated the 95%
highest density intervals (HDI) of their mean ratings for the urn data as well as the
HDIs of the real-world data by running the function HDIofMCMC.R from Kruschke
(2014). We then check which observed mean ratings fall into the predicted HDIs.
If the model estimated the latent weight and threshold parameters well, the model
should manage to predict all of the ratings we measured in the production task. For
the urn data, 96% of the observed mean ratings fall into the predicted HDIs. For
the real-world data, the model managed to correctly predict 93% of the data.
Figures 7.12 and 7.13 show the results of the PPC. The black circles are the
participants’ mean ratings in the judgment task. The error bars represent the 95%
credible intervals of the sampled data’s mean ratings per prior-proportion pair. The
error bars are printed in black when the participants’ mean ratings fall into the
credible interval. It is printed in red when the model’s predictions do not match
the participants’ ratings. The ATM model managed to predict all but two of the
mean ratings for few and many in the urn scenario correctly. Of the real-world
contexts, the model’s predictions matched 243 out of 280 conditions. Another test
of the model’s fit to the data is to calculate the distribution of correlation coefficients
between predicted data sets and observed data. For the urn data, the mean of this
distribution was 0.84, and it was 0.92 for the real-world sentences. Next, we turn to
the most credible threshold values inferred via Bayesian inference. That the ATM
turned out to fit the data well enough supports the hypothesis that few and many
have a stable core meaning. Table 7.3 presents the mean posterior distributions’
mean values. The posterior values of θmany,U and θmany,E are very close and their
HDIs overlap in [0.572 , 0.619]. When looking at these results for many, we might
wonder why the UTM’s fit to the data did not turn out better. For many, the same
threshold seems to apply to PU and PE. However, the picture looks different for
few. The posteriors’ mean values as well as their HDIs are very different: θfew,U ∈
[0.353, 0.397] and θfew,E ∈ [0.017, 0.119]. The proportional use of few cannot be
explained with one threshold value; it is necessary to differentiate between contexts
in which world knowledge is salient and contexts in which the sheer size of the
proportion is described.
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Figure 7.12: ATM’s PPCs of real-world data. Bars are the 95% HDIs of the model’s
predictions, points are mean ratings measured experimentally (see Section 7.2.2).
Bars are printed in red if the experimental data and the model’s predictions do not
coincide
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Figure 7.13: ATM’s PPC of urn data. Bars are the 95% HDIs of the model’s
predicted mean ratings, points are mean ratings measured with in Section 7.3.1.
Red bars indicate that the experimentally measured mean ratings do not fall into
the PPC’s HDIs.
7.7 Discussion
This chapter set out to identify two sources which influence the use of few and many
when describing proportions. Furthermore, it investigated whether proportional few
and many have a stable core meaning and whether this threshold is the same for
expectations based on world knowledge and for an uninformed distribution over
proportions.
7.7.1 Contextual Factors Influencing the Proportional
Reading
The results of the model comparison support the ATM and lets us conclude that the
findings for the cardinal reading in Chapter 5 transfer to the proportional reading.
We identified a stable core meaning and showed that speaker behavior is correlated
with prior expectations. For the proportional reading, the influence of world knowl-
edge differs between contexts. The urn data is more influenced by the uninformed,
flat prior with a weight α of about 0.7. In this abstract scenario, the participants
seemed to have used few and many to mainly express that a proportion is numeri-
cally high or low, rather than being guided by their expectations of likely proportions
(triggered by the ratio of balls in the urn). For the real-world contexts, world knowl-
edge is more salient. We find that its influence rises, which corresponds to a lower
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α of about 0.38. Interestingly, the salience of world knowledge has the same effect
on few and many.
To sum up, we have seen that contextual information is employed both in the
form of pure numerical information and also as world knowledge. As an additional
sanity check of this assumption, future research might set out to test even more
extreme prior distributions. So far, we have mainly presented participants with
real-world contexts with rather left-skewed priors whereas the urn scenario used
right-skewed prior distributions. Ideal candidates for scenarios for a follow-up ex-
periments are contexts from Degen et al. (2015) in which expectations vary extremely
depending on the noun in the minimal pair.
(134) a. Context: John threw 15 [ballons | cups | marbles] into a pool.
b. Question: How many of the [ballons | cups | marbles] do you think
sank?
With these extremely left- or right-skewed priors the context-dependence of α and
the influence of a uniform prior (the numerical size of the proportion) on the pro-
portional reading could be tested further. In our experiments, world knowledge was
very influential in real-world contexts, but not in abstract scenarios. With Degen
et al.’s (2015) contexts, we could check whether it is possible anyway to have the
numerical size of the proportion described take over a greater role in real-world
contexts (i.e. a high α) or whether world knowledge always holds the upper hand.
However, also other factors might play a role. In some contexts a speaker might
choose a quantity word for reasons of politeness. He also might not know the exact
cardinality of objects or, on the other side, only ”express his value judgment at
the number [of objects in question] more or less regardless of what that number is”
(Keenan and Stavi, 1986).
7.7.2 A Possible (Lexical) Ambiguity of few and many
Next, we turn to the most credible threshold values inferred via Bayesian inference.
Even though the hypothesis of a fixed threshold on prior expectations could be con-
firmed, the posterior distributions’ mean values in Table 7.3 confront us once more
with the by now familiar difference between few and many. The posterior values
of θmany,U and θmany,E are very close and their HDIs overlap in [0.572 , 0.619]. This
suggests a fixed threshold semantics for proportional many since the same threshold
seems to apply to PU and PE. For few, the picture looks different again. The poste-
riors’ mean values as well as their HDIs are very different: θfew,U ∈ [0.353, 0.397] and
θfew,E ∈ [0.017, 0.119]. The proportional use of few cannot be explained with one
threshold value so that a fixed threshold hypothesis for proportional few needs to
be questioned. A higher threshold seems to be applied when few is used to describe
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the size of a proportion than when it compares a proportion with beliefs about its
size. A reason why the lower threshold of θfew,E is not compatible with PU is that
few likes to be applied to small proportions but not necessarily to small numbers.
We conclude this from the fact that the same proportion is rated significantly higher
if it corresponds to a larger number, see Section 7.3. For low numbers, few com-
petes with alternatives like no, a few, some and number words, especially when a
plural noun used to describe a single ball results in a number mismatch. This is
why a threshold value of about 0.05 predicts too low numbers to be applicable to
PU . Since many of the prior expectations in the real-world contexts are left-skewed
(see Figure 7.2), a low threshold on the cumulative density mass can still allow for
higher numbers.
Nevertheless, the PPC and correlation scores show that the ATM makes very
good predictions. Even though the values for θfew,U and θfew,E differ, we find that the
strategy of applying a fixed threshold to a distribution representing prior expecta-
tions seems to be employed across contexts, for both few and many in cardinal and
proportional readings. The ITM, which does not require this strategy, does not fit
the data any better. The puzzling result of the incompatible threshold parameters
for proportional few could also be due to methodological issues as discussed in the
next section.
Another interesting observation is that even though there is evidence that one
value θmany from the interval [0.572 , 0.619] can explain the production of propor-
tional many, this value is lower than the cardinal threshold which is predicted to
fall into the interval [0.687 , 0.699], see Section 5.5. Several explanations are con-
ceivable. The first would be to assume a lexical ambiguity between cardinal and
proportional many, as proposed by Partee (1989) and Krasikova (2011) among oth-
ers. It is also possible, however, that the different threshold values are not due to the
two readings but due to the data sets on the basis of which these parameters were
inferred. For the proportional reading, only production data was used whereas the
model for the cardinal case made predictions for both production and interpreta-
tion. As already discussed in Section 6.7 on surprisingly, the threshold values seem
to be more “extreme” when interpretation data is involved. In interpretation tasks,
participants seem to play it safe and choose lower numbers as the interpretation of
few and higher numbers for many than they rate to be true in a production task.
This greater freedom of choice might result in different threshold values when also
interpretation data is predicted by the model. We consider both options to be plau-
sible explanations for the discrepancy between cardinal and proportional θmany. For
now, we do not want to commit to any of them since our observations are made on
the basis of very limited data sets. We propose to further investigate the difference
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between cardinal and proportional many and few by collecting more data to validate
the models’ predictions.
7.7.3 Measuring Priors in Abstract Contexts
The attentive reader might have noticed that in the urn experiment from Section 7.3
we departed from our usual procedure. Prior expectations were not measured ex-
perimentally, but we simply assumed that participants made use of the normative
hypergeometrical distribution of blue balls in the draw, see Section 7.3.2. The rea-
soning behind this decision was that we assumed that in such an abstract context
there is less variation between the individual participants’ expectations since they
are not influenced by their world knowledge. To test this we ran a follow-up study
which elicited participants’ prior expectations of the number of blue balls in a draw
from an urn of varying content.
Design. To measure participants’ prior expectations in the abstract urn scenario
from Section 7.3 and to test whether they really employ the hypergeometrical dis-
tribution we have assumed, we again used a slider-rating task (e.g., Kao et al.,
2014; Franke et al., 2016). Participants were presented with an urn which contained
100 balls. Prior expectations were manipulated by varying the content of the urn.
[25|50|75|90] of the balls were blue, the rest red. A character then drew 10 balls
from the urn. Subjects were presented with 11 slider-interval pairs, labeled from 0
to 10, and rated the likelihood that the draw contains the respective number of blue
balls, by adjusting a slider labeled from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely”.
We formulated the task in a way to make the prior salient:
(135) task: For a draw from an urn with this content, please rate how likely it is
that from the 10 balls the following numbers are blue.
Participants. 25 subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with US-
IP addresses.
Materials & Procedure. After initial instructions that explained the task, each
subject saw the four prior conditions, [25|50|75|90] blue balls of 100 balls in the urn,
rest red, one after another in a random order. We used the same images of the urns
as in the production study, see Figure 7.4. For each prior condition, the 11 intervals
were presented horizontally on the screen in ascending order from left to right. On
top of each interval was a vertical slider. Participants had to adjust or at least click
on each slider before being able to proceed.
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Figure 7.14: Measured (one black line per participant) and normative (blue line)
prior expectations in the abstract urn context..
Results. Participants’ ratings per item were normalized by subject-prior-condition.
The black lines in Figure 7.14 show the individual distributions. We can see that
they show inter-subjective variance and that they appear to differ significantly from
the normative hypergeometrical distribution printed in blue.
These results pose a serious problem to our computational modeling and Bayesian
inference approach. Prior expectations are vital input for these methods and if
this input cannot be trusted to represent participants’ beliefs, the models’ predic-
tions and the inferred parameter values cannot be used to draw conclusions about
the behavior of speakers and listeners. If we choose to use the experimental pri-
ors as input for the model, predictive success of the model decreases. The model
with experimentally measured priors has a DIC of 1378.8 with pD = 16.0, which is
higher than when the normative priors were used (DIC = 1349.0 and pD = 22.0).
Furthermore, the inferred posteriors predicted for the urn data set become very
implausible. The threshold values for few are predicted to be far too high to be
realistic, θfew,U ∈ [0.608, 0.991] and θfew,E ∈ [0.328, 0.372], whereas the threshold val-
ues for many come out too low, θmany,U ∈ [0.027, 0.495] and θmany,E ∈ [0.674, 0.742].
Additionally, also the noise parameters σE of the production rule in Equation 7.8
are extremely high with values close to 1. This means that the uncertainty about
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the thresholds kmax and kmin could be so large that the standard deviation of the
Gaussian noise spans the entire interval of proportion. The result would be a very
flat production rule, which in turn makes very imprecise predictions. Given these
dubious results, we doubt that the slider task was a reliable measure to elicit rep-
resentations of participants’ prior expectations in these abstract contexts. In the
following, we want to discuss several aspects with respect to the discrepancy be-
tween the experimentally measured and the normative priors.
A first problem might have been caused by the experimental setup of the prior
elicitation task. So far the slider task asking for likelihood judgments from Kao
et al. (2014) has produced reliable results, however, and Franke et al. (2016) showed
that using averaged normalized slider ratings for binned quantities can fairly well
approximate inferred population-level beliefs. Furthermore, Herbstritt and Franke
(2016) successfully used a slider-based task to assess the mode of beliefs in even
more complex urn scenarios and the results reported do not diverge substantially
from the hypothesized normative priors. It seems that participants are (on average)
able to form judgments about the likelihood of such abstract events.
In the present case, the puzzling results might have been influenced by other
factors. It is possible that we did not make the task clear enough, given the abstract
scenario with which participants are probably not familiar. Moreover, a test round
might have been useful to familiarize participants with the material and the task of
giving likelihood judgments, especially since the experiment was very short and a
training effect cannot have ensued. In order to test whether the unexpected results
in the previous experiment were caused by a too demanding or unclear task, we
conducted an additional study. We had subjects choose the outcome of the draw
they consider most likely as well as the range of expected numbers of blue balls
in the draw, instead of asking for likelihood judgments. We checked whether their
answers are compatible with the hypergeometrical distribution we assumed.
Design. To test a possible task-effect on the discrepancy between the probability
distributions measured with the slider-task from Kao et al. (2014) above and the
normative hypergeometrical distribution, we opted for a different, probably concep-
tually easier dependent measure. Once more, participants were presented with an
urn which contained 100 balls. We manipulated prior expectations by showing urns
of varying content. [25|50|75|90] of the balls were blue, the rest red. A character
then drew 10 balls from the urn. Subjects were asked to give three judgments: the
number of blue balls they expect the character to draw, as well as the lowest and
highest number of blue balls the character might probably draw. For each answer,
subjects chose a number between 0 and 10 by adjusting a slider on a scale (see
Figure 7.15).
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Figure 7.15: Sample item in the prior elicitation task
Participants. 50 subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with US-
IP addresses.
Materials & Procedure. Two subjects were excluded from the data analysis
because they reported not to be native speakers of English. After reading an ex-
planation, each subject was presented with the four prior conditions, [25|50|75|90]
blue balls of 100 balls in the urn, rest red, in a random order. We used the same
images of the urns as in the previous prior elicitation task. For each prior condition,
participants provided their answers by adjusting three vertical sliders on the screen,
one for the number of blue balls in the draw they consider to be most likely, and
one each for the lowest and highest number they expect. The sliders ranged from 0
to 10. We accepted only those answers in which the lowest number, the most likely
number and the highest number were identical or in ascending order. Only if an
acceptable triplet of numbers was selected, participants could proceed to the next
trial.
Results. The histogram in Figure 7.16 shows the frequency distribution of ex-
pected numbers of blue balls. The mode of the ratings coincides with the number
which the hypergeometrical distribution assigns the highest probability in all urn
conditions but one. For the urn containing 75 blue balls, the mode of the ratings is
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Figure 7.16: Frequency distribution of the expected number of blue balls in the
draw..
at seven whereas eight blue balls are most likely for a normative prior. Moreover, we
analyzed the intervals that participants considered likely outcomes of the draw. We
considered a flat distribution with equal, non-zero mass on all the numbers between
the lowest and highest expected number, assuming that the remaining numbers
are considered unlikely and therefore assigned probability 0. For example, when a
participant answered three as the lowest and seven as the highest number, all five
numbers in the interval [3, 7] were assigned probability 0.2. If the interval were [6,
9], the probability of each number in the interval would be 0.25. We then summed
up all probabilities per condition and normalized again. The resulting distributions
are presented in Figure 7.17. When comparing them to the normative hypergeomet-
rical distributions plotted as the dashed lines, we see that the difference between
the experimentally measured, average prior expectations and the normative prior is
much smaller then in the previous experiment.
We conclude that the participants in the experiment, at least on the aggregate
population-level, were able to form prior expectations about the outcome of the
draw and that these expectations are (at least on average) compatible with the
normative priors we assumed, hypergeometrical distributions. These findings are
in line with Herbstritt and Franke (2016). Nevertheless, the elicitation of prior ex-
pectations is quite a young field of study. More work is necessary to understand
the influence of the different task types on the elicitation of prior expectations as
well as the relationship between their mental representations and experimental data.
To conclude, the Bayesian analysis of the experimental data confirmed the hypoth-
esis that the use of proportional few and many is both influenced by prior beliefs
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Figure 7.17: Probabilities derived from participants’ judgments of plausible intervals
(bars) and normative hypergeometrical distribution (dashed lines) in the abstract
urn context
about likely proportions as well as the numerical size of the proportion. The salience
of world knowledge can be modeled with a linear combination of speaker probabili-
ties based on these two distributions. For many, a fixed threshold hypothesis could
be confirmed for both the cardinal and the proportional reading even though more
research needs to be conducted to draw conclusions about a potential lexical ambi-
guity. For few, the same strategy seems to be at work, applying a fixed threshold to
prior expectations. As in several other cases, however, few seems to behave differ-
ently from many and the CFK semantics can neither be confirmed nor rejected for
proportional few. As pointed out above, it is therefore worthwhile to follow up on
the presented experiments and a Bayesian analysis of the data. To avoid the problem
of normative priors or normalized, population-level priors, a follow-up experiment
could elicit a participant’s contextual expectations in a controlled lab experiment
and then have the same participant carry out a production and interpretation task
of many and few using the same contexts. This way we hope to gain further insight,
especially about a lexical ambiguity and about proportional few ’s fixed thresholds.
7.A Experimental Material: Real-World Contexts
7.A.1 Interpretation Study
1. basketball — Alex took part in a basketball competition and was allowed
9/12 shots from the three-point line. — HIGH: Alex, who is a professional
player, made many (of the) shots. — LOW: Alex, who is an amateur player,
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made many (of the) shots. — How many (of the) shots do you think Alex
made?
2. boxes — When moving to a new flat, Martha packed 15/20 boxes. — HIGH:
Martha, who is a strong woman, carried many (of the) boxes herself. — LOW:
Martha, who is a weak woman, carried many (of the) boxes herself. — How
many (of the)boxes do you think Martha carried?
3. cinema — 30/40 people attended the late-night performance in a small cin-
ema. — HIGH: At the end of the movie, which was longer than people had
expected it to be, many (of the) people had fallen asleep. — LOW: At the
end of the movie, which was shorter than people had expected it to be, many
(of the) people had fallen asleep. — How many (of the) people do you think
fell asleep?
4. math — A math teacher presented a tricky problem to the 18/24 students in
his course. — HIGH: Many (of the) students in his course, which focuses on
problem-solving strategies, could solve the problem. — LOW: Many (of the)
students in his course, which does not teach problem-solving strategies, could
solve the problem. — How many (of the) students do you think could solve
the problem?
5. memory — For a memory test 9/12 three-digit numbers were read out to
Chris. — HIGH: Chris, who has a great memory, memorized many (of the)
numbers. — LOW: Chris, who has a bad memory, memorized many (of the)
numbers. — How many (of the) numbers do you think Chris memorized?
6. muffins — There were 9/12 muffins on the kitchen table in Ed’s flat. —
HIGH: Ed, who arrived feeling hungry, ate many (of the) muffins. — LOW:
Ed, who arrived feeling full, ate many (of the) muffins. — How many (of the)
muffins do you think Ed ate?
7. raﬄe — Deborah bought 9/12 tickets in a raﬄe. — HIGH: Many (of the)
tickets bought by Deborah, who is always lucky, were winning tickets. —
LOW: Many (of the) tickets bought by Deborah, who is never lucky, were
winning tickets. — How many (of the) tickets that Deborah bought do you
think were winning tickets?
8. shoes — Melanie had to choose which among 9/12 pairs of shoes to bring on
holiday. — HIGH: Melanie, who loves fashion, packed many (of the) pairs of
shoes. — LOW: Melanie, who doesn’t care about fashion, packed many (of
the) pairs of shoes. — How many (of the) pairs of shoes do you think Melanie
packed?
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9. slats — Jimmy jumped onto grandma’s old slatted bed frame which only had
18/24 slats left. — HIGH: Jimmy, who is a fat boy, broke many (of the) slats.
— LOW: Jimmy, who is a skinny boy, broke many (of the) slats. — How
many (of the) slats do you think Jimmy broke?
10. songs — In a music quiz the beginnings of 9/12 pop songs were played. —
HIGH: Heidi, who loves pop songs, recognized many (of the) songs. — LOW:
Heidi, who hates pop songs, recognized many (of the) songs. — How many
(of the) songs do you think Heidi recognized?
11. tennis — Bruno played 12/16 tennis matches last season. — HIGH: Bruno,
who is an unathletic person, lost many (of the) matches. — LOW: Bruno,
who is a fit person, lost many (of the) matches. — How many (of the) matches
do you think Bruno lost?
12. tents — On a camping trip 15/20 tents had to be put up. — HIGH: Dave,
who loves camping, pitched many (of the) tents. — LOW: Dave, who doesn’t
like camping, pitched many (of the) tents. — How many (of the) tents do you
think Dave pitched?
13. training — A football coach named Max invited 12/16 boys to come to
practice training. — HIGH: Max, who is an easy-going coach, allowed many
(of the) boys to come back in the next week. — LOW: Max, who is a strict
coach, allowed many (of the) boys to come back in the next week. — How
many (of the) boys do you think were allowed to come back in the next week?
14. trees — Jim had 15/20 trees in his garden. — HIGH: Jim, who is a strong
man, cut down many (of the) trees. — LOW: Jim, who is a weak man, cut
down many (of the) trees. — How many (of the) trees do you think Jim cut
down?
15. vacuum cleaner — Walter is a door-to-door salesman. Yesterday he pre-
sented a vacuum cleaner in 18/24 households. — HIGH: Walter, who offered
his product at a low price, sold a vacuum cleaner to many (of the) households.
— LOW: Walter, who offered his product at a high price, sold a vacuum
cleaner to many (of the) households. — To how many (of the) households do
you think Walter sold a vacuum cleaner?
16. vouchers — Carla won 9/12 vouchers for roller coaster rides on a fair. —
HIGH: Carla, who is an adventurous person, used many (of the) vouchers. —
LOW: Carla, who is a fearful person, used many (of the) vouchers. — How
many (of the) vouchers do you think Carla used?
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7.A.2 Judgment Task
1. basketball — Alex took part in a basketball competition and was allowed 9
shots from the three-point line. Alex is a [professional |amateur] player. He
made [1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 |8] of the shots. — For a [professional |amateur] player,
Alex made [few |many] of the shots.
2. boxes — When moving to a new flat, Martha packed 15 boxes. Martha is a
[strong |weak] woman. She carried [1 |3 |5 |8 |10 |12 |14] of the boxes herself.
— For [strong |weak] woman, Martha carried [few |many] of the boxes herself.
3. math — A math teacher presented a tricky problem to the 24 students in
his course. The course [focuses on |does not teach] problem-solving strategies.
[2-3 |6-7 |10-11 |12-13 |14-15 |18-19 |22-23] of the students could solve the
problem. — For a course which [focuses on |does not teach] problem-solving
strategies, [few |many] students could solve the problem.
4. memory — For a memory test 9 three-digit numbers were read out to Chris.
Chris has a [great |bad] memory. He remembered [1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 |8] of the
numbers. — For a man with a [great |bad] memory, Chris memorized [few
|many] of the numbers.
5. muffins — There were 12 muffins on the kitchen table in Ed’s flat. Ed arrived
feeling [hungry |full]. He ate [1 |3 |5 |6 |7 |9 |11] of the muffins. — For a man
feeling [hungry |full], Ed ate [few |many] of the muffins.
6. shoes — Melanie had to choose which among 12 pairs of shoes to bring on
holiday. Melanie [loves |doesn’t care about] fashion. She packed [1 |3 |5 |6 |7
|9 |11] of the pairs of shoes. — For a woman who [loves |doesn’t care about]
fashion, Melanie packed [few |many] of the shoes.
7. songs — In a music quiz the beginnings of 9 pop songs were played. Heidi
[loves |hates] pop songs. She recognized [1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 |8] of the songs. —
For a pop song [lover |hater], Heidi recognized [few |many] of the songs.
8. tennis — Bruno played 12 tennis matches last season. Bruno is an [unathletic
|fit] person. He lost [1 |3 |5 |6 |7 |9 |11] of the matches. — For an [unathletic
|fit] person, Bruno lost [few |many] of the matches.
9. trees — Jim had 15 trees in his garden. Jim is a [strong |weak] man. He cut
down [1 |3 |5 |8 |10 |12 |14] of the trees. — For a [strong |weak] man, Jim cut
down many of the trees.
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10. vouchers — Carla won 12 vouchers for roller coaster rides on a fair. Carla is
an [adventurous |fearful] person. She used [1 |3 |5 |6 |7 |9 |11] of the vouchers.
— For a [adventurous |fearful] person, Carla used [few |many] of the vouchers.
7.A.3 Prior Elicitation Study
1. basketball — Alex took part in a basketball competition and was allowed 9
shots from the three-point line. — Alex is a [professional |amateur] player. —
How many of the shots do you think Alex made?
2. boxes — When moving to a new flat, Martha packed 15 boxes. — Martha
is a [strong |weak] woman. — How many of the boxes do you think Martha
carried?
3. math — A math teacher presented a tricky problem to the 24 students in his
course. — The course [focuses on |does not teach] problem-solving strategies.
— How many of the students do you think could solve the problem?
4. memory — For a memory test 9 three-digit numbers were read out to Chris.
— Chris has a [great |bad] memory. — How many of the numbers do you
think Chris memorized?
5. muffins — There were 12 muffins on the kitchen table in Ed’s flat. — Ed
arrived feeling [hungry |full]. — How many of the muffins do you think Ed
ate?
6. shoes — Melanie had to choose which among 12 pairs of shoes to bring on
holiday. — Melanie [loves |doesn’t care about] fashion. — How many of the
pairs of shoes do you think Melanie packed?
7. songs — In a music quiz the beginnings of 9 pop songs were played. —
Heidi [loves |hates] pop songs. — How many of the songs do you think Heidi
recognized?
8. tennis — Bruno played 12 tennis matches last season. — Bruno is an [unath-
letic |fit] person. — How many of the matches do you think Bruno lost?
9. trees — Jim had 15 trees in his garden. — Jim is a [strong |weak] man. —
How many of the trees do you think Jim cut down?
10. vouchers — Carla won 12 vouchers for roller coaster rides on a fair. — Carla
is an [adventurous |fearful] person. — How many of the vouchers do you think
Carla used?
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7.B Graphical models of the Ambiguous Thresh-
olds Model (ATM) and of the Individual Thresh-
olds Model (ITM)
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Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation set out to investigate how the context-dependent quantity words
few and many receive their meaning in context. Concretely, we tested a particular
formalization of one theory by Fernando and Kamp (1996) which makes precise pre-
dictions about how the contextual information might be integrated in the semantics.
We called it CFK semantics because it goes back to ideas from Clark (1991) and
Fernando and Kamp (1996). This theory assumes that the “surprise reading” of few
and many expresses that a number or a proportion is lower or higher than expected.
Prior expectations of the context are formalized as probability distributions PE over
cardinalities and the cardinalities which count as few or many are determined by
applying fixed, context-independent thresholds θfew and θmany to the cumulative den-
sity mass of these distributions. In other words, few and many comprise a stable
core meaning, which explains why speakers and listeners manage to successfully
communicate with these context-dependent expressions and how children can ac-
quire proficiency in their use. Even though the quantity words are assumed to have
a fixed meaning, their denotation can vary to an extreme degree because the con-
textual input, prior expectations PE, may be dramatically different depending on
the context.
Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) surprise-based semantics may seem intuitively ap-
pealing, but it is hard to test it with the standard methods of the field. The thresh-
old values θfew and θmany cannot be directly measured nor can their existence or
uniqueness be validated based on intuitions alone. For this reason, we treat them
as latent parameters in a probabilistic model of language use whose values are es-
timated based on experimental data by applying Bayesian inference. We measure
representations of prior expectations by applying recent experimental methodology
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(Kao et al., 2014; Franke et al., 2016) and conduct production and interpretation
experiments.
The cardinal surprise reading of few and many was investigated first. We showed
how Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) theory can be couched in a computational model.
The model was used to infer those values for θfew and θmany which, by taking exper-
imentally measured prior expectations as input, are most likely to have generated
the production and interpretation data we measured. To test the CFK semantics,
we compared two variants of the model. The first, the General Thresholds Model
(GTM), assumed one pair of fixed threshold values, whereas the Individual Thresh-
olds Model (ITM) allowed for an individual value per context. Given their nearly
identical fit to the data, as measured by DIC, and the fact that the ITM is not
theoretically motivated and more complex because of the higher number of free
parameters, the GTM is preferred. Consequently, the data-driven computational
modeling approach supports a cardinal surprise reading of few and many which ex-
presses that a cardinality is higher than a fixed threshold on a measure of surprise.
What is surprising is in turn dependent on the contextual contribution in the form
of prior expectations.
The existence of a cardinal surprise reading brings up another interesting topic.
Since few and many can express that a cardinality is surprisingly low or high anyway,
does it make a difference if surprise is overtly marked? To answer this question, the
quantity words were combined with the adverb surprisingly. We presented two
possible views on the influence of surprisingly. On the one hand, it could simply
function like a frame setter and mark a comparison class of expectations in respect
to which the quantity word is evaluated. If this is the case, the production of
sentences with surprisingly few/many should not be different from sentences in which
expectations are explicitly made reference to by a compared to phrase (for example,
“compared to what you would expect for a man from the US”). On the other hand,
the presence of surprisingly could have an intensifying effect on few and many, just
as Bennett and Goodman (2015) predict for the adverb incredibly. To discriminate
between the two views, we collected production data of sentences with and without
the three modifiers and applied a production model incorporating the CFK semantics
for cardinal few and many to see if the modifiers have an effect on the threshold
values.
The data from the production task was analyzed both with a linear mixed effects
regression model and the computational model, delivering conflicting and surprising
results. To start with the uncontroversial findings, there was no significant differ-
ence between ratings of sentences with unmodified quantity words and ratings of
sentences in which a compared to phrase made reference to expectations. Moreover,
their threshold values’ HDIs overlapped. We take this as support for our assumption
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that few and many ’s most salient reading is the surprise reading. When it comes
to surprisingly, though, the results are less clear. The adverb seems to intensify the
meaning of many but not of few. For many, surprisingly patterns with incredibly,
resulting in lower ratings and a higher threshold than for sentences with unmodified
few and many. For few, on the other hand, we find no difference between sentences
with unmodified few and surprisingly few. The inferred threshold’s HDI for sur-
prisingly few overlaps both with the HDIs of the thresholds for incredibly few and
unmodified few, identifying it neither as an intensifier nor contradicting this option.
That the adverb surprisingly might have a different effect on many than on few was
not expected, neither was it predicted by the semantic literature. This is not the
only time where we find a difference between few and many. An overview will be
provided below after a review of our findings for the proportional reading of the
quantity words.
The computational model used to test the CFK semantics for the cardinal reading
of few and many was extended to test whether its predictions can be transferred
to the proportional reading. We proposed this extension because an interpretation
study showed that the proportional reading is both context-dependent, excluding a
fixed threshold on proportions, and sensitive to the size of the proportion described.
From these results, we conclude that the contextual contribution for the proportional
reading is two-fold, resulting in two kinds of prior expectations. The first is an
uninformed, uniform belief about proportions PU and the second are informed prior
expectations PE about likely proportions based on world knowledge. We propose
a linear combination model which incorporates the assumption that the amount of
world knowledge employed depends on its salience in the context.
The linear combination model turned out to be a good predictor for the propor-
tional reading in both real-world contexts and in an abstract scenario in which balls
are drawn from an urn. In total, it manages to explain 95% of the data correctly.
We take this as support for the assumption of two-fold prior expectations and an
influence of the context on the saliency of world knowledge. In terms of the fixed
threshold hypothesis for many, we find that a unique threshold value applies to
both PU and PE. Nevertheless, this threshold value is lower than for the cardinal
reading and their HDIs do not overlap. However, we do not yet want to jump to
the conclusion of suggesting a lexical ambiguity between cardinal and proportional
many. For the proportional reading, the threshold values were inferred only on the
basis of production data whereas for the cardinal reading also interpretation data
were available. We find that the inclusion of interpretation data generally leads to
more extreme threshold values because of the greater range of choices in this task.
Future research could shed new light on whether the difference in threshold values
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is caused by greater uncertainty in interpretation or whether the present results are
evidence for a lexical ambiguity of many.
For few, the results are once again less coherent. Even though the influence
of world knowledge is the same as for many, the model predicts widely separated
threshold values on PU and PE. Given the fact that a unique θmany could be iden-
tified, this result for few is surprising and is in line with several other aspects in
which few and many seem to differ.
8.2 Differences between few and many
In the following, the most substantial differences between few and many are sum-
marized once more. Experimental work by Sanford et al. (1994) finds that the use
of few and many differs in terms of the referents they highlight. Many tends to
make reference to the objects in the set whose size it describes (the reference set or
refset), whereas few makes reference to the objects which are not in the described
set (but in the complement set or compset). This is exemplified in the example
repeated from Section 3.2.
(136) a. Many of the football fans went to the match. They cheered loudly when
the player scored.
b. Few of the football fans went to the match. They watched the match at
home instead.
Sanford et al.’s (1994) observation might be linked with a speculation about
the semantics of the negative member in an antonym pair. Heim (2006, 2008) and
Bu¨ring (2007a,b) wonder whether “negative adjectives” like short or cheap have
negation as part of their semantic meaning by decomposing them into their positive
counterpart and a negative operator. When transferring this idea to quantity words,
few would decompose into NEG + many, with the negative operator being scopally
mobile. Even though Heim (2006, 2008) claims that this decomposition analysis
can account for ambiguous sentences with few, the theory cannot solve the puzzle
we are facing here. The difference in referents preferred by few but not by many,
as identified by Sanford et al. (1994), goes beyond the semantics of the sentence
since we are here describing an observation at the level of contextual enrichment. A
lexicalized negative operator, however, could only have an impact on the sentence’s
asserted meaning, i.e. the description of the cardinality’s size, and therefore cannot
explain why the quantity words prefer to highlight different referents. Coming back
to the modification by surprisingly, we again do not see how the surprising results
of an intensifying effect on many but not on few could be explained by the presence
or absence of a negative operator in the semantics. This negative operator in the
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semantics of few would only have to cancel the intensifying effect of surprisingly
while leaving everything else unaffected. At this point we do not see how this could
be achieved compositionally.
A last puzzling observation concerning the difference between many and few was
made when investigating their proportional reading. For many, a unique threshold
θmany applying to both PU and PE could be identified, which might also be compat-
ible with many ’s cardinal reading. We conclude that Fernando and Kamp’s (1996)
predictions for a surprise-based semantics of many could be confirmed. For few, this
is not the case, however. In sum, a major contribution of this thesis is to provide
further evidence that many and few differ in crucial respects. To complement our
findings and to naturally progress our work, we once more suggest conducting a
more extensive experiment and eliciting prior expectations as well as production
data in a within participants design to validate our findings. We expect that the
model’s predictions might be even more reliable when using individual priors instead
of normalized, population-level expectations.
Apart from testing the CFK semantics experimentally, this dissertation provided
an overview over three semantic accounts of the quantity words. Depending on the
semantic analysis, few and many are treated as quantifiers, adjectives or seman-
tically empty degree modifiers. The key features of the three accounts and their
advantages and disadvantages are summarized in Table 2.2. Building on the alter-
native semantic account of few and many by Romero (2015, 2017), we proposed a
modification of the positive operator POS in order to formally integrate subjective
beliefs into the compositional analysis of sentences containing the quantity words.
POSsurp in (87) can account for surprise readings by introducing an intensional com-
parison class and inferring compatible prior expectations. Truth conditions are then
determined by employing a particular formalization of Fernando and Kamp’s (1996)
fixed threshold theory. This analysis was extended to be able to also capture the
surprise reading of few and many in sentences with overt focus. While developing a
semantics for POSsurp, we realized that there seems to be a gap between semantic
theory and the available empirical data, even more so when it comes to the findings
brought forward by probabilistic modeling. We made an attempt to bridge this gap
and to incorporate our empirical findings into a semantics of few and many. We are
aware, however, that more work is necessary to shed light on all the details of this
complicated undertaking and to make sure that our proposal for POSsurp makes the
right predictions also in more complex constructions and contexts.
So what have we learned about the context-dependence of few and many? We can
identify three core results: first, few and many are dependent on prior expectations
of the context. Second, a compositional analysis of few and many ’s surprise reading
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can both integrate the CFK semantics and make use of the sentence’s comparison
class to infer prior expectations. Third, a data-driven computational modeling ap-
proach in concert with Bayesian inference could support the CFK semantics for both
the cardinal and the proportional reading of many. For few, we found evidence for
a fixed threshold θfew for the cardinal reading, but further work is required to test
CFK semantics’ predictions about the proportional reading of few as well as further
aspects in which few differs from many.
8.3 Perspectives for Future Research
After having summarized this dissertation’s core findings, we want to discuss inter-
esting related phenomena and perspectives for future research. So far, the computa-
tional model based on the CFK semantics was used to test the theory’s predictions
for the cardinal and proportional reading as well as modification by adverbs like
surprisingly or incredibly and compared to constructions. But the quantity words
appear in more environments, for example in combination with negation. Further
investigation and experimentation is recommended to learn whether the model man-
ages to predict the use of not many or of not few in relation to prior expectations,
as exemplified below.
(137) a. Sarah did not go to many restaurants last year.
b. Melanie does not own few pairs of shoes.
Semantically, few and many are also often treated on par with little and much. Solt
(2009, 2015) assigns them an identical semantics, with the only difference that few
and many are associated with cardinalities whereas little and much operate on other
dimensions.
(138) a. Much land burnt during last year’s bush fire season.
b. Little food was eaten at the party.
It would be interesting to see if little and much also express surprise readings and
whether the CFK semantics can be transferred to them. Moreover, a natural next
step would be to move from the investigation of the semantics of quantity words to
their pragmatics and to extend the model to also capture the fine-grained differences
between few, many and alternative utterances like a few, several or lots of.
When introducing the linguistic background of quantity words, we listed sim-
ilarities with relative and absolute gradable adjectives like tall, expensive or full.
These words are equally context-dependent and their use is also analyzed as being
governed by threshold values in the semantics (Kennedy, 2007). Several investiga-
tions using probabilistic models assumed that gradable adjectives are dependent on
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prior expectations of the context (Franke, 2012; Qing and Franke, 2014a; Lassiter
and Goodman, 2015), suggesting the availability of surprise readings. It would be
interesting to see if the our model can identify a fixed threshold on prior expecta-
tions for gradable adjectives as well and to learn whether the CFK semantics can be
transferred to other semantics objects. Furthermore, the model’s fit to experimen-
tal data on the use of adjectives could be compared with the fit of computational
models which are based on other theories. Lassiter and Goodman’s (2015) account
suggests that threshold values are the result of pragmatic inferences whereas Qing
and Franke (2014a) try to explain why particular threshold values are evolutionarily
optimal for successful communication. These models could in turn also be applied
to the presented data on few and many. By performing a statistical model compar-
ison, the three approaches could be compared in order to gain further insight into
context-dependence.
We have pointed out at several points that the CFK semantics makes predictions
for the so-called “surprise reading” which expresses that a cardinality or proportion is
lower or higher than expected. But more readings of context-dependent expressions
have been attested, which have been claimed not to express surprise. Barker (2002)
suggests that the use of gradable adjectives like tall affects shared knowledge in a
developing discourse. He claims that a sentence like
(139) Feynman is tall.
has more uses than only to convey that Feynman’s height is higher than the con-
textual standard. Instead, a metalinguistic use of this sentence would be an answer
to a question under discussion of what counts as tall in this country. In this case,
(139) would express what the prevailing relevant standard for tallness happens to
be.
The metalinguistic use as described by Barker (2002) is also available for quantity
words. The sentence
(140) Joe ate many burgers.
is a salient answer to the question under discussion of which numbers of consumed
burgers count as many. In this case, the listener knows the number n of consumed
burgers, and the prior expectations are formed about likely threshold values of which
numbers of consumed burgers count as many. This example can be related to our
discussion in Section 2.4 on the inference of the quantity word’s interpretation n and
the epistemic state underlying the prior expectations PE. In the uses of few and
many discussed during this dissertation, the quantity words are used to describe a
cardinality. There, the listener makes use of his knowledge of PE and the threshold
values θfew and θmany to learn about the actual degree n. When confronted with
the metalinguistic use, a listener would employ his knowledge n to jointly infer
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the prevailing relevant standard xmin and PE. Sentence (140) would then trigger a
context update and restrict the set of possible standard values to those which are
lower than the number of burgers eaten by Joe, similar to the interpretation rule
in Equation 5.3 and illustrated in Figure 5.4b. How exactly the CFK semantics for
few and many could be combined with Barker’s (2002) dynamic update semantics
for the metalinguistic use would be an interesting area of future research.
Another example that might be claimed to not express a surprise reading was
given by Fernando and Kamp (1996).
(141) As expected, many students arrived today.
(141) could be claimed to be paradoxical under a reading of many which describes
a number as greater than expected. However, Fernando and Kamp (1996) resolve
the contradiction by arguing that “the expectation underlying many above might
concern arrivals on days other than, or in addition, to today ; the expectation referred
to in as expected pertains specifically to today” (Fernando and Kamp, 1996, 65). This
example shows that more readings than expected at first sight can be accounted for
with the CFK semantics.
Even though the assumption of having prior expectations represent the con-
textual contribution produced good results for few and many, we have seen that
forming expectations can be much more difficult in some contexts than in others. In
real-world contexts as in the experiments in Sections 5.4 and 7.2, participants’ ex-
pectations did not vary a lot, but in abstract contexts as in Section 7.3, participants’
judgments were more diverse and some contrasted strongly with the mathematical,
normative prior (see Figure 7.14). The effect of great uncertainty about the context
on context-dependent expressions and the more psychological question of how prior
expectations are formed and can be measured under uncertainty is another aspect
worth investigating, I believe.
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